US embassy cable - 03DJIBOUTI1644

S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 001644 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, MOPS, DJ 
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: TERRORIST DOES NOT MATERIALIZE, BUT 
DRILL SUGGESTS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT EMBASSY 
COOPERATION WITH OTHER USG ELEMENTS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Tim Smith for reason 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (SBU) Because of the request for an immediate report, we 
have been  unable to reach non-State offices for clearance. 
For this reason, this cable is less detailed and shorter than 
a full report would be. 
 
2. (S) Summary:  Thursday, September 4, Combined Joint Task 
Force/Horn of Africa (CJTF/HOA), housed at Camp Lemonier on 
the southern end of Djibouti's Ambouli International Airport, 
prepared for the possible apprehension of one of East 
Africa's most prominent terrorists, the Al Qaeda leader 
associated with the Embassy bombings in 1998 and Mombassa 
attack of 2002,   CJTF actions included an evacuation drill 
which removed most of the camp's personnel to areas outside the 
compound in order to lower the potential death toll of a 
September 11-type suicide plane attack on the base.  Special 
Forces units mobilized to assist Djiboutian authorities in 
the possible orderly capture of a high-level Al Qaeda 
operative, or to deal with a hostage situation or prolonged 
standoff.  AmEmbassy Djibouti assisted CJTF by obtaining 
President Ismail Omar Guelleh's permission for the proposed 
operations and the President's instruction to Djiboutian 
security forces to follow the directions of CTFJ and the 
Embassy Regional Affair officer in case of an operation at 
the airport.(End Summary) 
 
3. (S) Intelligence received by CJTF at 11:45 suggested that 
Kenyan citizen Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the Al Qaeda leader 
believed to have had direct links with all three successful 
terrorist attacks in Kenya, would be departing on a 
commercial flight from Mogadishu.   Because of the 
possibility that Nabhan might be planning a suicide bombing 
attempt on the approximately 1700 American military personnel 
stationed at Lemonier, CJTF/HOA Commander Brigadier General 
Mastin Robeson ordered an evacuation drill to take all but a 
skeleton crew out of the danger zone of a direct hit during 
the scheduled arrival times for the three commercial flights 
(3:00 to 4:30 pm). 
 
4. (S) While the Station Chief and CJTF worked with 
Djiboutian security forces to prepare for Nabhan's 
apprehension or hostage standoff, American Embassy officers 
worked through the President's Qat-impaired aides to obtain 
Guelleh's personal approval of the arrest of Nabhan and his 
order to Djiboutian security forces to support the American 
plan. However, Nabhan did not arrive on any of the flights, 
and the operation stood down at approximately 5:30 pm. 
 
5. (S) Conclusion: CJTF forced were able to respond quickly 
to implement their plan.  Despite some initial difficulties 
with communications, we were equally effective in getting 
Presidential permission for the operation.  While permission 
probably would have been possible after the fact, Post 
believes that our  effort was important for maintaining 
Guelleh's complete support for the Global War on Terrorism. 
Tomorrow's (September 5) after-action meeting will prepare a 
report and allow all parties the opportunity to work off some 
of the rougher edges. 
SMITH