US embassy cable - 03SANAA2335

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MAKING THE MONEY WORK IN YEMEN; ON-GOING SUPPORT FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

Identifier: 03SANAA2335
Wikileaks: View 03SANAA2335 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2003-09-17 13:18:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PINR POLM YM COUNTER TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SANAA 002335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR PM A/S BLOOMFIELD FROM AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2013 
TAGS: PINR, POLM, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: MAKING THE MONEY WORK IN YEMEN; ON-GOING SUPPORT 
FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d). 
 
1. (u) This is an action request.  See paragraph 6. 
 
2. (s/nf) Summary/comment:  We need to stay engaged with the 
Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) to ensure that Yemen 
continues to support U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.  In 
order to be successful, we must both continue current levels 
of assistance -- both for security and for economic 
development -- and find ways to sustain and expand the 
programs we have created.  In 2003, the ROYG publicly 
designated their Ministry of Interior's Central Security 
Force (CSF), the National Counter-terrorist (CT) Force of 
Yemen.  This was due in large part to the specialized 
training the unit received  from U.S. and U.K. military 
personnel.  In the short while since the unit's designation 
as Yemen's National CT Force, they have conducted several 
successful CT operations.  However, sources of funding for 
this unit are severely limited.  We need to stay engaged with 
the ROYG, and the CSF in particular, to ensure that Yemen 
continues to take aggressive action against terrorism and 
does not revert to being a haven for extremists or 
terrorists.  If the U.S. expects the ROYG to be a useful 
partner in CT matters, a solution for sustainable funding 
will have to be found.  End summary/comment. 
 
3. (s/nf) Training and materiel support for the Central 
Security Force 
(CSF) is the cornerstone of our CT engagement in Yemen.  The 
CSF's 
participation and outstanding performance in a July 2003 
operation in Abyan to defeat terrorists who had attacked a 
ROYG medical convoy the previous month is an obvious example 
of the benefits of providing this training.  Elements of the 
Ministry of Defense along with Ministry of Interior 
U.S.-trained CSF soldiers killed or arrested the terrorists, 
who were holed up in caves.  In April 2003, this 50-member 
unit also captured Hamza Majali and Fawaz Al-Rabii AKA 
Furqan.  Furqan was a designated USCENTCOM High Value Target 
(HVT).  The CSF are training hard and operating aggressively 
against terrorism in Yemen.  They represent our most notable 
success in getting the ROYG to take action and we currently 
do not have a reliable, long-term solution for funding 
engagement with this unit. 
 
4. (s/nf) Military offices at Post have utilized a variety of 
sources to fund training the CSF to date.  The training 
conducted in FY 2003 was funded using Title 10, Commander's 
Initiative Funds (CIF).  These funds were authorized by the 
Joint Staff but are not allowed to be used on the same 
project two years in a row.  Fortunately, USCENTCOM recently 
received some FY 2003 CT Supplemental funds and has agreed to 
cover the costs of training the CSF throughout FY 2004 using 
these funds.  However, CIF and CT Supplemental funds are 
neither reliable nor sufficient to maintain long-term, 
productive engagement with the CSF. 
 
5. (s/nf) Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and/or International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) monies would appear to 
be possible long-term solutions, but there are legislative 
constraints against using FMF or IMET funds for training 
outside the control of a country's Ministry of Defense.  This 
issue was brought to the attention of Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence (SSCI) Staffer Randy Bookout and General 
Counsel Richard Douglas when they visited Sana'a in August. 
Bookout and Douglas suggested the possibility of a 
legislative fix to expand the scope of permissible uses for 
FMF funding and promised their support for a solution in 
Washington. 
 
6. (s/nf)  Action request:  I would like to request your 
assistance resolving this issue and identifying an on-going 
source of funding for sustaining U.S.-Yemen military 
cooperation with the CSF. 
HULL 

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