US embassy cable - 00HANOI765

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NOTES FROM SECDEF VISIT TO VIETNAM: PM KHAI TENSE, ANXIOUS TO DELIVER MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

Identifier: 00HANOI765
Wikileaks: View 00HANOI765 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Hanoi
Created: 2000-04-13 09:25:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL MARR ECON PINR VM DPOL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


2000HANOI00765 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO3595

PAGE 01        HANOI  00765  131006Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CEA-01   CIAE-00  COME-00  
      CTME-00  DINT-00  DOTE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EXIM-01  
      E-00     FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-01    FRB-00   H-01     TEDE-00  
      INR-00   ITC-01   L-00     MOFM-04  MOF-03   AC-01    NSAE-00  
      OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     
      SP-00    SSO-00   STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  
      PRM-01   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /018W
                  ------------------4B3461  131007Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9553
INFO SECDQ WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/FPA//
DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 000765 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB, INR/EAP/SEA, INR/B 
NSC FOR RAVIC HUSO 
SECDEF FOR ISA/EAP/LSTERN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/04/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, ECON, PINR, VM, DPOL 
SUBJECT: NOTES FROM SECDEF VISIT TO VIETNAM: PM KHAI TENSE, ANXIOUS TO DELIVER MESSAGE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  00765  131006Z 
 
REF: A) HANOI 686    B) HANOI 548   C) HANOI 530 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM DENNIS HARTER; 
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
2. (C) REFTELS HAVE REPORTED EXTENSIVELY ON THE VISIT OF 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COHEN TO VIETNAM, WHICH PROVIDED A 
 
SIPDIS 
STRONG BOOST TO BILATERAL RELATIONS.  ONE INTERESTING 
SIDEBAR TO HIS VISIT WAS THE ON-AGAIN, OFF-AGAIN MEETING 
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, PHAN VAN KHAI.  A MEETING WITH KHAI 
WAS PART OF THE ORIGINAL PROGRAM PROPOSED BY THE GVN AND 
REQUESTED BY THE U.S.  THE VIETNAMESE, THROUGH THE MINISTRY 
OF DEFENSE (MOD), PROPOSED A MEETING TIME THAT CONFLICTED 
WITH THE JTF SITE VISIT (ARRANGED UNILATERALLY BY THE U.S. 
SIDE), AND SECDEF STAFF CUT THE MEETING FROM THE SCHEDULE 
BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT.  THEN THE PM'S OFFICE CALLED DCM 
SAYING "THE PRIME MINISTER WANTS THE MEETING."  DCM AND PM'S 
OFFICE WORKED TO FIND OTHER TIMES BEFORE AND AFTER LUNCH, 
AND EVENTUALLY A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME WAS ARRANGED.  (PM 
WAS EN ROUTE HCMC THE EVENING OF THAT DAY OR EARLY THE NEXT 
DAY.  THE PM COULD NOT MEET EARLIER BECAUSE OF A CABINET 
MEETING AT LUNCH, AND SO THE U.S. SIDE SQUEEZED ITS 
AFTERNOON SCHEDULE.) 
 
3. (C) PRESSING FOR A MEETING AT THE LAST MINUTE LIKE THIS 
IS VERY UNUSUAL FOR THE VIETNAMESE.  THE GVN, OR THE PRIME 
MINISTER HQSELF, MAY HAVE QLT HE "NEEDED" TO MEET SECDEF 
IN ORDER TO GIVE THE APPROPRIATE CACHET FOR THE VISIT.  IN 
ADDITION, THE PRIME MINISTER LIKELY WAS "DELIVERING A 
MESSAGE" TO THE USG.  INTERESTINGLY, MOD DID NOT WANT TO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00765  131006Z 
INVOLVE ITSELF IN RE-SCHEDULING THE PM'S MEETING.  EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS AT MOD WAS ANGRY THAT THE PM'S OFFICE HAD 
CONTACTED THE EMBASSY DIRECTLY.  UNTIL A FEW HOURS BEFORE, 
THE MEETING HAD NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED AND PLACED ON 
THE SCHEDULE.  THE PM AND MOD OFFICES WERE COORDINATING 
WHETHER THE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE. 
(NOTE: PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY LE KHA PHIEU DID NOT ACCEPT 
SECDEF'S PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING.  END NOTE.) 
 
4. (C) AS NOTED REF A, THERE WERE A COUPLE OF POINTED 
MESSAGES THAT PRIME MINISTER KHAI DIRECTED TO SECDEF COHEN. 
ON THE ONE HAND, WHEN DISCUSSING THE BILATERAL TRADE 
AGREEMENT (BTA), KHAI MADE A CLEAR POINT OF SAYING VIETNAM 
CANNOT COMPETE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE U.S.  HE 
SAID THAT, WITHIN THE BTA NEGOTIATIONS, THERE MUST BE 
PROVISIONS THAT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT "THE REALITY THAT VIETNAM 
IS AN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY."  KHAI ALSO MADE A PITCH FOR 
INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM.  LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, 
KHAI ECHOED THESE THEMES, CLAIMING THE PROCESS OF 
GLOBALIZATION WOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF POOR PEOPLE. 
KHAI SAID VIETNAM RECOGNIZES GLOBALIZATION IS "THE 
INTERNATIONAL TENDENCY, WHICH WE CANNOT AVOID."  BUT HE SAID 
EACH COUNTRY NEEDS TO CHOOSE ITS OWN APPROACH TO DEVELOP 
ITSELF AND RAISE LIVING STANDARDS. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT: KHAI, WHO IS ONE OF THE LEADING 
TECHNOCRATS/REFORMISTS IN THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, HAS 
BEEN ON THE DEFENSIVE IN RECENT MONTHS, AND THERE IS 
SPECULATION HE MIGHT BE REPLACED AT THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS 
IN EARLY 2001.  IN HIS MEETING WITH SECDEF COHEN, KHAI 
LOOKED DRAWN AND TENSE, LESS ANIMATED THAN USUAL -- THOUGH 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00765  131006Z 
HE IS HARDLY CHARISMATIC ON HIS BEST DAYS.  KHAI MADE A 
DELIBERATE POINT OF ADDRESSING SEVERAL POINTED MESSAGES, 
SAYING TWICE THAT HE WANTED BOTH THE SECRETARY AND THE 
AMBASSADOR TO NOTE HIS WORDS.  KHAI MAY FEEL UNDER PRESSURE 
FROM MORE CONSERVATIVE AND IDEOLOGICAL ELEMENTS IN THE 
LEADERSHIP, AND HIS DELIVERY OF THESE MESSAGES TO SECDEF MAY 
REFLECT THAT.  END COMMENT. 
PETERSON 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 


Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04