US embassy cable - 03AMMAN5943

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JORDAN IV DENIED ENTRY TO U.S.

Identifier: 03AMMAN5943
Wikileaks: View 03AMMAN5943 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2003-09-16 04:53:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: CVIS CLOK PREL KPAO JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS, CLOK, PREL, KPAO, JO 
SUBJECT: JORDAN IV DENIED ENTRY TO U.S. 
 
REF:  State 258883 
 
1. (U) While the Department correctly notes the difficulties 
facing some students in fulfilling NSEERS requirement 
(reftel), other travelers bearing different visa 
classifications can also get caught up in the system.  A 
recent experience by a Jordanian contact traveling under the 
International Visitor (IV) program stands as evidence that a 
coordination mechanism between DHS (especially at Dulles) 
and Washington agencies would be useful in ensuring our high- 
priority.  USG-funded visitors are able to enter the U.S. to 
attend their programs.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) Post's experience tracks with the analysis laid out 
in reftel: many students may not initially grasp the intent 
and seriousness of the NSEERS program and the negative 
impact that non-compliance can have on return travel to the 
U.S.  We are also finding other travelers who do understand 
what NSEERS is all about but who, for one reason or another, 
have not fulfilled the letter of the NSEERS program -- and 
have paid for it. 
 
3. (U) A recent example: Jordan IV Haytham Wahdan was denied 
entry to the United States August 5 by Port of Entry 
Inspecting Officers on the basis of having failed to 
properly notify the INS of an earlier departure from the 
U.S. in February 2003.  Wahdan claims he tried to inform 
officials of his departure on that earlier occasion but 
found no one to tell -- unable to find a DHS officer, he 
seems to have thought that notifying an official-looking 
person at the departure gate (probably an airline employee) 
was sufficient.  When detected as an NSEERS violator upon 
his return in August, Wahdan spent over 24 hours in DHS 
detention before being placed on a flight back to Amman. 
 
4. (U) It is clear, in retrospect, that Wahdan did not check 
out properly in February, and that DHS officers were correct 
in detecting him as having violated the NSEERS system.  But 
from post's perspective, it would have been very much 
preferable for DHS to have exercised its authority to find 
that Wahdan had "rebutted the legal presumption that (his) 
future entry into the U.S. will be to engage in unlawful 
activity" (reftel para 5).  DHS might have done so on the 
basis of Wahdan's own statement (assuming DHS found him 
credible), but also because Wahdan was traveling on a fully- 
funded USG program intended to facilitate exchanges between 
influential foreigners and the U.S.  Wahdan is just the sort 
of visitor to the U.S. who we need to cultivate; 
unfortunately, Wahdan's experience on this occasion is 
unlikely to cement his ties with our country. 
 
5. (U)  Who was at fault?  Not DHS, as Wahdan had obviously 
not fulfilled NSEERS requirements.  Certainly Wahdan bears 
ultimate responsibility for leaving the U.S. without having 
made appropriate notification, but his account that he did 
not know the difference between a DHS official and an 
airline official has a ring of truth.  Sometimes, a bonafide 
traveler can make a mistake and run into the law, but the 
USG's best interests may be served by permitting entry.  In 
post's view, the most useful way to handle future cases like 
Wahdan's -- where the USG itself has already invested in 
getting the traveler to America -- is to establish a liaison 
link between DHS at Dulles (where the majority of our and 
most posts' IVs arrive) and the Department. 
 
6. (U) Under this system, when a visitor is brought aside 
for further review by DHS (including for NSEERS violation), 
and when it is seen that the visitor is participating in a 
USG-funded program, DHS could both inform the 
Department/post and seek an advisory view on permitting the 
traveler to enter the U.S.  If useful, post could even issue 
a sealed letter to USG-funded travelers affirming USG 
interest in their travel and requesting DHS call the 
Department/post at specified numbers if any problems occur. 
At best, this system would save DHS the time and expense of 
removing an alien who might otherwise benefit from a 
"rebuttal."  At minimum it would let the Department know 
that an officially-sponsored traveler was being turned 
around (in Wahdan's case, no one knew where he was for two 
days during his detention and turn-round).   Post would 
welcome Department's views on this proposal which we believe 
is in the best interests of DHS, State, the traveler, and 
U.S. security interests. 
 
7.  (U) The bottom line of course, as reftel makes clear, is 
that posts need to do all in their power to make visa 
applicants, including those traveling on USG programs, aware 
of these requirements.  We will redouble our efforts to make 
sure such sponsored travelers are fully briefed and asked 
about possible previous violations leading to 
ineligibilities.  But for such travelers who nonetheless 
have made innocent mistakes, a liaison system can save the 
USG money while allowing us to attain the goals which lay 
behind these visitor programs. 
 
HALE 

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