US embassy cable - 03AMMAN5569

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SOLANA IN AMMAN: DOWNBEAT ON ROADMAP, IRAN

Identifier: 03AMMAN5569
Wikileaks: View 03AMMAN5569 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2003-09-02 16:56:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL KPAL PTER IS IR JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005569 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, PTER, IS, IR, JO 
SUBJECT: SOLANA IN AMMAN:  DOWNBEAT ON ROADMAP, IRAN 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (S)  EU Foreign Policy Chief Xavier Solana briefed EU 
ambassadors in Amman September 1 on his recent swing through 
the Middle East and Iran.  On the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process, Solana expressed extreme frustration that 
Palestinian infighting and Israeli intransigence would 
scuttle the roadmap, leaving no alternative solution in its 
wake.  On Iran, he reported that President Khatami was 
stunned by the Najaf bombing, and that the Iranians were 
evasive when questioned about Iran's nuclear program and 
future cooperation with the IAEA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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SOLANA VERY DOWNBEAT ON PALESTINIANS... 
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2.  (S)  Spanish Charge Juan Jose Escobar (protect) briefed 
PolCouns September 2 on Xavier Solana's readout to EU 
ambassadors on his trip to the Middle Eats and Iran.  In 
Amman, Escobar said, Solana saw King Abdullah and Prime 
Minister Ali Abul Ragheb, who listened to Solana's account of 
his meetings in Israel and the West Bank, but offered little 
in exchange.  King Abdullah had criticized Arafat, Sharon, 
and Syria for their inflexible positions on the roadmap. 
 
3.  (S)  Speaking from his notes of Solana's briefing, 
Escobar said Solana described himself as "very pessimistic" 
about chances for success of the roadmap because of 
Palestinian political infighting and the hardening of 
Israel's position on roadmap implementation.  Solana 
expressed great frustration with the continuing battles 
between PA Chairman Yassir Arafat and PM Mahmoud Abbas (Abu 
Mazen).  In his conversation with Solana September 1, Abu 
Mazen told him that he wanted to remain in office, but Solana 
believes Abu Mazen is "determined to provoke a vote of 
confidence" in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). 
PLC speaker Abu Alaa told Solana that, if Abu Mazen seeks a 
vote of confidence, he might well lose, then the PA would be 
left without a PM or a PM candidate acceptable to Israel and 
the U.S.  By saying that Israeli considers Abu Mazen its only 
acceptable Palestinian interlocutor, Solana argued, Israel is 
inadvertently contributing to Abu Mazen's decline. 
 
4.  (S)  Solana also expressed discomfort about infighting 
between Mohammad Dahlan and Jibril Rajoub for control of 
Palestinian security forces.  The best solution to this 
battle, Solana posited, was to "end the dual control" of the 
security services by unifying them under an Interior 
Minister.  Solana said that Arafat was working against this 
solution. 
 
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...AND ISRAELIS AS WELL 
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5.  (S)  Solana had even harsher comments for the GOI and PM 
Sharon.  Israel's position that it will not accept a new 
Palestinian "hudna" (truce), its policy of continued targeted 
assassinations, and its hardened position on Arafat were 
"endangering the roadmap."  Solana was particularly disturbed 
by Israel's policy not to talk to foreign leaders who visit 
Arafat.  Solana said UN envoy Terje Roed Larsen, EU Middle 
East envoy Otte, and several EU foreign ministers had 
complained that this policy would make it impossible for them 
to speak to both sides and seek solutions.  Solana had hoped 
to see PM Sharon on September 1, but was afraid that Sharon 
would refuse to see him (Note:  Escobar said it was his 
understanding that Sharon had not seen Solana.  End note.) 
 
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"A VERY GRAVE MOMENT" 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (S)  Solana feared that the peace process was at "a very 
grave moment."  He told the EU envoys that the best possible 
-- although unlikely -- end to the current crisis would be 
 
--  Abu Mazen winning a vote of confidence; 
 
--  Dahlan gaining control of all Palestinian security 
services; 
 
--  the PA taking some real steps against HAMAS and Islamic 
Jihad in southern Gaza; and 
 
--  Israel responding positively to these Palestinian 
gestures by relaxing the closures and ending assassinations 
of Palestinian militants. 
-------------------------------- 
IRANIANS SHAKEN BY NAJAF BOMBING 
-------------------------------- 
7.  (S)  Solana then briefed on his visit to Tehran.  Solana 
arrived in Tehran just hours after the bombing at the Shia 
shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, Iraq, and said that President 
Mohammad Khatami and Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi were 
"stunned" by the bombing.  Solana said that, for the first 
time in his meetings with the Iranians, he saw "the 
realization that Iran had to fight against terrorism, no 
matter its source or justification."   Solana said Khatami 
and Kharrazi were "evasive" when questioned about Iran's 
willingness to cooperate with the IAEA on alleged Iranian 
enrichment of uranium. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (S)  Escobar said Solana spoke most -- and most 
passionately -- about the peace process and his frustration 
with both the Israelis and Palestinians. 
 
HALE 

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