US embassy cable - 03ANKARA5745

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005745 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2008 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION TEAM FOR 
PKK/KADEK IN IRAQ 
 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 5584 
     B. ANKARA 4787 
     C. ANKARA 4499 
 
 
Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch; reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Four and a half years after the capture of 
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, the GOT remains divided over how 
to deal with the remnants of the terrorist organization, how 
to handle Kurdish nationalism, and whether to loosen 
restrictions on Kurdish political and cultural expression. 
The GOT maintains the US must now make the next move to deal 
with the PKK/KADEK in northern Iraq.  Prospects for resolving 
the conflict between the State and the Kurdish community are 
complicated by: 1) the ineffectiveness of the PKK-related 
"Reintegration Law"; 2) the slow implementation of human 
rights and social reforms; 3) the alienation of southeastern 
Kurds from the political process; and 4) lack of GOT 
assistance for displaced Kurds wishing to return to the 
southeast.  The UNHCR rep in Ankara argues for close 
cooperation among the GOT, USG, and UNHCR to inform Makhmour 
refugees of improving conditions in southeast Turkey, and to 
ensure returnees receive adequate support.  Despite 
occasional cooperation between the GOT and the PUK and KDP in 
combating the PKK/KADEK, Turks remain deeply suspicious of 
Iraqi Kurds.  End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (C) While the Turkish Govenment wants our help in 
eliminating the Kadek safe haven in northern Iraq, it is 
dealing with the issue separately from the question of a 
Turkish contribution to the stabilization force.  However, 
U.S.-Turkish cooperation against the PKK/Kadek is essential 
to convincing the public and many of the elite that Turkish 
military participation in Iraq is in Turkey's national 
interest. 
 
 
------------------------- 
GOT: PKK Ball in US Court 
------------------------- 
 
 
3. (C) The Turks believe the ball is in our court and will be 
expecting some visibility on US plans for tackling the 
PKK/KADEK presence in northern Iraq.  We expect their focus 
to be on questioning the US side about military plans and 
timetables for action.  The GOT needs this visit to 
demonstrate to skeptics that the US is serious about its 
commitment to eliminate the threat of PKK/KADEK terror from 
northern Iraq.  No matter how much we want to de-link this 
issue from the possibility of a Turkish troop contribution to 
a stabilization force for Iraq, the Turkish public and 
parliament sees a firm US commitment to deal with the 
PKK/KADEK as a sin qua non for Turkish willingness to help 
out the coalition in Iraq and recognizing that the evolution 
to a new Iraq will be in Turkey's interest.  To the extent 
that the visiting USG delegation can boost Turkish confidence 
about our commitment and demonstrate serious practical 
cooperation, the visit can go a long way toward getting the 
Turks to yes on the troop contribution decision. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
State Lacks "Post-War" Plan 
--------------------------- 
 
 
4. (C) The Turkish State, having essentially won the military 
side of its battle with the PKK/KADEK, has failed to follow 
up its battlefield successes with a comprehensive "post-war" 
plan to establish a new relationship with Kurdish 
communities, especially in the southeast but also in the 
large urban conglomerations of western Turkey.  Some MPs and 
members of the bureaucracy, particularly in the MFA, want to 
move quickly to loosen restrictions on Kurdish language and 
culture and take further steps to bring PKK/KADEK militants 
back to productive participation in society.  Such measures, 
they believe, would not only advance Turkey's EU bid but 
would also eliminate resilient support for the PKK/KADEK. 
However, elements of the military and bureaucracy credit the 
defeat of the PKK to an unyielding approach, and remain 
adamantly opposed to concessions of any kind.  They maintain 
their long-held view of southeastern Kurds as separatists and 
PKK/KADEK supporters.  The effects of this internal GOT 
conflict can be seen in each of the areas outlined below. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Reintegration Law: Minimal Impact 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Despite the "Reintegration Law" adopted by Parliament 
in July (reftels B-C) few armed PKK/KADEK militants have come 
down from the mountains and turned in their weapons.  The 
vast majority of those who have applied for benefits under 
the law were already serving prison sentences.  According to 
the latest Ministry of Interior Statistics: 
 
 
-- 2,094 members of PKK/KADEK or other terrorist 
organizations already serving prison sentences have applied 
for benefits. Of these, 380 have been released.  (Note: The 
GOT estimates there are 4,500-5,000 PKK/KADEK fighters in 
northern Iraq plus approximately 1,000 in southeast Turkey. 
End Note). 
 
