US embassy cable - 03LAGOS1940

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NIGERIA: MILITARY BUILD-UP KEEPS WARRI QUIET

Identifier: 03LAGOS1940
Wikileaks: View 03LAGOS1940 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Consulate Lagos
Created: 2003-09-16 12:16:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Tags: PINS EPET PGOV ASEC PHUM NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001940 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2013 
TAGS: PINS, EPET, PGOV, ASEC, PHUM, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MILITARY BUILD-UP KEEPS WARRI QUIET 
 
REF: A. LAGOS 1866 
     B. ABUJA NI 1594 
     C. ABUJA 1379 
     D. ABUJA 1333 
     E. ABUJA 1354 
     F. ABUJA 1411 
 
 
Classified By: RHINSON-JONES FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
 
1. (SBU) The town of Warri has remained mostly calm over the 
last two weeks as the Nigerian military and mobile police 
(known as MOPOL) continue to build a presence in the area. 
Over the weekend of September 6th, oil service contractors in 
Warri and a Shell spokesperson told Econoff that in reaction 
to widespread rumors of an imminent Itsekiri attack against 
Ijaws (ref A), GON troops patrolled and "paraded" through the 
city in major shows of force that appeared to keep the peace. 
On September 15, a Shell security specialist in Warri told 
Econoff that the military is continuing such exercises day 
and night. 
 
 
-------------- 
POLITICAL PATH 
-------------- 
 
 
2. (SBU) Some Ijaw leaders have recently publicly announced 
their support for a plan proposed by Delta State Governor 
James Ibori to find a "political solution" to the ongoing 
ethnic clashes in Warri and throughout the riverine area of 
the Niger Delta.  Ibori has asked the State Assembly to 
create additional Local Government Areas (LGA) in Warri to 
even the ethnic balance for government representation, which 
currently favors the Itsekiri.  Disagreement over whether 
(and how) to redraw the boundaries of political zones in 
Warri served as a catalyst for the violence in March which 
ultimately shut down 40 percent of Nigeria's crude oil 
production.  This effort may prove futile, even if supported 
in Warri, since the federal government has floated a plan to 
do away with the current local government structure 
altogether. 
 
 
3. (U) But even while some Ijaw support the Governor's 
attempts to find a political solution to the ethnic clashes, 
there are news reports that unidentified Ijaw youth kidnapped 
six Yoruba people from Warri.  Other reports surfaced on 
September 10 that militant Ijaw have given all Yorubas seven 
days to leave Warri, but the threat was publicly denied by an 
Ijaw activist in Lagos.  The targeting of Yoruba by Ijaw, if 
true, appears to reflect accusations attributed to Ijaw Chief 
E.K. Clark that the Yoruba-based vigilante organization, Odua 
People's Congress (OPC), sponsored the Itsekiri in recent 
bloody clashes against the Ijaw. 
 
 
---------------------- 
THE MILITARY DIMENSION 
---------------------- 
 
 
4. (C/NF) The GON's deployment of troops and assets appears 
to have reached a level that maintains order and a fragile 
peace in Warri for the time being.  Embassy DATT has 
corroborated his estimate that troop strength in the Warri 
area is now near 4000.  In his view, the Nigerian military is 
making a significant commitment to the joint task force 
mission Operation Restore Hope in the Delta swamps. 
 
 
5. (C) The most important indication of a more muscular 
military posture to come are the many reports of significant 
oil company assistance to the Nigerian military to purchase 
helicopters, boats and other equipment for use in the Delta 
(refs B,C).  It will not arrive overnight, and will not 
necessarily be used well when it gets there, but the 
militants will see the mailed fist, and the threat of its use 
may be an effective deterrent.  If the military uses the 
ramped-up presence in an offensive (refs D,E,F), it could 
succeed in taking the militants down a few notches, or the 
engagement could prove an embarrassing disaster like the 
setback in March 2003. 
 
 
6. (C) COMMENT. We may be entering a significant yet not 
altogether predictable period in the Delta.  Political 
overtures by government officials and by leaders of the 
ethnic factions themselves may continue to forestall a return 
to major bloodshed, but results are far from certain. 
Furthermore, it is not clear to observers of the Nigerian 
military that the augmented armed forces can sustain 
themselves in the Delta indefinitely, even with oil company 
funding. If this proves to be the case, we may see a return 
to spotty or ineffective military operations in the mid-term, 
with a possible unraveling of whatever political progress may 
have been made in the interim.  And of course, the ethnic 
factions themselves have rarely proved predictable, and may 
simply launch attacks on each other without warning.  END 
COMMENT. 
HINSON-JONES 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04