US embassy cable - 03ANKARA5848

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COULD AN ELECTION-RELATED COURT CASE CUT AK PARTY'S MAJORITY AND BOUNCE P.M. ERDOGAN?

Identifier: 03ANKARA5848
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA5848 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-09-16 06:34:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PHUM PINS TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

160634Z Sep 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005848 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2008 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, TU 
SUBJECT: COULD AN ELECTION-RELATED COURT CASE CUT AK 
PARTY'S MAJORITY AND BOUNCE P.M. ERDOGAN? 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Supreme Appeals Court's likely confirmation 
of the sentence in an election fraud case against pro-Kurdish 
DEHAP raises the question whether High Election Board (YSK) 
will subsequently reallocate seats in Parliament, reducing 
AK's political dominance and enabling right-of-center DYP to 
enter as the third party in the legislature.  Some speculate 
that YSK might also annul the March 2003 re-run of the 
election in Siirt province which gave Erdogan the Prime 
Ministry, thus stripping him of his position.  Acting YSK 
chairman and other experts tell us reallocation and annulment 
are highly unlikely.  Other sources disagree.  AK contacts 
are mixed on whether AK would immediately call for early 
elections in such a case; political observers say a snap 
election under such circumstances would give AK an even 
greater majority.  In any event the case is distracting 
Erdogan.  End Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Two Options in Case of Conviction 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
2. (U) Sept. 29 (postponed from Sept. 11) Turkish Supreme 
Appeals Court will begin review of a lower court ruling 
convicting pro-Kurdish DEHAP officials of falsifying 
documents required for participation in the Nov. 2002 
national elections.  Turkish political parties are required 
to organize in half the country's provinces, 41 of 81, by six 
months prior to elections in order to participate.  DEHAP 
officials are accused of falsifying documents in order to 
give the appearance of meeting the requirement. 
 
 
3. (C) Ahmet Hamdi Unlu, a senior member of the High Election 
Board (YSK), told us August 25 that the seven permanent 
members of YSK would have two options in the event of an 
appeals court ruling against DEHAP: (1) decide to maintain 
the Nov. election results in order to preserve the 
"administrative stability" of the election process, or (2) 
cancel DEHAP's votes and recalculate the vote percentage 
garnered by each party.  Parties in Turkish elections must 
receive at least 10 percent of the popular vote nationwide to 
enter Parliament, a threshold met in November only by 
"conservative democratic" AK Party and left-of-center/statist 
CHP.  A recalculation under option two would thrust a third 
party, right-of-center DYP, over the threshold; it is 
estimated AK would lose 42 of 368 seats, and CHP would lose 
24 of 176, to DYP.  Press coverage has featured a third 
option, holding new elections, but Unlu insisted this is not 
on the table.  Unlu said he expects the court to issue a 
ruling soon after taking up the case. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
YSK: Reallocation Seemingly Unlikely 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
4. (C) Unlu intimated to us he would vote against a 
reallocation of parliamentary seats for the following reasons: 
 
 
-- Twenty five days before the Nov. election, Court of 
Appeals Chief Prosecutor tried to have DEHAP banned from the 
elections for falsifying documents.  YSK rejected this 
because: (1) the prosecutor presented no legal documents or 
other evidence to prove his charges, and (2) election 
preparations were set (ballots printed, etc.) and a 
last-minute change would disrupt the process.  Unlu 
emphasized that this decision was "legally sound." 
 
 
-- For the YSK, issuing decisions is like adding bricks to a 
wall: once you've placed a brick you don't want to remove it. 
 
 
-- Unfortunately, unlike in the U.S., he said, in Turkey 
"people don't want to accept court rulings." 
 
 
-- While insisting that YSK decisions are based solely on 
law, Unlu also said YSK recognizes that a decision against 
DEHAP will be perceived "by Europe and the world" as a 
reaction against "Kurdish nationalism." 
 