 
-- 161 active members of terrorist organizations have turned 
themselves in and applied for benefits; 138 of these have 
been released, the remainder will be tried in court. 
 
 
6. (C) Before the law was adopted, Kurds in general and the 
human rights community universally panned the draft 
legislation as inadequate, calling instead for a general 
amnesty for PKK/KADEK militants (reftel C).  Various Kurdish 
groups argued that the law repeated the same flaws that 
doomed seven previous efforts to encourage militants to 
surrender, in particular the measure requiring surrendering 
fighters to provide information about their organizations. 
GOT officials countered that an amnesty would cause social 
unrest by allowing terrorists to go unpunished. 
 
 
7. (C) Before the law was introduced in Parliament, a number 
of contacts told us earlier drafts were broader, placing 
fewer conditions on surrendering militants.  Later, we were 
told a committee dominated by representatives of the 
intelligence and security services reviewed the draft and 
rejected it as too generous (reftel C). 
 
 
------------------------- 
GOT, Kurds Exchange Blame 
------------------------- 
 
 
8. (C) The GOT blames PKK/KADEK for the law's meager yield. 
Interior Minister Aksu told the Ambassador September 2 that 
the organization's top leaders, who are excluded from the 
benefits of the law, are actively undermining the effort 
(reftel A).  Aksu accused PKK/KADEK leaders of preventing the 
rank and file from learning about the law.  Other GOT 
officials point to: PKK/KADEK's decision to revoke its 
unilateral ceasefire; increased attacks by the terrorist 
organization, including an attempt to assassinate the Tunceli 
Governor; and the killing by PKK/KADEK members of fellow 
militant Engin Sincer in northern Iraq, allegedly for his 
support of the Reintegration Law. 
 
 
9. (C) Kurdish/human rights activists, in turn, criticize the 
GOT for failing to support the Reintegration Law with 
confidence building measures.  For the Reintegration Law to 
work, they argue, PKK/KADEK would have to decide as an 
organization to support it, and that won't happen unless the 
GOT goes the extra mile to demonstrate good faith. 
Specifically, they call on the GOT to: implement Kurdish 
language reforms adopted by Parliament; release Leyla Zana 
and three other Kurdish former MPs for the duration of their 
current retrial; and transfer jailed PKK leader Ocalan from 
Imrali Island to a mainland prison, where the reduced 
humidity would presumably relieve his reported respiratory 
ailments. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Promising Reforms Not Implemented 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
10. (C) Kurds in southeastern Turkey universally back 
Turkey's EU bid, in the hope that EU membership will force 
the GOT to allow them to express freely their Kurdish 
identity.  To the extent that Kurds support an independent 
"Kurdistan," it is largely out of the belief that only 
independence can release them from the stifling grasp of the 
Turkish State.  Over the past two years, the GOT has adopted 
a number of EU-related reforms intended to loosen 
restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language and Kurdish 
names, and provide greater space for political expression in 
general.  The GOT has also adopted legislation designed to 
crack down on torture, a nationwide problem but one which has 
left a searing mark in the southeast.  These reforms could 
potentially eliminate support for Kurdish separatism and lead 
to a new relationship between the State and the Kurdish 
community.  However, there has been little change to date on 
the streets of places in the broad belt from Bingol to Van, 
Diyarbakir to Hakkari.  Kurds have been frustrated by the 
slow pace of implementation, as anti-reform elements of the 
bureaucracy have dragged their feet and undermined 
impressive-seeming legislation by drafting highly restrictive 
implementing regulations. 
 
 
-------------------- 
Political Alienation 
-------------------- 
 
 
11. (C) In the November 2002 national elections, the 
pro-Kurdish DEHAP Party won a landslide victory in the 
southeast (DEHAP's left-wing character means, however, that 
it would be vulnerable if there were a right-of-center 
pro-Kurdish alternative).  However, like its predecessors, 
DEHAP failed to pass the threshold of 10 percent of the 
national vote required to enter Parliament.  This is a 
recurring theme: Kurds in the southeast overwhelmingly back 
the "Kurdish" party; while Kurds elsewhere, more integrated 
into Turkish society, support other parties, though they 
retain strong feelings of Kurdishness; as a result, the 
Kurdish party fails to cross the 10 percent threshold. 
Southeastern Kurds feel alienated by a democratic process in 
which, as they see it, their votes are meaningless. 
 
 
12. (C) To make matters worse, police and prosecutors 
regularly harass DEHAP (and its predecessors before it) and 
take its leaders to court.  In March, the Constitutional 
Court announced its decision to close HADEP (DEHAP's 
predecessor) on separatist charges, on the same day 
prosecutors opened a case to close DEHAP on similar charges. 
In the past, authorities also closed two of HADEP's 
predecessors. 
 
 
----------------------- 
Few Displaced Returning 
----------------------- 
 
 
13. (C) EU membership criteria require the GOT to establish a 
program to develop the economy of the southeast and enhance 
assistance to those displaced from the region during the 
height of the PKK conflict who want to return to their homes. 
 This has proven to be one of the most difficult challenges 
in Turkey's EU bid.  The GOT has argued for more time, 
claiming, with some justification, that this effort will 
involve a long-term economic project.  But the GOT to date 
has conducted only limited, secretive return programs. 
Powerful elements of the State, particularly the security 
services, do not want displaced Kurds to return to the 
southeast, where they assume Kurdish identity is strongest. 
They believe time is their ally -- the longer displaced Kurds 
remain outside the southeast, the more they will assimilate 
into mainstream society.  For the Kurds, however, the lack of 
support for returns is proof of the State's continued 
hostility. 
 
 
-------- 
Makhmour 
-------- 
 
 
14. (C) According to UNHCR Ankara rep Gesche Karrenbrock, the 
end of PKK/KADEK's unilateral ceasefire has the Turkish 
refugee residents of northern Iraq's Makhmour camp nervous. 
Those who previously were inclined to accept repatriation to 
Turkey may now prefer to wait and see how Turkey responds to 
recent violence in the southeast, and whether there will be 
more violence there.  Karrenbrock cautioned that the more the 
camp population feels pressured to return to Turkey, the less 
likely they are to do so.  She reported that there had been 
two US military visits to the camp, during which US troops 
were accompanied by Turkish liaison officers, and that these 
visits, which were not run through the UNHCR, were not 
welcomed by the camp population.  The refugees, she said, 
felt pressured to make a repatriation decision based on 
changes that had taken place in Iraq, not in Turkey. 
 
 
15. (C) Karrenbrock stressed that there was a need to 
separate the true civilians in the camp from militants and 
worried that the UN and the GOT had only budgeted for a small 
number of Makhmour returnees.  If a large group decided to 
return, there would be a financial crunch.  She also worried 
that the GOT was not prepared to facilitate the integration 
of returnees via a "fast-track" sympathetic approach, 
including legal and economic assistance.  Without these, 
returnees will wonder why they came back, and those remaining 
behind will not follow.  Finally, she said the camp residents 
lack a clear sense of what exactly is on offer in Turkey - 
not just in terms of material assistance, but of signs that 
they are wanted back in Turkey.  She said that whoever works 
on the Makhmour returns needs to talk to as many people in 
camp as possible, and not just the "leaders" who may screen 
information for political reasons.  Camp residents, 
Karrenbrock said, need to know what is going on in the fields 
of cultural rights, the lifting of emergency rule and other 
real openings in the southeast, as well as good examples of 
successful returnees.  She made a case that the US and Turkey 
should work with the UNHCR on these issues. 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
Turkish attitudes towards Iraqi Kurds 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
16. (C) Statements from PM Erdogan and FM Gul 
notwithstanding, with rare exception, Turks view Iraqi Kurds 
with suspicion and distrust.  Turks broadly see the Iraqi 
Kurds as separatists who at worst assist the PKK/KADEK, and 
at best are sympathetic to the PKK/KADEK and antagonistic to 
Turkey.  While acknowledging that at times both the KDP and 
the PUK have assisted Turkey in its fight against the 
PKK/KADEK, Turks also accuse both the KDP and the PUK of 
assisting and providing safehaven to the PKK/KADEK.  Most 
Turks believe that whatever the Iraqi Kurds say, their 
ultimate aspiration is an independent Kurdish state, with 
dire implications for Turkey.  How bad is it?  Barzani and 
Talabani are regularly vilified in Turkey and considered as 
some kind of war-lords turned political party bosses. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
Kurdish Cross-Border Solidarity 
------------------------------- 
 
 
17. (C) At the same time, Turkish Kurds feel a strong 
solidarity with Iraqi Kurds, though they are divided by 
linguistic and cultural differences.  Between 60 and 70 
Kurdish AK MPs voted against the transit of US troops through 
Turkey into Iraq in the run-up to the war, fearing the 
consequences of a wave of Turkish troops into northern Iraq. 
High-level contacts have told us Kurdish MPs remain a 
question mark concerning the possibility of a Turkish 
contribution to a stabilization force in Iraq. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EDELMAN