US embassy cable - 03ANKARA5930

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005930 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, MOPS, MARR, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKISH ENVOY KARAOSMANOGLU SHARES 
IMPRESSIONS FROM 3 WEEKS IN IRAQ - MIXED MESSAGES FROM 
IRAQIS - NO DOUBT TURKISH TROOPS WOULD BE ATTACKED, US 
TROOPS IMPRESSIVE 
 
 
Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch.  Reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
 
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Summary 
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1. (S) DCM met Sept. 17 with Turkish MFA Envoy Karaosmanoglu, 
who spent three weeks in Iraqi in August/Sept. on a fact 
finding mission to help the GOT determine whether to support 
a Turkish troop contribution to a stabilization force in 
Iraq.  Karaosmanoglu said most Iraqis he met were opposed to 
occupation forces in public and receptive to the idea of 
Turkish troops in private.  Karaosmaoglu believes that no 
matter where and under what mantle the Turks deploy in Iraq, 
they would be shot at, leading to tensions between Turkey and 
Iraq, and possibly between Turkey and the US.  Despite that, 
he said he believed Turkey should send troops, but to a 
sector far from Kurds, Turkmen and Iranians and one with a 
low level of violence.  He noted that he had not been asked 
to recommend whether or where Turkish troops should deploy 
and cautioned that he was regarded as a bete noire on Iraq 
within the MFA.  He had a number of suggestions for the 
coalition (whose troops he praised as extremely professional 
and proper) and CPA, including that they give Iraqis more 
ownership of the situation, employ more Iraqis, intensify the 
coordination between the military and CPA, and emphasize the 
coming restoration of full sovereignty and the inviolability 
of Iraq's borders.  He warned against excluding tribal 
leaders from Iraq's new structures and urged the CPA to find 
a way to incorporate Ayatollah Sistani and his supporters. 
End Summary. 
 
 
2. (U) DCM called on MFA envoy Amb. Karaosmanoglu Sept. 17 
for a readout of his recent three-week fact-finding mission 
to Iraq.    Karaosmanoglu expressed his gratitude to CPA and 
CJTF-7 authorities in Baghdad, especially Amb. Bremer and LTG 
Sanchez.  He asked that we convey his "heartfelt appreciation 
for the assistance and the welcome" extended to him and his 
delegation.  Karaosmanoglu also said he was struck by the 
discipline and professionalism of US forces. 
 
 
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Sistani is One Key to Iraq 
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3. (C) Karaosmanoglu told us he had met more than 100 people 
in 25 meetings during his trip, including some who may have 
been involved in acts of resistance against the coalition. 
He met with a variety of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, 
Sunni, and Shia, mostly in Baghdad, but also in Samarra and 
Najaf.  He also met with Governing Council member Ahmed 
Chalabi and with Ayatollah Sistani. Karaosmanoglu said he 
spoke at length with Sistani's son and advisor, Mohammed Reza 
Sistani, who told Karaosmanoglu that he did not want a 
secular or an Islamic state, "not like France, but more like 
a "religious" US."  Sistani strongly supported the unity of 
Iraq.  Karaosmanoglu said he could not overstate the 
importance of incorporating Sistani into coalition efforts to 
get Iraq back on its feet. 
 
 
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Even if Welcomed, Turkish Troops Will Get Attacked 
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4. (S) Turning to the question of how Turkish troops might be 
received (a key point in the GOT's analysis about whether to 
send Turkish troops), Karaosmanoglu said that some Iraqi 
interlocutors who claimed in  group meetings to oppose the 
presence of foreign troops, in private were receptive to the 
idea of a Turkish troop contribution, provided the Turks came 
as peacekeepers, not occupiers, and preferably under a UN 
mandate and not as part of a US force.  Karaosmanoglu claimed 
that 95-98 percent of the Iraqis he met were receptive to the 
idea of Turkish troops, including non-KDP and non-PUK Kurds. 
 
