US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1554

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Sri Lanka/Maldives: Mission views on possible reaction to proposed UNSC Resolution on Iraq

Identifier: 03COLOMBO1554
Wikileaks: View 03COLOMBO1554 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2003-09-08 10:27:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Tags: PREL MARR MOPS PGOV CE MV IZ UN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001554 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, IO/UNP, PMAT, PM/RSAT, NEA; 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:     DECL:  09-08-13 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, PGOV, CE, MV, IZ, UN 
SUBJECT:  Sri Lanka/Maldives:  Mission views on possible 
reaction to proposed UNSC Resolution on Iraq 
 
Ref:  State 256573 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) In response to Reftel, Mission has the following 
comments regarding possible Sri Lankan and Maldivian 
reaction to the proposed UN Security Council Resolution 
on Iraq. 
 
2.  (C/NF) SRI LANKA:  Although it is generally pro-U.S. 
and has not been hostile in any sense toward Coalition 
operations in Iraq, the Sri Lankan government has not 
previously expressed an interest in participating in the 
Stabilization Force, or defraying its costs.  While the 
proposed UNSC resolution would be greeted warmly by the 
government in public and in private as a sign of 
international resolve regarding Iraq, we do not believe 
that the resolution would put it in position to be a 
contributor due to domestic political considerations. 
If it was to announce a military contribution, for 
example, the government fears serious domestic criticism 
from opposition parties and others that troops would be 
leaving the country while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) remain a serious threat despite the ongoing 
peace process.  Such criticism would be made although 
the Sri Lankan Army -- which badly wants exposure to 
international peacekeeping operations -- has privately 
indicated to us that it perceives no problem, vis-a-vis 
the potential LTTE threat, with deploying perhaps a 
company to a battalion of troops overseas.  In addition, 
the government would also fear that a proposal to send 
Sri Lankan troops to Iraq might alienate the country's 
important Muslim community (seven percent of the 
population).  The GSL's control of Parliament relies in 
part on Muslim MPs, who are already upset with the 
direction of the peace process, and we think it would be 
loathe to offend Muslim sensibilities regarding Iraq. 
The concern about Muslims, of course, might be obviated 
if a new resolution leads to the participation of Muslim 
countries in the Stabilization Force. 
 
3.  (C/NF) In terms of defraying costs, while economic 
indices are looking up due to the ongoing peace process, 
Sri Lankans are already searching for the elusive "peace 
dividend" and budget constraints are severe.  In light 
of this, significant GSL monetary contributions to 
operations in Iraq would almost certainly not be 
forthcoming.  Some sort of token "in kind" contribution 
might be offered -- several months ago, for example, the 
GSL offered to send tea.  Overall, while Mission 
believes a quiet diplomatic effort should be made to 
sound out the GSL re a possible contribution if a UNSC 
resolution is in the cards, we are not confident that 
the effort would result in tangible support for 
operations in Iraq.  To some extent, however, Sri Lankan 
international policy looks to India as a guide and a 
favorable signal by the GoI to the resolution might have 
a positive impact on GSL views. 
 
4.  (C/NF) MALDIVES:  The Maldivian government has not 
previously expressed an interest in participating in the 
Stabilization Force, or defraying its costs.  While not 
explicitly negative in its spare public comments, the 
Maldivian government has not come out in support of the 
Coalition's efforts in Iraq.  Indeed, in the government- 
controlled press, the GoRM is allowing a fair amount of 
criticism of U.S. efforts to be aired in the completely 
Muslim country.  Given this situation, we think the 
proposed UNSC resolution could only help melt the ice 
with the GoRM regarding Iraq.  With a resolution, for 
example, we believe that the GoRM might even be tempted 
to provide some sort of token support, such as a medical 
or radio team, or perhaps some funds if it saw that 
other Muslim countries were joining in.  As the Maldives 
is a very small country with extremely limited military 
capabilities, we doubt that it could do more than 
something relatively modest in size.  Nonetheless, if 
the proposed UNSC resolution is passed, we believe that 
an effort should be made to sound out the Maldives 
regarding possible ways to support the Coalition's 
efforts.  Like Sri Lanka, the Maldivian government also 
looks to India on international issues, and we think its 
calculus on this matter would be affected by the Indian 
government's reaction to some degree. 
 
5.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD 

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