US embassy cable - 03TEGUCIGALPA2380

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 002380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P, T, WHA, WHA/CEN, PM, AND INR/IAA 
NSC FOR SHANNON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MASS, MCAP, PBTS, PINR, HO 
SUBJECT: HONDURAS READY TO MOVE FORWARD ON REGIONAL 
DISARMAMENT; WILL NOT NEGOTIATE BILATERALLY 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 2274 
     B. TEGUCIGALPA 2022 
     C. MANAGUA 2575 
     D. MANAGUA 2585 
     E. SECSTATE 249219 
     F. MANAGUA 2659 
     G. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA 041716Z SEP 03 
 
Classified By: PolChief Francisco Palmieri; 
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  According to Government of Honduras (GOH) 
officials, Honduras is still very inclined to move forward on 
regional disarmament, but remains insistent that the process 
proceed through established channels, particularly the 
Central American Security Commission (SICA), and that all the 
Central American (CENTAM) countries proceed in tandem. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials acknowledged that 
the current process is proceeding slowly, but strongly argued 
that it at least presents a viable roadmap that the CENTAMs 
can follow. Moreover, the Maduro Administration maintains 
they are much more concerned about trans-national security 
threats, such as organized crime and narco-terrorism, rather 
than excess military inventories, which they claim are not a 
major problem in Honduras.  Apart from its vaunted F-5 fleet 
(of which only 7-8 out of 11 aircraft are operational), 
Honduras' armed forces are the smallest in the region and its 
weapons inventories among the most modest.  As such, the 
Nicaraguan arms reduction initiative was not well received in 
Honduras (ref A).  The GOH views the proposal as a means to 
divert attention from Nicaragua's excess Man Portable Air 
Defense Systems (MANPADS).  Beyond that, the GOH feels that 
the Government of Nicaragua (GON) proposal lacks substance, 
and in its current form, actually sets back progress that has 
already been made through the SICA.  Post will send 
translated synopsis of Nicaraguan proposal via septel.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
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Nicaraguan Arms Reduction Initiative 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (S) The GOH takes issue with the Nicaraguan arms reduction 
initiative on many levels.  Politically, GOH officials view 
the Nicaraguan proposal as grandstanding; offering nothing 
new, ignoring long-standing positions, and actually reopening 
important key elements (including agreed upon concepts, 
definitions, and reporting formats) from the existing agenda. 
 In essence, the MFA points out that it basically brings the 
whole process back to square one.  The GOH believes the GON 
knows this and is suspicious that the true GON agenda is to 
undermine the disarmament process and deflect USG and 
regional attention away from its excess stocks of MANPADS. 
Moreover, the GOH remains concerned over the mixed signals 
being sent from the GON by its civilian leadership and 
military establishment.  They cite numerous press statements 
by GON military leaders that seem to contradict elements of 
the GON proposal.  GOH officials tell us that they have 
little confidence in negotiating with the GON civilian 
leadership, whom they feel will not be able to deliver on any 
agreement over the objections of the Nicaraguan military. 
 
3. (S) Militarily, Honduras views MANPADS as a bilateral 
issue between the USG and the GON.  Minister of Defense (MOD) 
Federico Breve has been emphatic that, while he supports a 
rationally balanced program of CENTAM arms control, the GOH 
will not sacrifice Honduras' fleet of F-5's on a bilateral 
basis (ref G).  (COMMENT:  The GOH understands the need to 
reduce MANPAD stocks in Nicaragua.  However, the GOH feels 
that unfair pressure is being applied by the U.S. on 
Honduras.  The MOD has made clear to EmbOffs, SecDef, and 
CJCS that the GOH will continue to resist any effort to 
couple its remaining fleet of F-5's for a reduction of 
Nicaraguan SA-7 stocks, which in his view are of little value 
against F-5's.  END COMMENT) 
 
------------ 
Beyond F-5's 
------------ 
 
4. (C) There is a clear divergence of views on regional 
disarmament.  GOH military and diplomatic sources report that 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala do not believe the 
disarmament process concerns them.  A senior MFA official 
said El Salvador particularly views the process instead to be 
between the GOH and the GON over MANPADS and F-5's. 
President Maduro and MOD Breve, in carefully nuanced public 
statements, have indicated the GOH remains ready to discuss 
its fleet of F-5's, but only as part of a regional 
discussion.  GOH civilian leaders are also quick to point out 
that the Honduran military is considerably smaller than its 
neighbors, and that the fleet of F-5's go a long way toward 
countering its neighbors numerical superiority. 
5. (C) President Maduro has repeatedly stated that military 
hardware in the region is excessive.  However, Maduro feels 
strongly that time would be more productively spent 
concentrating on ways to improve CENTAM cooperation against 
trans-national threats such as organized crime, 
narco-terrorism, and kidnapping syndicates, which affect the 
entire region and pose significant threats to all CENTAM 
countries.  The constant violation of CENTAM territory by 
narcotraffickers is a particular area where Maduro would like 
to see increased regional cooperation.  (COMMENT:  Maduro's 
comments reflect the extent to which SOUTHCOM Combatant 
Commander General Hill's and WHA Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Fisk's initiatives on regional military integration have 
penetrated strategic thinking here.  GOH officials have noted 
on numerous occasions that war between any of the CENTAM 
countries is now unthinkable as well as unsustainable.  END 
COMMENT) 
 
6. (S) Post notes that Honduras' over-rated fleet of F-5's 
should also be put in perspective.  Honduras maintains a 
fleet of 10 F-5's at the Coronel Hector Caraccioli Moncada 
Air Base in La Ceiba on the Caribbean coast.  Of these, only 
seven-to-eight are currently operational with a readiness 
rate of only 72 percent.  The remaining fleet will 
deteriorate further because of a lack of spare parts, making 
it likely that within a few years Honduras will not be able 
to effectively deploy these assets.  It is also highly 
improbable the GOH will invest scarce resources into 
replacing this fleet with more modern jet aircraft. 
Moreover, Honduran combat pilots train on these aircraft only 
one hour a month due to high fuel costs. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT:  While open to discussing disarmament issues 
on a regional basis, Honduran MFA and MOD officials express 
some exasperation and frustration that the GON has 
successfully convinced the USG to link MANPAD destruction to 
either a reduction in Honduras' F-5 inventory or a broader, 
and more politically tedious and difficult, regional arms 
balancing process.  The bottom line is that Honduras will 
resist any effort to discuss disarmament issues on a 
bilateral basis, particularly with the GON.  END COMMENT. 
Palmer