US embassy cable - 03JERUSALEM2819

C O N F I D E N T I A L  JERUSALEM 002819 
 
 
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2013 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, KWBG, PGOV, IS 
SUBJECT: THE TALE OF PM ABBAS'S RESIGNATION 
 
REF: A. JERUSALEM 2771 
     B. JERUSALEM 2772 
 
Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Jeffrey Feltman, Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, disappointed 
and embittered after losing a power struggle with Arafat that 
left him publicly branded as a traitor, sent his letter of 
resignation to the PA President on September 6, then vented 
his frustrations to the Legislative Council in a closed 
session the same day.  Abbas criticized Arafat for impeding 
his ability to govern, Israel for continuing its policy of 
targeted killings, and the U.S for failing to press Israel to 
implement its roadmap commitments.  Upon receiving Abbas's 
resignation letter, Arafat discussed his PM's fate among the 
Fatah,  PLO and PLC leadership, and -- with most in favor of 
Abbas's departure -- scribbled on the letter, "Accepted, with 
God's blessing."  On September 7, Arafat, after further 
consultations with the Fatah leadership, announced his 
decision to tap PLC Speaker, Ahmed Qure'i (Abu Ala'a), to 
form a new government.  Assuming Qure'i accepts the 
appointment, he will have five weeks to form a government. 
Even as the next phase of political machinations began, 
several Fatah and PLC members in this weekend's drama looked 
back with wonder and not a little remorse.  End summary. 
 
The PM Says Goodbye 
------------------- 
 
2. (C) According to several ConGen sources in Ramallah, Abbas 
had already sent his resignation letter -- via Cabinet 
Affairs Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo and Cabinet Secretary (and 
FCC member) Hakim Balawi -- to the Muqatta'a hours before he 
addressed the PLC in closed session at noon on September 6. 
(Abed-Rabbo told A/PO that he had expected Arafat to refuse 
to accept the letter except from Abbas himself.  To 
Abed-Rabbo's surprise, Arafat appeared "eager," nearly 
grabbing the letter from Abed-Rabbo's hands.)  The PM was 
reportedly deeply disturbed by Fatah-organized demonstrations 
against him in Ramallah and Gaza the previous week (ref A), 
and graffiti on buildings in both cities branding him and his 
Security Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan collaborators with 
Israel and the U.S.  One story has it that he was 
particularly upset after hearing that his grandson's 
classmates taunted him by shouting that his grandfather was a 
traitor.  To avoid the crowd that was assembling outside the 
PLC building, Abbas entered through the rear door and, 
without revealing that he had already submitted his 
resignation, proceeded to enumerate his grievances. 
 
3. (C) Israel and the U.S., Abbas lamented, had "misled" him 
with their professions of support for his government and the 
roadmap.  Most seriously, Israel, by killing several Hamas 
and PIJ activists in Nablus and Hebron in early August, had 
effectively torpedoed the hudna, ignited a new cycle of 
violence, and halted or revoked implementation of Israel's 
other roadmap commitments.  He faulted the U.S. for not 
taking action to restrain Israel. 
 
4. (C) But Abbas directed most of his ire at Arafat.  Arafat, 
he told the legislators, had interfered with his power of 
appointment as guaranteed in the amended Basic Law, 
describing incidents in which Arafat improperly re-instated 
the head of the dismissed Personnel Bureau head in Gaza and 
revoked the appointment of Abdel Fattah Hemayel as Minister 
of Sports and Youth.  Similarly, Abbas complained about 
Arafat's interference in Abbas's decision to designate his 
Foreign Minister, Nabeel Sha'ath, as the PA's delegate at 
Arab League and UN meetings.  Abbas said he had obtained 
Arafat's acquiescence, but then the Chairman reversed his 
position, embarrassing the PM and throwing PA diplomatic 
representation into confusion. 
 
5. (C) Finally, with regard to the central issue of 
consolidating the security forces under the Prime Minister, 
Abbas argued that he had not been trying to challenge 
Arafat's constitutional role as supreme commander of the 
armed forces, but rather to bring the PA into compliance with 
the roadmap.  Nevertheless, he said, Arafat fought the move, 
even though it was clearly against an agreed PLO/PA policy to 
implement the roadmap fully.  Abbas ended his speech by 
observing that his political position had deteriorated so 
badly, he had been labeled a "Karzai" by the public.  PLC 
Speaker Abu Ala'a then announced that Abbas had submitted his 
resignation earlier in the morning. 
 
