US embassy cable - 03ISTANBUL1348

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 001348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, TK, Istanbul 
SUBJECT: DEEDS FOR SALE! GET YOUR PROPERTY DEEDS RIGHT HERE! 
 
 
REF: ISTANBUL 1039 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: A property amnesty currently being planned 
by the Justice and Development (AK) Party government has set 
off a flurry of debate and criticism in Istanbul.  AK sees 
the measure as a potential major source of revenue, a 
realistic solution to a long-ignored problem (i.e., "illegal" 
settlements and the political and social limbo squatters live 
under), and a popular pre-local election vote-getter in the 
poor and disenfranchised voter base of Istanbul's crowded 
urban sprawl.  Opponents in Istanbul charge, however, that 
what they dismiss as a populist measure will undermine what 
they allege are existing sensible land-use, environmental, 
and disaster-mitigation policies and encourage illegal 
land-grabs and construction.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (U) Having wiped out the detailed Ottoman land registry 
system, the Republic of Turkey has never carried out a 
systematic survey or introduced a new and complete land 
registry system.  Nor has the Turkish state controlled the 
use of state-owned lands or enforced zoning laws.  With this 
lack of control, and under succeeding national and local 
governments of all political stripes -- including CHP -- 
squatter communities, including some of the most stable 
neighborhoods in Turkey's largest cities, have mushroomed 
since the 1960's, with periodic commitments by local 
governments to supply utilities and paved roads on a catch-up 
basis.  The provision of utilities in turn has spurred 
developers to offer squatters free apartments in return for 
letting them consolidate squatter plots and build apartment 
blocks. 
 
 
3. (SBU) In this context, the Justice and Development (AK) 
Party government is planning a property amnesty as a means to 
generate revenue and regularize the quasi-legal resident 
status of hundreds of thousands of migrants to Turkey's major 
cities.  The impact of such an amnesty would be felt 
particularly in Istanbul where approximately 700,000 
buildings, or 60-65 percent of the total, are believed to be 
illegally constructed (i.e., without proper building 
permits), with many of them built on state lands (i.e., 
without deeds).  In addition to new laws and regulations, a 
comprehensive amnesty will require a constitutional amendment 
(which could eventually go to a national referendum) to 
enable the government to reclassify some "forest lands" which 
have long been built on or used as agricultural land. (Note: 
Currently the proposal would cover only lands which had been 
converted by 1981, but it is unclear how all such 
determinations could be accurately documented.  End Note.) 
 
 
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Property Amnesties = Votes and Cheap Labor 
------------------------------------------ 
4. (SBU) The history of property amnesties in Turkey has 
paralleled (and, some believe, contributed to) the massive 
waves of rural-to-urban migration over the last five decades. 
 Since the first amnesty in 1949, there have been six more 
culminating in the most recent one in 1986.  In the early 
years, the unavailability and/or inaffordability of proper 
housing forced newly-arrived migrants to construct their own 
"gecekondu," or squatter residences, recreating their village 
lifestyle in the greater Istanbul region.  Although built on 
state property and without the requisite building permits, 
both industry and politicians benefited, tapping the 
settlements for cheap labor and votes.  As such, the early 
amnesties that allowed gecekondu owners to "purchase" permits 
and legal titles to their property were win-win propositions 
for the politicians: they were popular vote-getters that also 
generated extra revenue for the government coffers. 
 
 
5. (SBU) In the 1980s and 1990s, Istanbul grew to become 
Europe's most populous city and was increasingly unable to 
absorb and manage the massive population influx, reaching as 
high as 500,000 migrants each year.  With time, the clear-cut 
populist equation of property amnesties became murkier.  Land 
speculators and corner-cutting contractors built sub-standard 
multi-story apartment buildings to rent out to poorer 
families, making money on the ever-increasing demand for 
housing and gambling on the expectation that future 
governments would legalize their properties.  More and more 
people objected to new amnesties as "unfair" (i.e., they 
provided legal cover to law-breakers) and municipal 
authorities in more affluent areas became increasingly 
frustrated with the negative effect they had on their 
attempts to conduct sensible urban planning and management. 
Amnesties aside, however, politicians and bureaucrats 
continued to profit from the fresh supply of potential voters 
and the endemic corruption involved in turning a blind eye to 
new, illegal properties. 
 
 
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AK's Amnesty 
------------ 
6. (SBU) A chronic lack of comprehensive urban land-use 
planning in the last several decades has left the current AK 
government with an untenable situation in which hundreds of 
thousands of city-dwellers live in quasi-legal or illegal 
residences.  Thousands of acres of so-called "forest lands" 
in and around the cities have long been cleared and developed 
to accommodate rural migrants or wealthy city apartment 
dwellers in search of homes with gardens.  Even the 
opposition CHP party campaigned last year with a pledge to 
transfer such lands to the current residents.  AKP, however, 
has emphasized the revenue-generating potential of a new 
property amnesty.  In discussing the issue, Prime Minister 
Erdogan has made repeated references to expected revenues, a 
figure that some government officials put as high as USD 25 
billion.  Some we have talked to, however, note that 
amnesties never generate the revenue anticipated and have 
labeled the latest proposal as merely another in a long 
series of amnesties that will reward supporters and win 
votes: 
 
 
-- Eyup Muhcu, Chairman of the Istanbul Chamber of 
Architects, railed against the proposed amnesty, calling it a 
blatant attempt to make money and win votes that violates 
most people's "sense of justice," encourages more illegal 
construction, and complicates efforts to prepare for a major 
earthquake (reftel). 
 
 
-- Selami Ozturk, the Republican People's Party (CHP) Mayor 
of Kadikoy (where approximately 1 million Istanbul residents 
live), told poloff that a new amnesty would make it "nearly 
impossible" for him to provide municipal services to 
gecekondu neighborhoods that developed without any urban 
planning or oversight.  Moreover, pointing to detailed 
neighborhood maps overlaid with the 2002 voting results, 
Ozturk noted how the amnesty would primarily benefit those 
neighborhoods that had voted heavily for the AK Party. 
 
 
-- While careful not to directly criticize the AK 
government's policies, Irfan Uzun, Head of the Planning and 
Property for the Istanbul Greater Municipality, told poloff 
that city land-use plans would be undermined if completely 
illegal buildings without deeds or permits are provided 
amnesty.  Uzun worried aloud that the city may have to "buy 
back" deeds awarded during an amnesty in order to expropriate 
and destroy properties that conflict with city infrastructure 
projects. 
 
 
7. (SBU) The proposed amnesty has its share of supporters: 
 
 
-- AKP founding member and independent businessman Cuneyt 
Zapsu defended the amnesty as sensible economic policy, 
arguing that the government must acknowledge the irreversible 
fact that many of these "forest lands" can not be restored 
and that thousands of illegal settlements can not be 
destroyed.  By legalizing these properties and "bringing them 
into the system," the amnesty will not only generate revenue, 
but will also change now untransferrable assets into 
convertible ones, benefiting the economy as a whole. 
 
 
-- Yahya Karakaya, the Saadet Party mayor of Sultanbeyli 
listed the lack of legal property deeds as one of his 
district's major problems, arguing that even the residents of 
his poor district would be willing to purchase building 
permits and deeds to escape the constant threat of eviction. 
(Note: Approximately 75 percent of the buildings in 
Sultanbeyli lack permits and 25 percent are built on state 
lands and lack deeds.  End Note.) 
 
 
8. (SBU) Even opponents of a new amnesty conceded that 
certain strict conditions could theoretically minimize the 
negative effects of an amnesty: mandating basic building 
codes and safety standards, authorizing municipal authorities 
to retrofit neighborhoods for services, limiting the amnesty 
to owner/residents, and ensuring that this be the "final" 
amnesty.  Uzun from the Istanbul Greater Municipality claimed 
that most of the buildings without permits have only minor 
problems, but that an amnesty that allowed the city to 
examine and reissue permits to buildings with minor 
construction problems would actually be beneficial. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
Forest Lands and Forest Fires 
----------------------------- 
9. (SBU) Perhaps the most controversial part of the amnesty 
plan relates to a proposed constitutional amendment to 
reclassify a portion of the country's designated "forest 
lands" (those which lost their forest nature by 1981) to 
enable the government to sell off properties that have long 
since been illegally cleared and settled.  Although the first 
effort to pass such an amendment was vetoed by President 
Sezer earlier this year, the government is determined to push 
forward, even if it means risking the chance that the 
President will submit it to a national referendum (Note: The 
President has the authority to veto such bills only once.)  A 
rash of summer forest fires this year (summer forest fires 
have been a problem for at least a decade but the press 
reports a large increase last year) may be an indication that 
some unscrupulous speculators hoping to profit from newly 
"cleared" land expect the amendment and a broad amnesty to 
pass.  (Note: They would need to produce fake documentation 
to show that the lands had been deforested long before, or 
perhaps they see the proposed amnesty as the first in a new 
series of such amnesties.  End Note.) 
 
 
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Comment 
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9. (SBU) AK is motivated by an understanding that 
regularizing the status of people who now live in fear of 
constant eviction will win them votes and by wishful thinking 
that an amnesty will bring in substantial revenue.  Seeking 
to balance popular measures with the dictates of an IMF 
package, the government desperately needs the increased 
flexibility that any extra fiscal revenue will provide. 
This, combined with the fact that AK would benefit directly 
at the ballot box from a property amnesty, gives the 
government a powerful incentive to press forward with this 
proposal. 
 
 
10. (SBU) The impact on Istanbul from an urban planning 
perspective will likely be negative.  An amnesty without 
strict conditions (and past experience and realistic 
expectations suggest that such conditions are unlikely to be 
adopted) will complicate the city's efforts to prepare for an 
earthquake, provide municipal services, and plan for 
sustainable growth. 
 
 
11. (SBU) Although many in Istanbul are uninterested, or at 
least ambivalent, about the idea of a property amnesty, they 
would likely be more decisive if the "forest land" issue 
comes to a referendum.  Unaware of or despairing over the 
extent of deforestation in Istanbul, large numbers of voters 
living in the heart of the long built-up urban area would 
probably turn out in opposition, thereby setting the stage 
for a divisive vote that government critics will bill as a 
referendum on the AK government's overall performance. 
ARNETT