US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1114

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BURMA: UNODC MAKES A PITCH FOR KOKANG/WA INTERVENTION (KOWI)

Identifier: 03RANGOON1114
Wikileaks: View 03RANGOON1114 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2003-09-12 07:18:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: SNAR BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP AND INL; DEA FOR OF, OFF; 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2013 
TAGS: SNAR, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMA: UNODC MAKES A PITCH FOR KOKANG/WA 
INTERVENTION (KOWI) 
 
REF: RANGOON 707 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The UNODC has been making a quiet pitch 
for support among donors for a new counternarcotics 
intervention in the Wa and Kokang areas of Burma's Shan State 
(dubbed the "KOWI" project).  UNODC Burma resident 
representative Jean-Luc Lemahieu recently conducted a round 
of bilateral consultations within the diplomatic corps and 
gave a more detailed description of the proposed KOWI 
intervention at an August 26 mini-Dublin Group meeting.  He 
also shared more details from the 2002-2003 UNODC opium 
survey, which concluded that overall opium cultivation is 
sharply down in Burma, but revealed disturbing signs that the 
Wa are increasing opium activity in advance of their 2005 
deadline to cease cultivation.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) In a private meeting with COM and P/E chief, Lemahieu 
reported that UNODC's Wa project had been extended for two 
years, primarily to enhance the project's community 
development component, and he was hopeful that USG funding 
would return to previous levels (which he indicated was USD 
700,000).  Lemahieu suggested that the USG had decreased Wa 
funding in favor of increased support for counternarcotics 
activities in Afghanistan.  In response to COM's inquiry 
about a standing Wa commitment to cease opium cultivation by 
2005, Lemahieu said that reports the Wa had postponed their 
target date by two years were false and the GOB's drug czar, 
General Kyaw Thein, had personally confirmed that the Wa are 
keeping to their promised schedule.  However, Lemahieu 
acknowledged that there is intense pressure within the Wa 
population to increase opium cultivation, explaining that 
farmers are unconvinced that there will be sufficient 
resources to offset future losses of income. 
 
UNODC 2002/2003 Opium Survey 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) At an August 26 mini-Dublin Group meeting, chaired 
by the Japanese Ambassador, Lemahieu said that UNODC's 
2002/2003 crop survey had determined that Burma experienced a 
24 percent decrease in overall opium cultivation.  However, 
there had been a marginal increase in production due to 
improved weather conditions.  In specific regions, the Kokang 
areas of northeastern Shan State experienced a 50 percent 
decrease in cultivation (which Lemahieu described as too 
fast, not allowing the GOB enough time to consolidate gains), 
while Wa areas saw a 20 percent increase.  Queried by 
mini-Dublin Group participants about the disturbing Wa 
increases, Lemahieu explained that the Wa were likely taking 
advantage of an "open window" for short-term profit before 
the 2005 moratorium on production.  In fact, he added, the 
yield in parts of the Wa territory was above 13 kg per 
hectare, approaching Afghanistan yield levels, which implies 
the use of outside technical assistance, irrigation, and 
fertilizer--inputs heretofore not a part of the Burma opium 
industry. 
 
4. (SBU) UNODC's Lemahieu appealed for donor pledges for the 
next opium survey, noting that their was a need to support 
salaries for counterpart units and a desire to extend the 
survey into Kachin and Rahkine States.  He observed that the 
political situation in Burma (i.e. the aftermath of the May 
30 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi) had caused some donors to back 
off of previous pledge commitments. 
 
Donor Issues 
------------ 
 
5. (SBU) At the 8/26 mini-Dublin meeting, Lemahieu described 
the USG as a "traditional pillar of support" for UNODC, and 
added that solid funding was also in the pipeline from 
Germany (USD one million) and Italy (USD 100,000) for the 
existing Wa project and from Australia for other Shan State 
projects.  Australia also reported that it now has both a 
permanent police advisor and a technical assistant attached 
to the Narcotics Task Force in Mandalay.  The Japanese 
delegation said that they would provide USD 500,000 for the 
Kokang project, but noted a Tokyo decision to cease new 
development funding in Burma as a result of the May 30 
attack.  Last year, Japan contributed USD 1.2 million under 
the Human Security Fund to construct a canal in the Wa 
region.  COM reported to participants that President's 
certification decision would be announced in mid-September 
and that a new DEA representative had recently arrived in 
Burma. 
 
KOWI: Kokang/Wa Intervention 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) According to UNODC, a joint assessment conducted 
with Japanese and NGO participation in March and April 
revealed the urgent need to counter the growth of cultivated 
land in northern Wa territory and a worsening humanitarian 
situation in Kokang areas.  The result is a Kokang and Wa 
Intervention (KOWI) proposal, a five year, USD 12.85 million 
project comprised of 20-plus varied components.  Japan, which 
is apparently prepared to commit USD 500,000 for emergency 
assistance to the Kokang, has identified four priority KOWI 
components: food security, rural development, agricultural 
development, and a development of a "comprehensive strategy." 
 The World Food Program (WFP), which also participated in the 
joint assessment, pledged an immediate contribution of USD 
200,000 for immediate food security needs, and several NGOs 
will collaborate in food for work programs. 
 
6. (C) Lemahieu noted that the GOB was not initially very 
receptive to an international presence in the Kokang area, 
but reluctantly agreed to two field missions and the WFP 
immediate response project.  With regard to advancing the 
proposed KOWI intervention, Lemahieu said that UNODC wanted 
to get a full commitment for funding from donors before 
devoting substantial UNODC resources to planning and 
undertaking initial steps. 
 
Expanding the Mini-Dublin Group? 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) At the August 26 mini-Dublin Group meeting, several 
participants suggested that the next meeting should include 
representatives from neighboring countries affected by trade 
in narcotics and precursor drugs.  UNODC reported that China 
in particular has expressed a keen interest in discussing 
drug cooperation efforts.  This appears to be an outcome of 
the August 2001 Beijing Declaration on regional law 
enforcement cooperation between Burma, Thailand, Laos, and 
China.  As a result, UNODC proposed, and participants agreed, 
to invite China, Thailand, and India to the next mini-Dublin 
Group meeting. 
Martinez 

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