 
5. (S) Karaosmanoglu told us he had come to the conclusion 
that even if Turkish troops were widely welcomed, they would 
be attacked by someone, somewhere.  Inevitable Turkish 
casualties would then lead to tensions between Turkey and the 
Iraqi people, and perhaps between Turkey and the US. 
However, if Turkey decided not to send troops, it would be at 
odds with US.  Whether Turkey decides to send troops or not, 
any US failure in Iraq would become Turkey's failure, he 
said.  The DCM replied that if Turkey decided not to send 
troops, it would be letting others determine Turkey's risks. 
Karaosmanoglu then said that he had not been asked for a 
recommendation on this, but if asked he would support a 
Turkish deployment, but to the right sector - not near Kurds 
or Turkmen or Iranians - where there is the least violence. 
He also said any Turkish deployment should try to learn from 
the coalition forces mistakes (especially regarding issues of 
cultural sensitivity).  If Turkey were to send troops and 
experience failure in Iraq, he said, it would be a disaster 
for the GOT. 
 
 
6. (S) Karaosmanoglu said his delegation noticed there were 
Iranians all over, including some who reportedly  tailed the 
Turkish delegation.  He reported that Ba'ath activists he met 
said that they did not have a single leader to unite them. 
Karaosmanoglu said that it was a mistake to consider all 
Ba'athists bad guys, though some no doubt were.  He said much 
of Iraq's mischief was being made by Wahabbists, including 
non-Iraqis.  Most Iraqis Karaosmanoglu met, he said, were not 
anti-US, although many were opposed to the US Administration. 
 He urged that the US take measure to retain the support of 
Iraq's secular, western-oriented society.  If we failed to do 
so, it would be a disaster, he said.  In this regard, CIMIC 
activity was critical. 
 
 
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Iraqis Fear Civil War, Partition 
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7. (C)  Karaosmanoglu, who had also visited Iraq in May, said 
there was more of a war atmosphere during his August/Sept. 
trip (note: in May he was mostly in the more stable north, 
while this time he was mainly in Baghdad).  However, he noted 
that some improvements were readily apparent, especially the 
visible presence of Iraqi police.  He said that in his 
conversations with Iraqis, they told him they felt the 
situation was on a razor's edge, and could lead to either 
civil war or partition.  There was a great contradiction in 
the average position between rejection of occupation and 
recognition that coalition forces were needed to prevent 
chaos.  Tribal chiefs he met said they did not think that US 
troops would survive the Iraqi summer.  When they did, the 
chiefs were surprised and admired the Americans' tenacity. 
 
 
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Karaosmanoglu Suggestions for CPA/CJTF-7 
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8. (C) Karaosmanoglu had a number of suggestions for CPA and 
CJTF-7 based on his observations.  He said that the CPA 
should employ more Iraqis, including hiring ex-generals who 
had been dissidents and giving them positions of authority. 
He recommended that the CPA make more of an effort to give 
Iraqis ownership of the situation.  He advocated developing 
regional CBMs to build bonds across borders with Arab 
neighbors whom the Iraqis view with great suspicion.  He 
stressed the importance of accommodating the tribal system 
and enfranchising the tribes in the new Iraq.  He opined that 
there was a need for more military-CPA coordination.  He 
suggested that the US start a sister-city/school twinning 
program with cities and schools in Iraq.  Finally, he noted 
(reflecting the national Turkish preoccupation with Iraq) 
that the Iraqis' main concern was partition.  He said we 
should counter that concern by emphasizing the path to full 
sovereignty and the non-violability of Iraqi borders. 
 
 
9. Comment: Karaosmanoglu is thoughtful, pragmatic and 
cautiously optimistic.  He advocates a Turkish approach to 
Iraq that gets away from the past obsession with the north, 
the possibility of a Kurdish state and the KDP and PUK. 
Perhaps for these reasons, he is viewed by others at the MFA 
with some skepticism.  By his own account, he was not asked 
for his views on whether or not Turkish troops should deploy 
to Iraq, and doubts he will be asked to remain involved in 
Iraqi affairs at the MFA. 
 
 
10. (U) Baghdad Minimize Considered. 
EDELMAN