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| Identifier: | 03JERUSALEM2771 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03JERUSALEM2771 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Consulate Jerusalem |
| Created: | 2003-09-04 16:06:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL KPAL KWBG PGOV IS |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
O 041606Z SEP 03 FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4972 INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 002771 NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013 TAGS: PREL, KPAL, KWBG, PGOV, IS SUBJECT: FATAH LEADER HINTS AT PM ABBAS'S DOWNFALL Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Jeffrey Feltman, Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Fatah Central Committee member and frequent Arafat ally Sakher Habash, in a conversation with Pol/C in Ramallah 9/3, said he saw only two ways out of the ongoing political crisis in the Palestinian Authority: either PM Abbas makes amends with Arafat and the Fatah leadership, or he resigns and Arafat appoints another Central Committee member as PM in his place. Habash said he thought Abbas had little to gain from seeking support from the Legislative Council; the PLC may not vote down his government, but it is also unlikely to give him a new mandate. Habash guessed that Abbas knows this and wants to use his PLC appearance on 9/4 to presage his resignation from the government. End summary. "Peackocks Fighting Over a Garbage Dump" ---------------------------------------- 2. (C) Abu Mazen and Abu Ammar (Arafat) are "two peacocks fighting over a garbage dump," scoffed Sakher Habash, an influential member of Fatah's Central Committee who has been closely involved in the recent shuttle diplomacy between the PA Prime Minister and the PLO Chairman. Instead of fighting, they should be working closely together because they need one another to carry out the difficult steps on reform and security called for in the roadmap. He laid primary blame for the failed relationship with Abu Mazen, who in his view has failed to consult the Chairman sufficiently. 3. (C) Habash also faulted the PM for resigning from Fatah's governing body, the Central Committee (Note: Abbas resigned from the Central Committee on July 7 after he was accused by its members of failing to achieve sufficient results in roadmap talks with the GOI. The Central Committee has refused to accept his resignation. End note). "Without the backing of Fatah and Arafat, who will support him? How can he be expected to confront Hamas?" he asked, pointing to the PM's poor faring in recent public opinion polls (three-percent popularity in a July poll). Abbas added to his difficulties by delegating Interior Minister authorities to Mohammed Dahlan, Habash said, thus "circumventing" the Fatah Central Committee's decree that the Interior Minister must be one of their own. 4. (C) Finally, Habash concluded, neither Israel nor the U.S. gave the PM sufficient support. Habash said he did not doubt that the U.S. wanted Abbas to succeed, as the means of making the roadmap succeed. But he said that he had serious doubts that Israel had accepted the roadmap in good faith -- "Otherwise, they would have done much more to strengthen Abu Mazen." Cooperate or Resign ------------------- 5. (C) So what's the way forward, Pol/C asked? Habash responded that there are only two options. Under the first, Abbas makes amends with Arafat, re-joins the Central Committee, and comes to a mutually acceptable resolution of who controls the security services (Note: As reported previously, the plan currently under discussion involves the PM appointing a Central Committee member such as Nasser Yusif as Interior Minister with authority over all the security forces, and agreeing to cooperate with an Arafat-chaired "national security council" that would provide policy guidance on security matters. End note). 6. (C) Under the second, PM Abbas resigns and Arafat appoints a new PM. Habash was quick to emphasize that any new PM would also need to come from the Central Committee; he refused to discuss likely names, only noting that "there are eleven of us here" and ruling out himself. Asked for his reaction to Salam Fayyad and Munib al-Masri as possible PM candidates -- Fayyad is a political independent and Masri, while a Fatah member, has mainly concentrated on his business activities -- he laughed and offered more colorful metaphors. While praising the Finance Minister's performance and personal integrity, he said, "Fayyad is a dentist. Why appoint a dentist when what we need is a cardiologist?" As for the businessman Masri, he said, "He is made of wax; he will melt in the job." 7. (C) As for Abbas's gambit to elicit a new mandate from the PLC on 9/4, he said he doubted it would help him, as the PLC would likely neither vote him down nor give him his desired mandate. "He is probably using the PLC to prepare for his resignation," Habash mused. Comment ------- 8. (C) Throughout the meeting, Habash returned to the theme that no prime minister can succeed without the support of Arafat and Fatah's leadership. Although there is no precedent to Abu Mazen's premiership, one could argue that recent history indicates that he has a point. Beginning with his quarrels with Arafat over the formation of his government in April, Abbas became increasingly exasperated with Arafat and his allies in Fatah, consulted them less frequently, and finally resigned from the Central Committee in early July after its members leveled harsh criticism at him for his handling of roadmap negotiations with Israel. The conflict with Arafat and the Fatah elders flared up again in August over who should control the security services. Given the stakes involved in the security services issue, it was not surprising therefore that Arafat and his allies fought back more fiercely, launching a series of demonstrations this week against Abbas and his government (singling out Fayyad and Dahlan in particular), raiding Fayyad's offices in Gaza, and encouraging an Arafat appointee who was dismissed by Abbas to remain on the job with the assistance of armed gunmen. Lacking public support, Abbas has turned to the PLC for a mandate, which he is unlikely to get. Of course, there is another way that we choose to read this tale: that Abu Mazen was never really given a fair chance, with or without the Fatah Central Committee, because Arafat was never going to allow him to exercise real authority. FELTMAN
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