US embassy cable - 03HARARE1861

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001861 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, PREL, ZI, ZANU-PF 
SUBJECT: MINISTER OFFERS INSIGHTS ON ZANU-PF POSTURE 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1794 (B) HARARE 1782 (C) HARARE 1599 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton, under Section 1.5(b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Minister of Mines Edward Chindori-Chininga 
on September 11 spoke with Ambassador Sullivan on ZANU-PF 
succession issues and internal party elections. 
Chindori-Chininga did not break any new ground but confirmed 
party elections' potential implications for succession and 
the government's tentative interest in re-engagement with the 
USG.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) During a meeting in Ambassador Sullivan's office on 
September 11, Chindori-Chininga elaborated on developments 
within ZANU-PF.  With regard to potential talks with the MDC, 
Chairman John Nkomo and Spokesman Nathan Shamuyarira were in 
charge.  Chindori-Chininga asserted that the exclusion of 
hardliners, such as Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa and 
Information Minister Jonathon Moyo, augured well for the 
talks' prospects.  Indeed, Chinamasa had been chastened over 
impolitic remarks about the people of Manicaland bringing on 
their own misfortune by successively supporting opposition 
candidates, was embarrassed, and had stopped attending 
Parliament.  Referring to the bishops' initiative (ref A), 
Chindori-Chininga predicted that the church would have some 
role in facilitating interparty talks, but that the talks 
would likely be direct.  Talks could start quickly, and 
parliamentary elections were possible before 2005, when they 
were next scheduled.  A presidential election was nearly 
certain to occur before the next scheduled one in 2008. 
 
3.  (C) Chindori-Chininga advised that Mugabe's intentions 
about retirement and succession remained uncertain.  Even if 
he were prepared to step down, Mugabe would play things close 
to the vest and not allow himself to become a lame duck.  In 
any event, ZANU-PF internal elections were proceeding with 
Mugabe's blessing and held potentially significant 
implications for succession.  Confirming Nkomo's 
characterization to the Ambassador earlier in the week (ref 
B), Chindori-Chininga described a sequence of ZANU-PF 
elections commencing with local polls and climaxing with 
provincial choices by November -- in time for the Party 
Congress in December.  Provincial leaders could be asked for 
preferences that would influence or dictate the selection of 
a new party head.  Chindori-Chininga conceded that the party 
had little experience in such a senior selection process, 
other than the selection of Chairman John Nkomo in 2000. 
That case, which saw the unexpected emergence of Nkomo over 
the favorite, Emmerson Mnangagwa, suggested this instance 
could yield a surprise as well. 
 
4.  (C) Speculating on succession candidates, 
Chindori-Chininga asserted that Mnangagwa remained a serious 
contender.  While unpopular in many circles, he was strong in 
Midlands and Masvingo, and might be able to secure the 
backing of party stalwarts in Manicaland.  He had helped 
himself as Speaker of the Parliament by dealing with the 
opposition in a tough but civil manner.  For his part, Nkomo 
was highly regarded enough, but was underexposed on a 
national basis among the party faithful.  His ZAPU heritage 
and Ndebele ethnicity might prove additional handicaps. 
Defense Minister Sekeramayi also was a viable candidate.  His 
public image of being indecisive was contradicted by his 
performance within the Cabinet, which had impressed party 
leaders.  Former Finance Minister Simba Makoni was very 
capable, but probably not a logical choice.  He had yet to 
cultivate a strong base even in Manicaland, his home 
territory, or to engage significantly with the party's 
grassroots.  Indeed, emphasizing the difficulty of 
handicapping the race, Chindori-Chinongo observed that none 
of the candidates had engaged closely with party bases in the 
provinces beyond the most senior level. 
 
5.  (C) Chindori-Chininga confirmed that the political crisis 
was getting in the way of rational economic policy-making. 
For instance, arguments for currency devaluation or for 
printing higher denomination notes were frustrated by 
arguments over the political cost ZANU-PF would absorb by 
taking these measures on its own.  In the meantime, failure 
to devalue was killing the banks and key export-oriented 
sectors, such as minerals.  He was hopeful that the Utete 
Report on land reform, which he confirmed was presented to 
the Cabinet by Mugabe that day and was scheduled to be 
published on September 16, would address corruption and 
clarify nettlesome issues such as multiple ownership.  The 
last issue was close to home, as a court recently found 
against him in a highly publicized ownership dispute with 
prominent War Veterans' leader Michael Moyo -- a case he 
attibuted to unspecified "mischief" by Agriculture Minister 
Joseph Made. 
 
6.  In closing, Chindori-Chinongo expressed interest in how 
the GOZ and USG might re-engage without offering any 
suggestions himself. 
 
7.  COMMENT: Neither a politburo member nor a dominant force 
in the Cabinet, the Minister of Mines nonetheless presents a 
window into ruling party preoccupations and priorities.  His 
professed interest in re-engagement with the USG is 
consistent with tentative sentiments expressed by others in 
the government and may be part of an overarching 
"water-testing" exercise signalled to the bishops last month 
by Mugabe himself (refs A and C).  Chindori-Chininga's 
dismissal of Chinamasa's role in potential talks with the MDC 
is at odds with the Justice Minister's reported central 
involvement in discreet interparty talks about a new 
constitution; indeed, the constitutional discussions may 
explain in part his relatively low profile since he blasted 
the bishops' initiative last month. 
SULLIVAN