US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1631

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001631 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPT FOR SA, SA/INS, PM 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
SECDEF FOR OSD:  CLILIENFELD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  09-19-13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, PARM, CE, IS 
SUBJECT:  Sri Lanka:  Untangling the confusion over the 
Bushmaster cannons matter 
 
Refs:  Colombo 1529, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In this message, Mission provides a 
brief overview of the status of the possible FMS 
procurement of Bushmaster cannons for the GSL. 
Suggested next steps for Washington to review with 
visiting Minister Moragoda and Ambassador Subasinghe are 
discussed.  Mission would appreciate any additional 
information from Washington on this matter.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) POSSIBLE FMS PROCUREMENT:  In light of Minister 
Moragoda's upcoming visit to Washington, Mission wants 
to provide a brief overview of the proposed FMS 
procurement of Bushmaster cannons for the Sri Lankan 
Navy (SLN) and review possible next steps.  As flagged 
in Reftel, the possible FMS procurement has been 
controversial in Sri Lanka, with the Prime Minister and 
others in the GSL, including Moragoda, strongly 
supporting it.  SLN Commander Admiral Daya Sandagiri, 
however, has been fighting a rearguard action against it 
(see Paras 3-5).  This debate has gone on amid public 
charges and counter-charges over specification issues, 
and insinuations that the SLN is exploring other options 
for corrupt reasons.  In a September 17 telephone call 
with the Ambassador, Sri Lankan Ambassador to the U.S. 
Devinda Subasinghe seemed confused about the whole 
matter and we think it is important that the U.S. have 
its ducks in a row before Moragoda arrives. 
 
3.  (C) KEY FACTS:  In our estimation, pertinent facts 
regarding this matter follow: 
 
-- The November 2002 PACOM Defense Assessment of the Sri 
Lankan military recommended that SLN fast attack craft 
(FAC) be outfitted with 30mm cannons to upgrade the 
existing 23mm cannons.  This upgrade would assist SLN 
efforts to interdict and deter Sea Tiger resupply 
efforts.  The GSL agreed with the recommendation, 
settling on the U.S.-made Bushmaster cannon as an 
option.  DoD proceeded to look into possible procurement 
under FMS and determined that the Mark 46 weapons system 
(which includes a Bushmaster cannon) might be 
appropriate. 
 
-- The SLN, however, announced in June 2003 that it 
thought that the Mark 46 weapons system was too heavy 
for its 30 FAC.  There had been no/no definitive 
determination by DoD that this was the case, however. 
As mentioned in an August 18 letter from the USN IPO to 
the Sri Lankan DATT, the U.S. indicated that it would be 
willing to do a technical feasibility study to determine 
if the Mark 46 could be modified to fit the FAC, but 
that "this would require funding."  We are not aware of 
a SLN response to this letter. 
 
-- In the meantime, the SLN has looked into other 
options, including a possible commercial sale involving 
a Mark 44 weapons system (Bushmaster cannons and a 
"Typhoon" mount) sponsored through the Israeli company 
Rafael.  DoD has informed the SLN, however, that the 
U.S. could not/not provide this system as a FMS 
procurement, as the Mark 44 is not a proven system. 
 
-- The SLN's preferred solution, and one endorsed by the 
Ministry of Defense, is to buy an Israeli system based 
on the Oerlikon gun for all 30 FAC's. 
 
-- SLN Commander Sandagiri stated in a September 14 
newspaper interview that his preferred option was the 
Oerlikon system, but that he was being pressured by the 
PM to buy 15 Oerlikon systems and 15 from the U.S. for 
"political" reasons. 
 
