US embassy cable - 03ROME4187

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004187 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2013 
TAGS: PREL, IT, IR, RS, EUN, IAEA 
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI AND PUTIN DISCUSS IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: A/DCM SCOTT KILNER.  REASON: 1.5 (B)(D) 

1. (U) GUIDANCE REQUEST.  SEE PARA 7. 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY:  DURING THEIR AUGUST 29-31 MEETING IN 
SARDINIA, RUSSIAN PRESIDENT PUTIN TOLD PM BERLUSCONI THAT 
RUSSIA IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM.  ACCORDING TO BERLUSCONI'S SENIOR DIPLOMATIC 
ADVISOR, PUTIN SAID THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO MAKE IRAN SHIP 
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL BACK TO RUSSIA.  BERLUSCONI WILL WRITE TO 
PRESIDENT KHATAMI URGING IRANIAN COMPLIANCE WITH IAEA 
GUIDELINES.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (C)  THE PM'S SENIOR DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, GIOVANNI 
CASTELLANETA, TOLD DCM AND POLOFF ON SEPTEMBER 11 THAT PUTIN 
HAD CONFIDED TO BERLUSCONI THAT HE HAD MUCH GREATER CONCERNS 
THAN WHEN THEY LAST MET (IN JULY) OVER IRAN'S INTENTIONS FOR 
ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.  HE WAS THEREFORE DETERMINED TO PUT IN 
PLACE MEASURES TO KEEP THE PROGRAM CIVILIAN, AND TO MONITOR 
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE NUCLEAR FUEL RUSSIA IS SELLING TO IRAN. 
PUTIN PLANS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS BY DEMANDING THAT IRAN SHIP 
THE SPENT FUEL BACK TO RUSSIA.  PUTIN IS NOT JUST THINKING 
ABOUT IT, SAID CASTELLANETA, HE IS GOING TO DO IT. 
CASTELLANETA THOUGHT, AND PUTIN'S OWN DIPLOMATIC ADVISORS 
CONFIRMED, THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT 
AN IRAN WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD REPRESENT A THREAT NOT 
ONLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT ALSO TO MANY OF THE COUNTRIES OF 
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND TO RUSSIA ITSELF. 
 
4. (C)  IN A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO A LETTER FROM IRANIAN 
PRESIDENT KHATAMI OUTLINING IRAN'S PROMISES THAT ITS NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM WOULD REMAIN CIVILIAN AND IRAN WOULD SIGN THE IAEA 
    PROTOCOL, BERLUSCONI WILL URGE IRAN TO MATCH ITS WORDS WITH 
ACTIONS.  HE WILL EMPHASIZED TO KHATAMI THAT IRANIAN 
BEHAVIOR, SYMBOLIZED BY THE DISCOVERY OF TRACES OF PLUTONIUM 
IN TEHRAN, WAS NOT IN LINE WITH ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  NOTE: THE PM'S OFFICE WILL PROVIDE 
EMBASSY WITH A COPY OF THE LETTER AS SOON AS IT IS SIGNED. 
END NOTE. 
 
5. (C) DCM AGREED WITH CASTELLANETA'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE US 
AND EU MUST KEEP THE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON IRAN TO COMPLY 
WITH IAEA REGULATIONS, BUT THAT THE SITUATION WAS DELICATE. 
FOR ITALY, A MILITARY SOLUTION AT THIS TIME WOULD NOT BE 
ACCEPTABLE.  THE "COUNTDOWN HAS STARTED" TO THE END OF THE 
FRAGILE REGIME IN TEHRAN THROUGH INTERNAL PRESSURES.  WE MUST 
BE CAREFUL, CAUTIONED CASTELLANETA, THAT TOO HARD A LINE AND 
TOO MUCH PRESSURE FROM THE OUTSIDE COULD CAUSE THE 
CONFLICTING FACTIONS WITHIN IRAN TO UNITE AGAINST A COMMON 
ENEMY. 
 
6.  (C)  ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, THE ATMOSPHERICS DURING 
PUTIN'S VISIT TO BERLUSCONI'S SUMMER HOME ON THE ISLAND OF 
SARDINIA WERE EXCELLENT.  PUTIN'S PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
BERLUSCONI HAS GROWN VERY STRONG, AND HE SEEMED TO BE VERY 
"PRO-WESTERN" IN HIS POLITICAL VIEWS, AS EVINCED BY PUTIN'S 
CONSIDERATION OF SENDING RUSSIAN TROOPS TO IRAQ UNDER US 
COMMAND.  IN RESPONSE TO THE DCM'S OBSERVATION THAT PUTIN'S 
RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT BUSH WAS ALSO DEVELOPING 
POSITIVELY, CASTELLANETA NOTED THAT PUTIN SAID HE WAS LOOKING 
FORWARD TO HIS UPCOMING TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 
UNGA AND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH.  PUTIN PROMISED TO 
RAISE WITH THE PRESIDENT MANY OF THE SAME ISSUES OF STRATEGIC 
    IMPORTANCE HE AND BERLUSCONI COVERED IN SARDINIA. 
 
7.  (SBU) CASTELLANETA WILL ACCOMPANY BERLUSCONI ON HIS TRIP 
TO THE US SEPTEMBER 21-24.  HE HAS OFFERED TO REMAIN  BEYOND 
THAT TIME IF THE US WANTS TO SCHEDULE A MEETING, WITH NSA 
RICE FOR INSTANCE, AFTER THE CRUSH OF UNGA RELATED 
ACTIVITIES.  DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE IS REQUESTED ON HOW WE 
SHOULD RESPOND TO CASTELLANETA'S OFFER. 
SEMBLER 
 
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 2003ROME04187 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL