US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1692

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001692 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, UK, NP, Political Parties, U.S-Nepali Relations 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  AMBASSADOR URGES PARTIES TO TURN OFF 
POTENTIALLY VIOLENT RALLY; SEEK UNDERSTANDING WITH PALACE 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1674 
 
     B. KATHMANDU 1612 
     C. KATHMANDU 1664 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (S) Ambassador Malinowski, accompanied by British 
Ambassador Keith Bloomfield, had separate discussions with 
party leaders and the Prime Minister on August 31 and 
September 1 in an effort to head off a potentially violent 
all-party demonstration planned for September 4 (Ref A).  The 
Indian Ambassador carried the same message in his own 
meetings with the party chiefs.  The Ambassadors emphasized 
that the August 27 break in the ceasefire offers a fresh 
opportunity for the parties and the Palace to reconcile.  The 
party leaders committed to scale back the planned protest but 
emphasized that they were seeking a sign from the Palace, in 
return, indicating a willingness to reconsider reviving 
Parliament and/or establishing an all-party government.  Amb. 
Bloomfield said that he would communicate the message to King 
Gyanendra, currently in the UK for medical tests.  End 
summary. 
 
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DOUBLING UP DIPLOMATICALLY; 
US, UK AMBASSADORS IN FULL-COURT PRESS ON PARTIES 
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2. (C)  On August 31 and September 1, the US and UK 
Ambassdors (together) and the Indian Ambassador (in his own 
meetings) teamed up to send a strong joint message to the 
political parties to call off the massive anti-government 
protest planned for September 4 (Ref A).  The Ambassadors 
stressed in their meetings with party leaders that the break 
in the ceasefire makes it likelier than ever that the Maoists 
will try to infiltrate the protest, thereby virtually 
guaranteeing significant violence.  They emphasized that it 
is the wrong time to place additional pressure on either the 
Government of Nepal (GON) or the thinly stretched security 
forces, who, after three assassination attempts by the 
Maoists in the capital over the past week, cannot be diverted 
to provide security for a mass rally.  Should the rally turn 
violent and the GON move firmly to quell it, the 
confrontation could complicate possibilities for 
rapprochement between the parties and the Palace. 
 
3.  (S) On August 31 the Foreign Secretary told the 
Ambassador that the GON was planning to issue a ban on all 
public rallies in the capital.  The Ambassador said that no 
one could object to the ban if its purpose is to ensure 
safety and security in the capital, but asked that the GON 
not surprise the parties by issuing it without alerting them 
beforehand.  Later the same day, the Ambassador, accompanied 
by UK Ambassador Keith Bloomfield, met with Nepali Congress 
President and former Prime Minister G.P. Koirala.  The 
Ambassadors reported indications from the Palace that King 
Gyanendra (now in the UK for a medical check-up) may be 
reconsidering reviving Parliament for a certain period and 
with a limited mandate and/or setting up an all-party 
government.  They cautioned, however, that the planned 
September 4 rally could derail such progress toward a 
political understanding with the Palace.  The envoys warned 
of intelligence indicating that the Maoists plan to hijack 
the rally for their own ends. 
 
4.  (S)  While no one disputes the right to free assembly, 
the Ambassadors said, holding such a rally now--after the 
Maoists' decision to break the ceasefire with violence (and 
the subsequent assassination attempts, including on two 
former Nepali Congress figures)--would be nothing short of 
irresponsible.  Friendly countries, they emphasized, would 
not understand such behavior on the part of democratic 
leaders who should be working with the GON against the 
Maoists.  A Nepali Congress decision to push the rally to the 
detriment of national security would negatively affect how 
the US Embassy views the party in the future, the Ambassador 
noted.  The party should not back itself into a corner but 
should seize this opportunity to pursue rapprochement with 
the Palace.  Both envoys urged Koirala to reconsider holding 
the protest. 
 
5.  (S)  Koirala, who seemed refreshingly flexible and 
uncharacteristically amenable to reason, conceded the danger 
of violence.  A Parliament limited both in duration and 
agenda--but with a mandate to negotiate with the Maoists and 
to hold general elections--could be acceptable, he said.  He 
asked if the King could send a message, either public or 
private, from London indicating his openness to the idea.  UK 
Ambassador Bloomfield said he would attempt to obtain such a 
message. 
 
