US embassy cable - 03JERUSALEM2771

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FATAH LEADER HINTS AT PM ABBAS'S DOWNFALL

Identifier: 03JERUSALEM2771
Wikileaks: View 03JERUSALEM2771 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Consulate Jerusalem
Created: 2003-09-04 16:06:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KPAL KWBG PGOV IS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
O 041606Z SEP 03
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4972
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L  JERUSALEM 002771 
 
 
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, KWBG, PGOV, IS 
SUBJECT: FATAH LEADER HINTS AT PM ABBAS'S DOWNFALL 
 
Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Jeffrey Feltman, Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Fatah Central Committee member and frequent 
Arafat ally Sakher Habash, in a conversation with Pol/C in 
Ramallah 9/3, said he saw only two ways out of the ongoing 
political crisis in the Palestinian Authority:  either PM 
Abbas makes amends with Arafat and the Fatah leadership, or 
he resigns and Arafat appoints another Central Committee 
member as PM in his place.  Habash said he thought Abbas had 
little to gain from seeking support from the Legislative 
Council; the PLC may not vote down his government, but it is 
also unlikely to give him a new mandate.  Habash guessed that 
Abbas knows this and wants to use his PLC appearance on 9/4 
to presage his resignation from the government.  End summary. 
 
"Peackocks Fighting Over a Garbage Dump" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Abu Mazen and Abu Ammar (Arafat) are "two peacocks 
fighting over a garbage dump," scoffed Sakher Habash, an 
influential member of Fatah's Central Committee who has been 
closely involved in the recent shuttle diplomacy between the 
PA Prime Minister and the PLO Chairman.  Instead of fighting, 
they should be working closely together because they need one 
another to carry out the difficult steps on reform and 
security called for in the roadmap.  He laid primary blame 
for the failed relationship with Abu Mazen, who in his view 
has failed to consult the Chairman sufficiently. 
 
3. (C) Habash also faulted the PM for resigning from Fatah's 
governing body, the Central Committee (Note: Abbas resigned 
from the Central Committee on July 7 after he was accused by 
its members of failing to achieve sufficient results in 
roadmap talks with the GOI.  The Central Committee has 
refused to accept his resignation.  End note).  "Without the 
backing of Fatah and Arafat, who will support him?  How can 
he be expected to confront Hamas?" he asked, pointing to the 
PM's poor faring in recent public opinion polls 
(three-percent popularity in a July poll).  Abbas added to 
his difficulties by delegating Interior Minister authorities 
to Mohammed Dahlan, Habash said, thus "circumventing" the 
Fatah Central Committee's decree that the Interior Minister 
must be one of their own. 
 
4. (C) Finally, Habash concluded, neither Israel nor the U.S. 
gave the PM sufficient support.  Habash said he did not doubt 
that the U.S. wanted Abbas to succeed, as the means of making 
the roadmap succeed.  But he said that he had serious doubts 
that Israel had accepted the roadmap in good faith -- 
"Otherwise, they would have done much more to strengthen Abu 
Mazen." 
 
Cooperate or Resign 
------------------- 
 
5. (C) So what's the way forward, Pol/C asked?  Habash 
responded that there are only two options.  Under the first, 
Abbas makes amends with Arafat, re-joins the Central 
Committee, and comes to a mutually acceptable resolution of 
who controls the security services (Note:  As reported 
previously, the plan currently under discussion involves the 
PM appointing a Central Committee member such as Nasser Yusif 
as Interior Minister with authority over all the security 
forces, and agreeing to cooperate with an Arafat-chaired 
"national security council" that would provide policy 
guidance on security matters.  End note). 
 
6. (C) Under the second, PM Abbas resigns and Arafat appoints 
a new PM.  Habash was quick to emphasize that any new PM 
would also need to come from the Central Committee; he 
refused to discuss likely names, only noting that "there are 
eleven of us here" and ruling out himself.  Asked for his 
reaction to Salam Fayyad and Munib al-Masri as possible PM 
candidates -- Fayyad is a political independent and Masri, 
while a Fatah member, has mainly concentrated on his business 
activities -- he laughed and offered more colorful metaphors. 
 While praising the Finance Minister's performance and 
personal integrity, he said, "Fayyad is a dentist.  Why 
appoint a dentist when what we need is a cardiologist?"  As 
for the businessman Masri, he said, "He is made of wax; he 
will melt in the job." 
 
7. (C) As for Abbas's gambit to elicit a new mandate from the 
PLC on 9/4, he said he doubted it would help him, as the PLC 
would likely neither vote him down nor give him his desired 
mandate.  "He is probably using the PLC to prepare for his 
resignation," Habash mused. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) Throughout the meeting, Habash returned to the theme 
that no prime minister can succeed without the support of 
Arafat and Fatah's leadership.  Although there is no 
precedent to Abu Mazen's premiership, one could argue that 
recent history indicates that he has a point.  Beginning with 
his quarrels with Arafat over the formation of his government 
in April, Abbas became increasingly exasperated with Arafat 
and his allies in Fatah, consulted them less frequently, and 
finally resigned from the Central Committee in early July 
after its members leveled harsh criticism at him for his 
handling of roadmap negotiations with Israel.  The conflict 
with Arafat and the Fatah elders flared up again in August 
over who should control the security services.  Given the 
stakes involved in the security services issue, it was not 
surprising therefore that Arafat and his allies fought back 
more fiercely, launching a series of demonstrations this week 
against Abbas and his government (singling out Fayyad and 
Dahlan in particular), raiding Fayyad's offices in Gaza, and 
encouraging an Arafat appointee who was dismissed by Abbas to 
remain on the job with the assistance of armed gunmen. 
Lacking public support, Abbas has turned to the PLC for a 
mandate, which he is unlikely to get.  Of course, there is 
another way that we choose to read this tale:  that Abu Mazen 
was never really given a fair chance, with or without the 
Fatah Central Committee, because Arafat was never going to 
allow him to exercise real authority. 
 
 
FELTMAN 

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