US embassy cable - 03AMMAN5698

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005698 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, JO 
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD BASED IRAQIS SHARE THEIR PERSONAL 
EXPERIENCES ON LIFE IN IRAQ 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) PolOff discussed with two Baghdad based Iraqis what 
their lives in Iraq are like post-Saddam, Iraqi expectations 
vs. current realities, the lack of security and basic 
services, and observations on how the U.S. can ensure 
stability, democracy and prosperity in Iraq. Among their 
chief concerns is the continued instability and the political 
power given to the Shi'a community.  End Summary. 
 
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IRAQIS HOPES DWINDLING 
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2. (C) PolOff met September 3 with Vahe Minas, an Iraqi 
Christian, businessman and wealthy landowner living in 
Baghdad, to discuss his views on the current situation in 
Iraq.  Minas holds Jordanian residency and travels frequently 
between Baghdad and Amman, where his extended family resides. 
 Minas described the situation in Baghdad as "chaotic".  He 
owns a cosmetics company, with 20 employees, and continues to 
operate his factory with the aid of generators.  He said 
Baghdadis, while hopeful and optimistic after the war, now 
feel that the U.S. presence has done nothing for them, citing 
how Iraqis, now more than ever, rely on the Saddam-era 
"ration" system for their daily subsistence.  High among his 
many concerns is the deteriorating security situation.  He 
described how he hid his 6 late model cars before the war in 
a friend's walled garden for safekeeping and how they remain 
there due to the high incidence of carjackings.  In Baghdad, 
he drives a beat up car to try to stay unnoticed by roaming 
carjackers.  He has friends who have been stopped, ordered 
out of their cars, and seen their cars driven off by gangs 
who seem to operate with total impunity. 
 
3. (C) Minas detailed how U.S. forces are losing much of the 
goodwill they initially enjoyed after the war.  He related 
how he found his house looted after the war with only a few 
pieces of furniture left.  Adding insult to injury, he 
returned days later to find that U.S. forces had broken his 
front door, burst in looking for documents, and damaged the 
few remaining pieces of furniture.  He wondered why U.S. 
forces had not contacted him and asked for keys to the house. 
 He said the U.S. forces later claimed they were searching 
for important documents but all they found were Minas family 
deeds to properties owned in Iraq.  He claimed U.S. forces 
often rely on misinformation supplied by ill intentioned 
informants.  Minas is very concerned about kidnappings for 
ransom and the lack of security along the Baghdad-Amman 
corridor.   He cannot understand why U.S. forces are not able 
to patrol such a vital road and provide travelers a greater 
level of security.  He said bandits are known to operate in 
the Ramadi-Falluja sector. 
 
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Political Landscape 
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4. (C) Minas said that the Governing Council (GC) lacks 
confidence and credibility.  Iraqis view them as unknowns and 
consider GC member Adnan Pachachi as a follower rather than a 
leader.  On INC leader Ahmed Chalabi, Minas acknowledged 
that, although he comes from a prominent and respected Iraqi 
family, he is tarnished by allegations of corruption and seen 
as an outsider rather than someone who endured the many 
hardships suffered by Iraqis under Saddam's rule.  He added 
that many Iraqis have a soft spot for Hashemite pretender 
Sharif Ali, seen by some Iraqis as next-in-line to the Iraqi 
royal family. 
 
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Bring back the Ba'athi Armed Forces and more... 
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5.  On September 2 PolOff met with Dr. Nihad Jassam, a Sunni, 
Baghdad based businessman and member of an informal "think 
tank" composed of Iraqis from different religions, political 
backgrounds and walks of life.  Jassam said the biggest 
mistake the U.S. made was abolishing the Iraqi regular armed 
forces.  The regular army was not closely aligned with 
Saddam's regime and was widely supported by the people. 
Evidence of this, he highlighted, was that the regular army 
did not fight against U.S. forces.  He stressed that the U.S. 
must bring back the Ba'athi armed forces, "wearing the same 
old uniforms and using the same tanks" to show people a 100% 
Iraqi face they recognize.  This step would allow U.S. forces 
to get out of major cities and make the "occupation" less 
visible.  He added that the U.S. armed forces hold no 
credibility with average Iraqis. 
 
6. (C) Jassam described the Governing Council as an 
ineffective body that "has no arms and legs".  Jassam also 
recommended, after bringing back the regular armed forces, 
naming Ministers of Defense (letting the army itself make the 
choice)  and Foreign Affairs would contribute to the 
stabilization of the country to be followed by the 
establishment of parliament.  Why, asked Jassam rhetorically, 
must Iraqis waste time drafting a new constitution when the 
1921 Constitution can be updated and modernized.  He warned 
against federalism, which he believed could promote 
sectarianism, and suggested following King Faisal's 
autonomous governorates approach. 
7. (C) Jassam added that bringing back the Iraqi monarchy 
would act as a unifying symbol for all Iraqis.  Iraqis would 
have to determine, he stressed, the type of monarchy, the 
powers of the King and whether the armed forces would be 
under the  control of the King or a separate Prime Minister. 
He opined that the armed forces must be composed of mixed 
Sunni, Shi'a, Christian, Kurdish and Turkmen regiments and 
stressed that the U.S. would be instrumental in making it a 
professional army. 
 
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Shi'a Empowerment: Double Edged Sword 
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8. (C) Jassam warned against allowing the Shi'a to gain the 
"political" upperhand in Iraq.  Jassam, a Sunni married to a 
Shi'a, said that the Sunni were the "glue" that held Iraq 
together.  He stressed the region is mainly Sunni, Christians 
view the Sunni as moderates and have established strong 
bonds, and the Shi'a accept them as fellow Arabs.  He 
believes the Shi'a are playing a game of "wait and see" and 
warned that once they've obtained what they want no one will 
be able to control them.  He would not go into further 
details but promised to continue the dialogue with PolOff 
when he next visits Amman. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9. (C) Both Minas and Jassam consider themselves part of an 
elite group of Iraqis who want to rebuild Iraq.  They both 
want to see the U.S. succeed in Iraq and set the country on a 
prosperous and democratic road.  While still optimistic, they 
are deeply concerned with the slow progress and continuing 
political and social instability.   Minas and Jassam both 
believe that the U.S. opened up a political "Pandora's box" 
in Iraq, and that it will prove difficult to determine what 
shape the Iraqi political landscape will follow. 
HALE