US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1055

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, CH, BM 
SUBJECT: CHINA'S AMBASSADOR TO BURMA: "NON-INTERVENTION 
WITH SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS" 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1029 
 
     B. RANGOON 1031 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for reasons 1.5 (B/D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Chinese Ambassador to Burma provided us 
on August 27 with an overview of the purpose and results of 
SPDC Vice Chairman General Maung Aye's recent "routine" China 
visit, China's negative view of U.S. sanctions and their 
implications for regime change, the rationale behind recent 
Chinese troop movements along the Burmese border, and the 
potential for additional Chinese economic aid to Burma. 
China, according to their Ambassador, will maintain its 
long-standing policy of non-interference in Burma's internal 
affairs, while actively engaging with the current regime to 
bring about economic growth and gradual political change. 
U.S. sanctions, he argued, are counterproductive and will 
lead to greater suspicion of ASSK by the military regime and 
diminish prospects for political change in Burma.  End 
Summary. 
 
General Maung Aye's China Visit:  Business as Usual 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (C) During an August 27 meeting with COM, Chinese 
Ambassador to Burma Li Jinjun offered that a top-level 
Burmese mission to China in late August had been planned for 
almost a full year, implying it was not a reaction to the 
events of May 30th.  Li acknowledged, however, that the 
participation of the regime's second in command, SPDC Vice 
Chairman General Maung Aye, had not been expected and only 
came about after the events of May 30.  Li added that the 
proximity of Maung Aye's visit to a realignment of the 
Burmese government following his return to Rangoon (refs A, 
B) was merely a "coincidence." 
 
3. (C) Li described the Maung Aye trip as a "normal and 
friendly" bilateral visit, noting that similar exchanges, 
particularly military, are routine.  Li affirmed press 
reports that Maung Aye had met with leaders from China's 
Central Military Commission (CMC), as well as with President 
Hu Jintao and State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, to discuss 
regional and bilateral issues.  Li demurred on the COM's 
request for more details and stated that China's Burma policy 
was consistent and continued to be based on China's "five 
basic principles of coexistence and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries," points he said both Hu 
Jintao and Tang Jiaxuan had emphasized during their meetings 
with Maung Aye. 
 
"Sanctions Interfere...With Our Paychecks" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) Li explained that China opposes U.S. sanctions on 
Burma and views the measures as interference in Burma's 
internal affairs.  Nonetheless, because the current situation 
in Burma has led to heightened international concern, China 
has urged the regime to take "proper steps" to keep the 
process of national reconciliation moving forward.  The key, 
said Li, is increasing the speed of economic development. 
Too much pressure on Burma, such as that being imposed by the 
U.S. and others, will be counterproductive and undermine 
chances for the speedy release of ASSK, he opined. 
 
5. (C) Li said that prior to the Maung Aye visit he had met 
with SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe, who was 
"emotional and angry" over U.S. sanctions and international 
pressure placed on Burma.  Than Shwe complained to the 
Chinese Ambassador that the international community failed to 
recognize his contributions to Burma, alleging that foreign 
governments were engaged in efforts to get rid of him. 
Ambassador Li assessed that the Burmese generals believe the 
SPDC is being treated unfairly, and it is therefore difficult 
for them to take steps to release ASSK from detention. 
 
6. (C) Li observed that U.S. sanctions have hurt Chinese 
businesses in Burma, leaving them with a "negative impression 
of the U.S." because the greatest impact is on foreign 
manufacturers and Burmese citizens, not the Burmese regime. 
COM responded that the violent May 30 attack had required a 
strong reaction from the U.S. and that sanctions were a 
message to the SPDC that the regime needs to make a credible 
move to return to the pre-May 30 era by releasing ASSK and 
others and beginning a meaningful political dialogue.  (Note: 
 At a follow-on lunch we hosted for the Chinese Embassy's 
political section, the Chinese political counselor expressed 
dismay over U.S. sanctions, and then emotionally complained 
that she and her colleagues are unable to receive their U.S. 
dollar-denominated salaries because wire transfers from their 
New York accounts have been blocked for over a month.) 
 