6.  (S)  The Ambassador then spoke by telephone with Madhav 
Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal - 
United Marxist Leninist (UML), about the rally and the 
likelihood of reconciliation with the Palace.  Nepal 
confirmed that a Palace representative had floated a similar 
plan with the party (Ref A) and said that the UML would 
attempt to modify the September 4 program in view of security 
concerns.  The parties might hold separate programs on that 
day in different locations to cut down on traffic in the 
capital, he suggested.  He said that he, like Koirala, was 
open to reconciliation with the Palace (although he prefers 
an all-party government to restoration of Parliament).  Like 
Koirala, he is also seeking some sign or message from the 
Palace confirming the openness is mutual. 
 
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PM PREDICTABLY LESS ENTHUSIASTIC 
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7.  (C)  On September 1 the Ambassador, again accompanied by 
the British Ambassador, met with Prime Minister Surya Bahadur 
Thapa.  Ambassador-at-large Bekh Thapa also participated in 
the meeting (Ref C).  PM Thapa said the security forces were 
reviewing the scope of the as-yet unissued ban on assemblies. 
(Note:  A notice was issued later that day banning public 
assemblies of more than five people in all three districts in 
the Kathmandu Valley until September 23.  End note.)  The 
Ambassadors briefed Thapa on their efforts to dissuade the 
political parties from holding the rally and on the parties' 
interest in reaching a political settlement with the Palace. 
While welcoming the news of the parties' apparent openness to 
modifying their program, he was somewhat less enthusiastic 
about either the prospect of an all-party government or a 
revived Parliament (both of which scenarios would, 
implicitly, require his resignation).  It might be improper 
for the King to send a message from a foreign country, he 
quibbled, for (unspecified) reasons of protocol. 
 
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PARTIES' COMPROMISE: 
DECENTRALIZED PROGRAM 
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8.  (U)  On September 2 the five parties who had been 
planning the September 4 rally, citing "the current critical 
and sad situation of the breakdown of the ceasefire and peace 
talks," announced a modified program of protest.  Instead of 
having one massive rally in Kathmandu, the parties have 
decided to hold a peaceful non-cooperation program in the 
capital (which would nonetheless defy the curfew), with 
additional protests at the district level.  What exactly will 
constitute the non-cooperation program was not spelled out in 
the press statement. 
 
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WAITING FOR A MESSAGE FROM LONDON 
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9.  (C)  After an all-party meeting on September 2, Nepali 
Congress Central Committee member Dr. Suresh Chalise and 
Sujata Koirala, daughter of the Party President, met with the 
Ambassador to brief him on the parties' decision and to 
inquire if a message had been received from the King.  In 
light of the security concerns posed by the break in the 
ceasefire, the parties had decided to pare down the scale of 
the planned protest, they reported.  Party workers were no 
longer being asked to travel to Kathmandu from across the 
country, they said, and were being told instead to hold their 
own separate programs in their own districts.  Nonetheless, 
the Kathmandu rally may attract "ten or twenty thousand," 
they claimed.  (Comment:  We think this is very optimistic. 
End comment.)   The program in Kathmandu would be primarily 
"symbolic," Sujata said, aimed at demonstrating the parties' 
"non-cooperation" with the GON.  Now that the Nepali Congress 
leadership had put its credibility on the line by dissuading 
its party workers (whom they described as eager to die for 
democracy) from participating in the rally, it was all the 
more important for the King to send a message from London. 
Otherwise, how could they pacify their zealous party cadres? 
The Ambassador emphasized that the British Ambassador had 
committed to trying to obtain such a message; if, how and 
when such a message might be obtained cannot be certain.  It 
is important to remain focused on the goal of political 
reconciliation, he stressed, and not to allow possible 
fall-out from the rally to undermine the prospects for 
progress.  The parties do not want a confrontation, Sujata 
said, and are actually seeking a way out.  She added that the 
pair would be visiting the British Ambassador later in the 
afternoon.  (Note:  They did.  End note.) 
 
10.  (S)  On September 2 the Indian Ambassador told 
Ambassador Malinowski that he had contacted royal confidant 
Prabhakar Rana, now en route to London to meet the King, to 
urge that the monarch send the desired message to the 
parties.  Rana reportedly said he would convey the request. 
 
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COMMENT 
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11.  (S) Despite the Nepali Congress claims that hordes of 
party workers are only too eager to protest, we suspect the 
parties would welcome a face-saving device that would avert 
almost certain Maoist-instigated violence and a confrontation 
with the government.  Both the Nepali Congress (with a Party 
President more affable and accommodating than we can recall 
in more than two years) and the UML seem ready to consider 
several options--as long as those options contain one crucial 
component:  an overture from the King.  In the parties' view, 
the ball is squarely in the royal court. 
 
MALINOWSKI