Arafat Says OK 
-------------- 
 
6. (C)  Following the PLC session, Arafat convened the Fatah 
Central Council (FCC) to discuss how to react to Abbas's 
resignation.  In the FCC, Nabeel Sha'ath and Tayib Abdel 
Rahim reportedly argued against accepting Abbas's resignation 
or, alternatively, accepting it and then re-appointing him. 
But they were in the minority, and the FCC eventually agreed 
by consensus that Abbas should go.  This view was reinforced 
by reports that Abbas had informed the press that his 
decision was final.  Arafat then reportedly made the decision 
to accept Abbas's resignation, writing on the PM's letter, 
"Accepted, with God's grace." 
 
7. (C) That evening, Arafat next summoned PLO leaders and 
about 50 PLC members to the Muqatta'a to discuss the matter 
further, even though he had already reached his decision. 
Some argued for giving Abbas another chance -- PLC member 
Mohammed Hourani, in particular, argued that Abbas had been 
treated unfairly and complained that he had been compared to 
"Karzai."  "Don't ever utter Abbas's name and Karzai's in the 
same sentence again," warned Arafat, as he announced his 
decision to the group and declared the matter at an end. 
(Abu Mazen later mused to A/PO that he didn't understand the 
complaints -- "would they rather have the warlords or Taliban 
leading Afghanistan?  It should be a compliment to be called 
'Karzai'!") 
 
Abu Ala'a Is Tapped 
------------------- 
 
8. (C) The next day, September 7, Arafat turned his attention 
to choosing Abbas's successor.  Once again, he convened the 
FCC, whose members (including four who reside abroad who 
participated by phone) unanimously supported their FCC 
colleague, Abu Ala'a.    The FCC members also reportedly 
discussed a security strategy to satisfy U.S. demands that 
the PA unify its security services under the PM and take 
action on the ground. 
 
The Weekend's Players Look Back with Remorse 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) A tone of remorse prevailed as several Fatah and PLC 
members today looked back over the weekend's events in 
conversations with Poloff.  A tired Mufid abd Rabbo, a 
Tulkarm PLC and Fatah Higher Committee member, stayed in 
Ramallah all weekend for what he described as a "series of 
meetings filled with tension, anger, and blood-loss."  Still, 
he argued, "you can't steal authorities (from Arafat) in our 
government, and that is what Abu Mazen was trying to do." 
Amin Maqbul, acting head of the Fatah Higher Committee, 
struck a defensive note in recounting the weekend's events to 
Poloff.  "We met over and over again and didn't reach an 
understanding (with Abu Mazen)," he said.  But, he insisted, 
"we didn't push him to leave."  Jamal ash-Shobaki, now 
Minister of Local Government in a caretaker cabinet, was 
inconsolable.  "Abu Mazen sincerely wanted to reform this 
government," he lamented.  "He had some successes, but 
outside problems kept strengthening the people who were being 
hurt by the changes.  So they had an excuse to start calling 
him a traitor.  Israel caused the collapse of Abu Mazen by 
never complying with the roadmap."  Nablus PLC member Dalal 
Salameh summed up the weekend without Shobaki's rancor 
(probably because she is not in danger of losing a 
ministership) but with possibly greater poignancy.  Her 
comment was an epitaph: "You lost a moderate current in 
Palestine," she said, "and we lost an important leader." 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) The alacrity with which Abbas resigned and Arafat 
accepted his resignation and tapped PLC Speaker Abu Ala'a for 
the job surprised many observers here, but Arafat and the 14 
members of Fatah's Central Committee were unlikely among them 
(ref B).  Irked by Abbas's penchant for acting alone and 
failing to consult traditional Palestinian leadership bodies 
(i.e., foremost among them the FCC, of course), Arafat and a 
determined group within the FCC, reportedly led by Hani 
al-Hassan and Abbas Zaki, have worked steadily, mostly behind 
the scenes, to undermine Abbas since the day he returned from 
the summits at Aqaba and Sharm al-Sheikh last June.  Abbas's 
efforts to wrest control of the security forces after the 
August 19 bus bombing went a step too far for Arafat.  The 
questions now are whether and to what extent Arafat and the 
FCC will back Abbas's successor.  These issues are now under 
negotiation, as Abu Ala'a works out his terms with the PA 
President for accepting the appointment. 
 
 
FELTMAN