We Shall Engage 
--------------- 
 
7. (C) Li said that whether the current regime ultimately 
will accept a government led by ASSK depends on whether 
mutual mistrust can be reduced; ASSK cannot continue with her 
confrontations and expect the support of the Burmese Army 
should she become leader of the country.  Furthermore, 
current international pressure makes the military government 
even more mistrustful of ASSK's intentions.  The 
international community, including the U.S., EU, and ASEAN, 
must take immediate steps to reduce pressure on the regime, 
as positive change will only be possible in an environment 
where an inclusive, rather than an isolationist, approach is 
used.  Thus, China will maintain close contact with the 
current government.  Li indicated he had urged U.N. Special 
Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail to put pressure on the U.S. to 
adopt a similar approach. 
 
8. (C) Li said the recent appointment of former SPDC 
Secretary -1 General Khin Nyunt as the Prime Minister was not 
 
SIPDIS 
a surprise and would be helpful in improving Burma's 
international image.  This realignment suggests the military 
regime may be moving toward separation of political and 
military affairs, a move which should facilitate the 
resumption of the dialogue process.  Li said he viewed the 
appointment as a promotion and believes that Khin Nyunt's 
responsibilities should be further modified to include the 
SPDC's economic portfolio, but exclude his current role as 
chief military intelligence, in order to effect greater 
separation of powers between the military and civilian sides 
of the government. 
 
Unifying PLA Border Protection 
------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) COM inquired about reports of recent Chinese troop 
movements on the Sino-Burmese border.  Li acknowledged the 
reports were true, but said that the PLA movements were also 
a "coincidence", intimating they had nothing to do with Maung 
Aye's visit to Beijing, the SPDC realignment, or recent Thai 
threats against the ethnic Chinese United Wa State Army 
(UWSA) in Burma.  Li explained that the PLA has a national 
responsibility for maintaining China's land borders, but 
until recently Burma and the DPRK have been exceptions to 
this practice.  In January 2003, Li claimed he personally 
lobbied Luo Gan, who is in charge of border management, 
suggesting that unified management of China's borders under 
the PLA would be beneficial in combating illegal migration, 
drug trafficking, and prohibited mining and forest 
activities.  Li said that while Beijing had made the decision 
at the beginning of the year to replace police and 
immigration personnel on the Burmese border with regular PLA 
units, central authorities had just recently implemented the 
order. 
 
More Economic Aid? 
------------------ 
 
10. (C) Pol/Econ Chief inquired about the mid-August signing 
of a USD 200 million Chinese loan to Burma for the purpose of 
constructing a hydropower plant.  Li noted the timing of this 
event was another "coincidence;" the "soft" loan had been 
agreed to in January 2003 but the final signing, originally 
scheduled to take place in April or May, had to be postponed 
because of the SARS crisis in China and the May 30th 
"incident".  Li commented that the shortage of electricity in 
Burma is not only contributing to a stagnant economic 
development situation, but also is impacting negatively on 
the lives of the Burmese people.  Li did not respond whether 
China had plans at this time for additional loans or 
assistance, but intimated that bilateral aid would continue 
to be a primary policy tool in Burma. 
 
Comment: We'll Do It Our Way 
---------------------------- 
11. (C) Li is a polished diplomat who smoothly and without 
apology articulated his government's seemingly contradictory 
policies of non-interference in Burma and intense engagement 
with the SPDC.  While there are some areas of agreement 
between the U.S. and China on Burma, including the need for a 
quick resumption of dialogue and significant economic and 
political reform, Li gave every indication that China will 
continue to follow its own path and cannot be expected to 
support U.S. sanctions or added pressure on Burma's regime to 
release ASSK and resume a political dialogue.  To the 
contrary, Li suggested that China is looking for 
opportunities to provide the generals with support and succor 
in order to offset their increased isolation from the rest of 
the international community. This attitude indicates hopes 
that China would take an active role in urging meaningful 
change by the SPDC are misplaced, at least for now.  End 
Comment. 
Martinez