-- In his September 17 conversation with the Ambassador, 
Subasinghe added that he was looking at other possible 
weapons systems (other than the Mark 46 or Mark 44). 
Subasinghe also stated that the U.S. had agreed with the 
SLN that the Mark 46 system was too heavy.  To our 
knowledge, that is not the case. 
4.  (C) FURTHER BACKGROUND:  Regarding some of the other 
dynamics swirling around this matter, Mission is not 
certain why the SLN seems so opposed to a FMS 
procurement of the Mark 46.  It is possible that it 
honestly believes that the Mark 46 would not meet SLN 
needs because it is too heavy.  It could also be because 
the SLN does not want to start a FMS relationship with 
the U.S.  At the same time, as mentioned above, there 
are many rumors floating around that the SLN is on the 
take and believes that it can siphon funds from a 
possible Rafael-arranged sale, but not from a FMS 
procurement. 
 
5.  (C) As for the GSL, we believe that the PM and 
Moragoda strongly want to establish a FMS relationship 
with the U.S. involving lethal weapons such as the 
Bushmaster cannon.  At this point, especially given all 
of the contentious, politically tinged press coverage, 
we believe that the government feels it has a lot 
invested in obtaining a FMS procurement involving a U.S. 
system.  Sandagiri is known to be very close to 
President Kumaratunga and, for the GSL, the issue of the 
Bushmaster cannons has become linked with chronic 
cohabitation strains between the PM and the president. 
In the PM's view, giving in on the FMS procurement would 
make him look weak and give a victory to its political 
opponents. 
 
6.  (C) NEXT STEPS:  During his meetings in Washington, 
Moragoda will almost certainly raise this issue.  We 
should make clear that we understand that the underlying 
issues involved are technical and complex, but stress 
that the U.S. wants to assist the GSL in coming to the 
best decision on how to proceed.  (We should also make 
clear that the U.S. has never expressed agreement with 
the SLN view that the Bushmasters are too heavy if in 
fact that is true.)  We suggest that the following 
options be considered for discussion: 
 
-- If the GSL wants to proceed with the possible FMS 
procurement of the Mark 46 weapons system, it should 
request that DoD send a team to assess the technical 
feasibility of the system.  The question of who would 
fund this assessment would need to be reviewed.  The GSL 
should also understand that this assessment might 
indicate that the proposed procurement is not practical. 
 
-- If the GSL wants to proceed with the possible 
commercial procurement of the Mark 44 weapons system, it 
is free to do so.  The U.S. would be happy to discuss 
commercial options with the GSL and we would recommend 
purchasing a U.S.-made product (like the Bushmaster 
cannon), if at all possible. 
 
-- If neither the Mark 46 or Mark 44 are technically 
feasible, the GSL should feel free to proceed with any 
other option. 
 
We should also offer Moragoda and other GSL officials 
follow-up meetings that would provide additional detail 
and help clear up any lingering confusion over this 
matter.  In the meantime, Mission would appreciate any 
additional information from Washington. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  There are at least two sets of related 
issues here.  The first are technical:  the suitability 
for the FAC's of the Bushmaster cannon and its 
capabilities compared to other available systems such as 
those offered by Israel.  There also may be cost issues 
here.  We at Post are not competent to judge the 
technical issues.  Some, such as the suitability issue, 
are probably not resolvable without further study. 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT (Continued):  The second set comprises 
political issues.  The PM and Moragoda are not experts 
on weapons systems; their desire for the Bushmaster 
seems driven at least as much by their political desire 
to have an FMS relationship with the U.S. on a lethal 
item as by any technical considerations.  Cohabitation 
stresses with the president are clearly weighing on the 
PM and allowing Sandagiri to dictate weapons purchases 
would be seen as a political defeat for the PM.  From 
our perspective, it would be best to:  (1) Resolve the 
technical issues in a definitive manner so that (2) the 
GSL can decide definitively how it wishes to move 
forward.  From our perspective, while there is political 
value for us in an FMS relationship with the GSL, it is 
not an overriding imperative.  However, to the PM and 
his supporters this matter has significant political 
resonance domestically.  We should therefore be as 
helpful as possible in facilitating and possibly funding 
the study to determine whether the Mark 46 is feasible. 
It would make no sense for anyone to expend significant 
political capital if the system is technically not 
feasible.  END COMMENT. 
 
9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD