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| Identifier: | 03COLOMBO1546 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03COLOMBO1546 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Colombo |
| Created: | 2003-09-05 06:30:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV PTER PINR CE IN NO LTTE |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 001546 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09-05-13 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, CE, IN, NO, LTTE - Peace Process SUBJECT: Peace Process: Indian sticks vs. Norwegian carrots Refs: Colombo 1533, and previous (U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 1. (C) The Ambassador paid introductory calls on Indian High Commissioner Nirumpam Sen and Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar on September 4. The two were a study in contrasts. Sen, not surprisingly, evinced a hardline towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE needs to see only sticks, not carrots, he said. Asked what "sticks" could be used, Sen thought that a Canadian proscription would hit the LTTE hard. He thought that US redesignation would also be a useful signal. Sen also expressed great concern about the impact of cohabitation on the peace process. In a rather confusing aside, he predicted that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe would become President in two years, and that President Kumaratunga could then become PM, "but only if she has more power than Ranil has now." Outsiders, he said, could help by thinking of creative ways to give CBK a stake in the game. 2. (C) Brattskar, by contrast, emphasized carrots for the LTTE. Showing his unease with the recent Japanese proposal for a donors meeting during Special Envoy Akashi's upcoming visit (see Reftel) he said it would be counterproductive to attempt to only provide humanitarian assistance in the North and East for now and withhold development assistance until the peace talks resume. Perhaps showing a bit of clientitis, he said that he had told the Tigers that the assassinations of their opponents had to stop because "they create a bad atmosphere for the peace talks." When the Ambassador noted that they also involved the murder of people, Brattskar said, of course, that was also a bad thing. The Ambassador also informed Brattskar of the highly likely U.S. redesignation of the LTTE and the USG desire that it not be used as an excuse by the Tigers for further delays in resumption of peace talks. Brattskar thought a direct explanation to the Tigers of what we were doing and why would be helpful. In particular, he thought the Tigers should learn that the redesignation did not mean the Tigers would have to wait three years for another chance at getting off the list. Interestingly, Sen, who has a totally different perspective on the LTTE, also thought a "one-off" US/LTTE contact would be useful. 3. (C) COMMENT: Brattskar's comments raise the potential for a spirited debate at the Japanese-proposed Sept 12 meeting over how to proceed with assistance. In the meantime, it would be useful if the Department could provide us an update on the redesignation timeline. END COMMENT. 4. (U) Minimize considered. LUNSTEAD
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