 
-------------- 
Other Skeptics 
-------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Sept. 8 Vehbi Dincerler, a former Minister and close 
advisor to the late P.M. and President Turgut Ozal and one of 
the wise men of Turkish politics, gave us four reasons why he 
thinks the YSK will reject any revision to the current 
parliamentary distribution.  First, the Appeals Court 
decision concerns a criminal case; there is nothing in the 
law binding YSK to make a specific decision in line with the 
Appeals Court ruling; YSK will base its decision on its own 
legal authority, regulations, and politics.  YSK is not even 
bound by its former decisions since it can argue that every 
case is different.  Moreover, unlike decisions of the 
Constitutional Court, Appeals Court decisions are not binding 
on other cases.  Second, YSK will decide according to (1) the 
constitutionally-enshrined concept of "administrative 
stability," under which it is incumbent on the authorities to 
seek to avoid disruptive interpretations; and (2) the concept 
that one cannot hold the national will as expressed at the 
ballot box hostage to the law.  Third, the election law 
specifies a period for objecting to the certification of 
election results, which has long since expired.  Fourth, 
Dincerler has heard from the immediate family of YSK chairman 
Tufan Algan that in a family conversation he expressed 
adamant opposition to any decision which would destabilize 
the country (Algan has subsequently been quoted in the press 
reaffirming that he is against any decision leading to 
"chaos"). 
 
 
6. (C) Having expressed his opinion, Dincerler nevertheless 
acknowledged when pressed that YSK might not be immune to 
voting its "conscience." 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
But It's Never Over 'til It's Over 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
7. (C) Seref Iba, deputy director of the parliamentary 
Legislation Department, has a different view.  While agreeing 
that a new round of voting is "out of the question," he 
asserted that chances are better than 50 percent that when 
Parliament reconvenes in October, DYP M.P.s will be present. 
Iba claimed to be in close contact with YSK and DYP leaders 
(he took a call from a DYP member during our meeting).  As AK 
gathers more power by approaching the two-thirds 
parliamentary majority needed to amend the Constitution, Iba 
implied that YSK is under pressure to reallocate seats.  "The 
judiciary, academia, and the military in particular are 
skeptical about AK," he said. 
 
 
8. (C) In recent separate conversations with us, two 
experienced AK party officials, Justice Minister/Spokesman 
Cemil Cicek and M.P. Ihsan Arslan, expressed a certain 
wariness  about the unpredictability of decision-making, and 
felt the YSK's likely rulings were in doubt. 
 
 
------------------------ 
DYP: Panting at the Gate 
------------------------ 
 
 
9. (C) The DYP is anxious to achieve a "reallocation." 
Deputy Chairman Mehmet Ali Bayar gave us a spirited argument 
that it is incumbent on YSK to reallocate seats.  Another DYP 
Chairman Salim Ensarioglu said that DYP has been fully behind 
the effort for months.  He speculated that, if reallocation 
entailed canceling the Siirt result as well and thus 
stripping Erdogan of his prime ministership, it would not be 
easy for AK to react by calling for snap general elections: 
FonMin Gul would return as P.M. and be reluctant to give up 
power and M.P.s would not vote for elections since they would 
not yet have served the two years necessary to guarantee them 
a pension, he asserted. 
 
 
10. (C) A respected journalist with exceptional access to 
politicians across the spectrum told us Sept. 8 that the YSK 
decision boils down to price.  She recounted how she believed 
that P.M. Erdogan had confirmed to her the price for YSK's 
approval of his candidacy in the Siirt election at $3 million 
(a widely accepted rumor in Turkish political circles).  She 
then said that former P.M. and DYP chairman Tansu Ciller, who 
would be among the DYPers to enter Parliament in any 
reallocation and is straining at the leash to return, had 
recently told her "the price for reallocation is $6 million." 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
11. (C) YSK essentially ruled on this matter before, when it 
decided there were insufficient grounds to bar DEHAP from the 
November elections.  The board was apparently swayed, in 
part, by the need to maintain consistency, a need which is no 
less present now.  Moreover, some AK M.P.s and close 
observers of AK have told us without hesitation that any 
reallocation of seats through such a legal maneuver would 
lead AK to call snap early elections.  All our contacts 
except DYP forecast that, given the Turkish electorate's 
propensity to vote against manipulative steps by the Turkish 
state Establishment, AK would return to parliament with 
40%-45% of the vote instead of the 35% from November and an 
even greater majority. 
 
 
12. (C) Bottom line: we think that YSK will deny 
reallocation.  However, the uncertainty, now prolonged at 
least into October by the Appeals Court's decision to 
postpone the hearing until September 29, has made Erdogan 
even more cautious in taking decisions that might affect his 
or AK's popular standing, including questions of direct 
interest to the U.S. 
EDELMAN 

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