US embassy cable - 03ABUJA1576

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MFA PERMSEC ON TAYLOR'S EXILE

Identifier: 03ABUJA1576
Wikileaks: View 03ABUJA1576 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2003-09-09 17:42:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL LI NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001576 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FROM CDA ROGER MEECE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LI, NI 
SUBJECT: MFA PERMSEC ON TAYLOR'S EXILE 
 
 
REF: STATE 256461 
 
 
Classified by CDA Roger Meece. Reason 1.5 (b/d) 
 
 
1. (C) I took the opportunity of a September 9 courtesy call 
on Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Permanent Secretary Amb. 
Daniel Hart to convey USG concerns regarding Taylor's exile 
per reftel.  I conveyed appreciation for Nigeria's leadership 
role to find a solution to the Liberian crisis, but observed 
that any Taylor activity to influence developments in Liberia 
represents an obstacle to further progress.  Hart stressed 
that President Obasanjo had incurred political risk with 
Taylor's presence in Nigeria, as press and many sectors of 
society disapprove.  He readily agreed that concern about 
Taylor is warranted, asserting that the GON intends to keep a 
very close eye on him.  Indeed, he added, his reading of the 
conditions suggest that Taylor's Calabar exile amounts to de 
facto house arrest.  He commented that he had personally been 
suprised that Taylor had traveled to meet Obasanjo via Lagos 
this past weekend, as the trip seemed a bit "excessive" to 
him.  He acknowledged, however, that the GON is not able 
(comment: or likely fully willing) to cut off Taylor's access 
to all forms of communication. 
 
 
2.(C) I asked if the conditions governing Taylor's removal to 
Nigeria specifically precluded any activities to influence 
political developments in Liberia.  Hart said that the 
understanding was not that explicit, but that it was fully 
understood that Taylor should not do so.  Somewhat 
cryptically he added that President Blah's turnover of power 
to the transitional authority in Liberia should provide an 
opportunity to eliminate any residual Taylor role.  Hart 
affirmed that the GON would view any actions by Taylor to 
interfere in Liberia as a serious breach of his commitments, 
and he appealed for close collaboration with the U.S. in 
sharing any information that might become available in this 
regard.  I assured Hart that we are commited to close 
cooperation to ensure Taylor is contained.  Hart volunteered 
that he would share the document summarizing Taylor's 
restrictions and conditions in Nigeria, and promised he would 
send us a copy. 
 
 
3. (C) I asked if the GON had received any communication from 
the Sierra Leone tribunal regarding Taylor.  Hart said that 
to his knowledge, the GON had not, but that he would not be 
suprised by the Tribunal judge taking a "legalistic" view 
that they should have jurisdiction over Taylor.  He said that 
this is an issue for the Head(s) of State. 
 
 
4. (C) Comment:  Hart was not at all hesitant to discuss this 
issue, seemed well informed, and fully on board on the need 
to keep Taylor reigned in.  He only ducked the question of 
Sierra Leone Tribunal jurisdiction.  His general theme was 
that the GON generally and Obasanjo specifically, have 
invested a lot in Liberia and do not want Taylor to be the 
spoiler.  Taylor's presence here is a political liability, 
and clearly Hart would like his President to get credit for 
taking on the problem.  Hart's reference to the opportunity 
to eliminate Taylor's influence definitively when Blah 
transfers power is intriguing, but may reflect nothing more 
than his vision of what the transitional government will be. 
We will pursue this issue, and I will follow-up during 
anticipated calls on the Foreign Minister and hopefully 
President Obasanjo before departure for the UNGA.  End 
comment. 
MEECE 

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