US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1546

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Peace Process: Indian sticks vs. Norwegian carrots

Identifier: 03COLOMBO1546
Wikileaks: View 03COLOMBO1546 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2003-09-05 06:30:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PTER PINR CE IN NO LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 001546 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. 
MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:     DECL:  09-05-13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, CE, IN, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Peace Process:  Indian sticks vs. Norwegian 
carrots 
 
Refs:  Colombo 1533, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) The Ambassador paid introductory calls on Indian 
High Commissioner Nirumpam Sen and Norwegian Ambassador 
Hans Brattskar on September 4.  The two were a study in 
contrasts.  Sen, not surprisingly, evinced a hardline 
towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
The LTTE needs to see only sticks, not carrots, he said. 
Asked what "sticks" could be used, Sen thought that a 
Canadian proscription would hit the LTTE hard.  He 
thought that US redesignation would also be a useful 
signal.  Sen also expressed great concern about the 
impact of cohabitation on the peace process.  In a 
rather confusing aside, he predicted that Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe would become President in two years, and 
that President Kumaratunga could then become PM, "but 
only if she has more power than Ranil has now." 
Outsiders, he said, could help by thinking of creative 
ways to give CBK a stake in the game. 
 
2.  (C) Brattskar, by contrast, emphasized carrots for 
the LTTE.  Showing his unease with the recent Japanese 
proposal for a donors meeting during Special Envoy 
Akashi's upcoming visit (see Reftel) he said it would be 
counterproductive to attempt to only provide 
humanitarian assistance in the North and East for now 
and withhold development assistance until the peace 
talks resume.  Perhaps showing a bit of clientitis, he 
said that he had told the Tigers that the assassinations 
of their opponents had to stop because "they create a 
bad atmosphere for the peace talks."  When the 
Ambassador noted that they also involved the murder of 
people, Brattskar said, of course, that was also a bad 
thing.  The Ambassador also informed Brattskar of the 
highly likely U.S. redesignation of the LTTE and the USG 
desire that it not be used as an excuse by the Tigers 
for further delays in resumption of peace talks. 
Brattskar thought a direct explanation to the Tigers of 
what we were doing and why would be helpful.  In 
particular, he thought the Tigers should learn that the 
redesignation did not mean the Tigers would have to wait 
three years for another chance at getting off the list. 
Interestingly, Sen, who has a totally different 
perspective on the LTTE, also thought a "one-off" 
US/LTTE contact would be useful. 
 
3.  (C) COMMENT:  Brattskar's comments raise the 
potential for a spirited debate at the Japanese-proposed 
Sept 12 meeting over how to proceed with assistance.  In 
the meantime, it would be useful if the Department could 
provide us an update on the redesignation timeline.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
4.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD 

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