US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1117

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM, IN 
SUBJECT: INDIA'S AMBASSADOR TO BURMA:  FINDING A BALANCE 
BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SUPPORT 
 
REF: BEIJING 12297 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  During a September 10 meeting with COM, 
Indian Ambassador to Burma Rajiv Kumar Bhatia described 
India's Burma policy as having two pillars:  engagement with 
the regime and support for democracy.  India will continue to 
move forward on both fronts simultaneously, he said, striking 
what it considers to be an appropriate balance between the 
two objectives based on India's strategic interests.  Bhatia 
expressed concern about a recent public statement by 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda urging the SPDC to 
release Aung San Suu Kyi prior to the upcoming ASEAN Summit 
in Bali, remarking that it would only incite a nationalistic 
and contrary response from the regime.  Further high-level 
statements certainly would derail prospects for her immediate 
release, he said.  Bhatia views the appointment of General 
Khin Nyunt as Prime Minister and moves to reconvene the 
National Convention as positive, stressing that we should not 
mechanically assume these actions are "more of the same" but 
rather interpret them as possible indicators of greater 
flexibility by the SPDC and the start of a phased succession. 
 End summary. 
 
A Two-Pillar Policy 
------------------- 
 
2. (C) The two pillars that form the basis of India's Burma 
policy are engagement with the regime and support for 
democracy, said Bhatia.  India continues to show its 
sensitivity to democratic sentiments by pushing privately at 
the highest levels of the Burmese government for the 
immediate release of ASSK, dialogue with the NLD, and 
transition to democracy.  Bhatia pointedly noted, however, 
that what constituted an appropriate balance between the two 
pillars had to be decided by India according to its strategic 
interests.  Noting that recent high-level Indian civilian and 
military visits to Burma had been in the pipeline for 1-2 
years, Bhatia rhetorically questioned whether they should 
have been postponed after the 30 May incident and answered 
"no," as one pillar of India's policy is engagement, 
afterall.  In fact, he said U.S. strategic interests 
vis--vis Burma, including HIV/AIDS, terrorism, and narcotics 
trafficking demand continuous engagement with Burma, not 
alienation.  Bhatia described Burma as a country looking for 
a model, commenting that any path to democracy must be 
adapted to local circumstances and that India is looking for 
signs that Burma is committed to its own path, rather than 
one imposed from outside. 
 
Remarks by Indonesian Foreign Minister "ill-timed" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3. (C) Bhatia characterized the recent statement by 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda on the need to release 
ASSK prior to the upcoming ASEAN Summit in Bali as "not 
especially helpful," arguing that it would incite a 
nationalistic response from the Burmese government at odds 
with the objective of securing ASSK's immediate release. 
Bhatia later commented that the statement "unnerved" him and 
assessed that any further similar statements by other 
governments, what he labeled "high-level chatter," would 
derail any prospect for a good outcome on this issue.  In 
response, COM remarked that continued international pressure 
was both necessary and effective, noting the regime has taken 
concrete action in response to international pressure and 
that during periods of no such pressure, there was no 
movement at all.  Bhatia agreed that pressure on the regime 
does result in a response, but that it must be calibrated 
properly, implying both the statement by Foreign Minister 
Wirajuda and recent U.S. actions had not been (read: 
sanctions and attention drawn to ASSK's hunger strike). 
 
The National Convention 
----------------------- 
4. (C) With regard to the seven-point roadmap outlined by 
Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt on August 30 and recent 
announcements on reconvening the National Convention, Bhatia 
said that if the National Convention really is reconvening, 
the matter should be straightforward.  However, there was no 
real continuity in the make-up of the Convening Commission 
and he was hearing a hard-line view from his contacts on the 
question of whether or not the NLD would be allowed to 
participate.  Nonetheless, Bhatia believed the regime was 
making an attempt to get the NLD back into the process and 
that in contrast to the situation 10 years ago, the 
possibility for flexibility on the part of the SPDC existed. 
"We should not mechanically assume it will only be more of 
the same," he exhorted.  In Bhatia's assessment, the recent 
changes are not purely cosmetic and should be viewed with 
limited optimism, although not interpreted as a signal that 
democracy is on the way.  Bhatia also offered that Khin Nyunt 
has shown tremendous resilience, moving from the "umbrella 
boy" of former dictator Ne Win to a "linchpin" in the SPDC. 
 
Engagement "Pillar" appreciated by MOFA 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) During an introductory courtesy call on 15 August, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Director responsible for 
South Asia U Ye Mying told Pol/Econoffs that India and Burma 
have a "fine tradition of friendship" and that close 
relations with its neighbors are the priority for Burma.  Ye 
Mying also noted that in addition to high-level bilateral 
visits, sectoral exchanges were increasingly 
institutionalized and of benefit to both sides.  In separate 
conversations with other Indian Embassy officials in 
late-August and early September, Pol/Econoffs were told that 
Burma attaches greater importance to the relationship with 
India than does India, as trade with Burma is only a small 
part of overall Indian trade and that while bilateral 
mechanisms for cooperation have had some successes, they 
generally have provided forums for discussion and building 
trust rather than resolving key issues. 
 
Comment: No Desire to Tip the Boat 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) While the Indian Ambassador remarked several times 
during the 10 September exchange that India remains focused 
on the immediate release of ASSK and other political 
prisoners as well as the quick resumption of dialogue on 
transition to democracy, he made it clear that India will 
continue to engage actively with the current government.  A 
spate of recent high-level civilian and military visits 
reinforces this message and suggests that like China, India 
does not intend to back away from the current regime and 
views as counterproductive what it considers to be increased 
international pressure and attempts to isolate the regime. 
Our interlocutors at the Indian Embassy tell us that the 
insurgency issue on the Indo-Burmese border is the most 
difficult bilateral issue now confronting the two countries, 
and India does not want to take any action on Burma's 
domestic political situation that could derail progress on 
this border problem.  While India's two pillar approach may 
serve U.S. interests in terms of providing a counterbalance 
to China's increasing influence in Burma, we recommend that 
we enter into a dialogue on Burma with New Delhi that 
parallels our dialogue with Beijing (reftel).  End comment. 
Martinez