US embassy cable - 03THEHAGUE2200

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, KPKO, IZ, NL 
SUBJECT: DUTCH GOVERNMENT DEFUSES OPPOSITION'S EFFORTS TO 
MAKE AN ISSUE OUT OF IRAQ 
 
 
1.  Summary: At the instigation of opposition parties, a 
hearing on Iraq originally scheduled for September was 
changed to August 28 in order to put pressure on the 
government on the eve of the Prime Minister's visit to the 
U.S. The opposition claimed that the Dutch government got 
involved in Iraq on the basis of "unreliable" intelligence 
from the U.S. and UK. FM de Hoop Scheffer beat back the 
charges, reminding parliament that the Dutch government 
asked for its support based on UNSC resolution 1441 and 
Iraq's persistent non-compliance with previous resolutions, 
and that there was no question that Iraq posed a threat. The 
"smoking gun" of the debate was the "revelation" that the UK 
had provided an eyes-only intelligence assessment to PM 
Balkenende and the PM had not shared the information with 
his ministers.  That item captured Dutch headlines.  FM de 
Hoop Scheffer and Defense Minister Henk Kamp also handled 
questions over the safety of Dutch troops, depleted uranium, 
and the way forward.  De Hoop Scheffer confirmed that Iraq 
is on the agenda in Washington, and that the Dutch wanted to 
exchange ideas over the UN's role.  (The Dutch want a bigger 
role for the UN, and are especially interested in UK and 
U.S. ideas.) End summary. 
 
Dispute over intelligence information 
------------------------------------- 
 
2.  For weeks, the leftist opposition had tried to call the 
government's credibility into question by arguing that the 
government's decision in March to give political support to 
the military intervention in Iraq was possibly based on 
unreliable U.S. and UK intelligence information.  It called 
for the release of the analysis of the controversial British 
and U.S. intelligence by the Dutch Military Intelligence 
Service (MIVD) so that the parliament could verify for 
itself whether the government made the decision to give 
support on the basis of slanted information.  However, both 
De Hoop Scheffer and Kamp refused to make the requested 
information public.  De Hoop Scheffer said he took offense 
at the opposition's display of distrust and emphatically 
denied that the government had anything to hide. 
 
3.  De Hoop Scheffer argued that UNSC resolution 1441 and 
Iraq's persistent failure to comply with imperative 
disarmament obligations imposed upon it by the UNSC had been 
the "decisive" factors in the GONL's decision to support the 
military intervention in Iraq.  Intelligence merely provided 
"supplemental" information.  Moreover, he noted that the UN 
had established over and over again that Iraq posed a real 
threat.  He observed that there never was a dispute over 
whether Iraq possessed WMD.  The dispute with the opposition 
was over the consequences of resolution 1441 and the timing 
of a military intervention.  He said "the absence of proof 
is no proof of absence."  The fact that no WMD have been 
found does not mean that they are or were not present.  He 
reiterated that the GONL has always regarded resolution 1441 
sufficient legitimacy for a military intervention.  The 
purpose of this intervention was "to enforce compliance." 
Asked about the timing, he said the government was of the 
opinion in March that the Iraqi procrastination had taken 
"long enough." 
 
4.  Kamp said he had no reason to believe that the MIVD had 
tampered with information.  He expressed full confidence in 
the MIVD's integrity and praised the quality of its daily 
reports.  Kamp rejected as utterly inappropriate the 
requested release of MIVD reports because that would 
seriously compromise and impair the way in which the MIVD 
reports confidentially to the government.  Besides, he 
added, foreign intelligence agencies must be able to rely on 
the fact that information passed to the MIVD is not made 
public via parliament. 
 
Only Prime Minister saw classified British intelligence 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
5.  Since the August 26 Financial Times reported that the 
Netherlands had been shown secret documents that served as 
the basis for the public British intelligence report, Labor 
party spokesman Koenders asked for clarification.  Prompted 
by the same news report, De Hoop Scheffer called around and 
found out that the secret reports had indeed been shown to 
Prime Minister Balkenende and "for his eyes only."  In the 
debate he was obliged to reveal this information and added 
that he was not surprised that Balkenende had not shared it 
with him or Minister Kamp.  After all, Balkenende was bound 
by secrecy.  De Hoop Scheffer maintained that this had in no 
way influenced the GONL decision to support the war in Iraq. 
"A different decision would not have been taken because the 
Prime Minister knew what he knew." he said. 
 
Netherlands seeks stronger UN role in Iraq 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.  Reacting to parliamentary calls for a broader and 
stronger role for the UN in Iraq, Minister de Hoop Scheffer 
said the GONL was pushing for a more substantial role for 
the UN for the purpose of winning the peace and encouraging 
more countries to contribute.  The aim should be to return 
Iraq as quickly as possible to the Iraqi people.  He also 
expressed the wish that the UN contribute fully to the 
nation building process and that a renewed appeal be made to 
the UN members to contribute to security, including securing 
the UN mission in Iraq.  As examples of a stronger UN 
contribution to the process towards a democratic, sovereign 
Iraq, he cited support to the constitutional process, the 
organization of, assistance to and monitoring of elections, 
as well as giving the Interim Government Council (IGC) 
legitimacy.  He said that a small step had been made in that 
direction with the adoption of resolution 1500 but that the 
GONL favored a new UNSC resolution with a stronger mandate. 
He welcomed the ideas in this context raised in the press by 
Deputy Secretary Armitage. In an implicit rebuke of the 
French, de Hoop Scheffer called it essential that the EU 
take one line because "the European voice is only heard in 
the U.S. when we speak with one voice and not four or five." 
Limited Dutch Assistance to Iraq 
-------------------------------- 
 
7.  De Hoop Scheffer explained the reasons for the GONL 
decision only to give limited development assistance to 
Iraq.  Iraq is potentially a very rich country and the 
Netherlands only has limited resources.  Both he and Kamp 
noted that the Dutch troops in Iraq are not relief workers. 
However, they do get involved in significant CIMIC projects. 
Kamp noted that 10 persons plus 4 DART persons are working 
permanently on CIMIC projects.  For the moment, their budget 
is only 50,000 euros but De Hoop Scheffer said more funding 
would be available if they submit proposals for additional 
projects. 
 
Depleted Uranium 
---------------- 
 
8.  Asked by several spokesmen about the risks to Dutch 
troops of exposure to depleted uranium, Minister Kamp noted 
that extensive scientific research has thus far not been 
able to prove any health hazards of such exposure.  The 
Dutch troops have nonetheless been instructed to be cautious 
if they come across materiel that may contain depleted 
uranium.  Until now, no traces of depleted uranium have been 
found in the area where the Dutch troops operate, Kamp 
added.  He noted that the U.S. had initially informed the 
Netherlands that ammunition with depleted uranium had not 
been used in the last war in the Al Muthanna province where 
the Dutch troops are stationed.  However, in response to 
media reports, he said he had asked the U.S. to look into 
the issue again. 
 
Russel