US embassy cable - 03ROME3926

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U/S BOLTON'S MEETING WITH ITALIANS

Identifier: 03ROME3926
Wikileaks: View 03ROME3926 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rome
Created: 2003-08-29 10:08:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP IT IAEA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T  ROME 003926 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2013 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, KNNP, IT, IAEA 
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON'S MEETING WITH ITALIANS 
 
REF: STATE 246558 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES EMIL SKODON FOR REASONS 1.5(B)(D) 
 
1. (S) Summary.  U/S Bolton discussed the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), North Korea, Iran and the Global 
Partnership with MFA DG for Political Affairs Giancarlo 
Aragona and other Italian MFA officials on August 27. 
Aragona underlined Italy's strong commitment to PSI, and 
agreed that the Statement of Interdiction Principles should 
be made public in order to foster transparency and inclusion. 
 He observed that the European Council has exclusive 
competency in some areas crucial to PSI, and agreed to 
develop proposals to address that factor.  Italy backs US 
views on urging a clear and unified IAEA stance on Iranian 
noncompliance, and took on board our request for Berlusconi 
to raise the issue with Putin when he visits the PM this 
weekend.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Aragona was accompanied by MFA Coordinator for 
Disarmament and International Security Policy Catalano and by 
MFA Director for Arms Control and Disarmament Formica. 
Aragona opened by noting with satisfaction that the EU's 
position on many nonproliferation issues has moved towards 
the USG position since Italy took the EU Presidency; progress 
that hasn't been easy to induce given the different interests 
and approaches within the EU.  U/S Bolton agreed that a good 
foundation has been laid for the next four months, during 
which the US, EU and other allies will face some hard choices 
on WMD and nonproliferation issues. 
 
PSI 
--- 
3. (S) Aragona stressed Italy's commitment to PSI, and 
pointed to the upcoming air exercise in the Mediterranean as 
evidence of Italy's support.  Adopting the Statement of 
Interdiction Principles will be a key objective of the 
September 4 meeting in Paris, he noted.  The European 
Commission's participation in the initiative will also need 
to be resolved, Aragona said, as well as the role of the 
European Council Secretariat.  The question goes beyond the 
outreach debate of which countries to include when and how, 
he explained.  The EC in particular, and the Secretariat, may 
have an important role in how the initiative is implemented 
when actual interdictions begin because the initiative 
overlaps with some sectors that are within the EC's exclusive 
competency.  Including an EC representative in the Italian 
delegation works while Italy holds the EU Presidency but will 
not be a solution when Ireland, a non-PSI member, takes the 
reins in January, he noted.  U/S Bolton suggested that the 
September 4 meeting would be an opportune time to find a 
practical arrangement that would address the issue and 
encouraged Italy to propose solutions.  Aragona said he would 
discuss options with the French hosts of the meeting. 
 
4. (S) U/S Bolton told Aragona that an experts drafting group 
will meet on September 3 (in addition to the military experts 
and intel group meetings) to finalize the Statement of 
Interdiction Principles to the extent possible before the 
plenary meeting on September 4.  The objective is to publish 
the Statement following the meeting in order to move forward 
with diplomatic efforts to gain support for PSI beyond the 11 
participating countries, he said.  Once the Statement is 
published, appropriate overtures can be made to China, Russia 
and other interested countries to explain the initiative and 
allay any suspicions or concerns about the purpose and intent 
behind it.  This approach would open the initiative to 
comment from a broad array, including from those countries 
that agree to support the PSI principles without 
participating in the core group.  The PSI core countries 
could then meet again, probably in October, to review 
reactions to the initiative and to agree on how to formalize 
affiliation.  Aragona agreed that outreach to China and 
Russia in particular would be important.  It would not be 
constructive to create a secretive atmosphere around the PSI. 
 He offered to raise the issue with appropriate officials 
during his upcoming visit to Moscow on September 10. 
 
5. (S) Aragona questioned whether emphasizing "tate and 
non-state actors of proliferation concern" in the PSI 
principles unduly limits the scope of the initiative, given 
that the goal is to interdict illegal trade from any source. 
U/S Bolton explained that ultimately this formulation was the 
most precise way to address the issue without inadvertently 
targeting legitimate transfers.  For the short term, less 
 
specificity leaves more room for the concept to evolve.  It 
will be easier to develop effective PSI mechanisms based on 
the upcoming exercises and input from other countries once 
the PSI principles are published, he noted. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
6. (S) The USG hopes the IAEA Board will proceed at the next 
Board meeting with a resolution that refers Iran's 
noncompliance and failure to cooperate to the UN Security 
Council, U/S Bolton said.  The NPT is under assault and the 
IAEA needs help in protecting it from Iran's lack of 
cooperation.  Referring the matter to the UNSC sends a strong 
and much-needed message to Iran -- and to other states of 
concern such as Libya and Syria -- from the international 
community.  Aragona agreed that international pressure has 
worked when applied.  As EU President, Italy has demarched 
IAEA Board members that a clear message needs to come from 
the next Board meeting.  U/S Bolton said it would be 
extremely important and helpful if Prime Minister Berlusconi 
could raise Iran's noncompliance with President Putin when 
they meet on August 29 and urge the Russians to hold firm 
until Iran proved willing to cooperate with the IAEA.  (In a 
follow-up conversation with Embassy's A/Political MC, Arms 
Control Director Formica promised that these points would be 
in Berlusconi's briefing memo for the Putin visit.) 
 
NORTH KOREA 
----------- 
7. (S) Heading into the multiparty talks this week, the USG 
position has not changed, U/S Bolton told Aragona: we seek 
the complete, irreversible, and verifiable dismantlement of 
North Korea's nuclear program.  We may be prepared to discuss 
a freeze but only if it is verifiable and a step toward 
complete dismantlement, he added.  It may be that the most 
the meetings produce is an agreement to meet again, possibly 
in October.  Aragona noted that the EU has taken a firm line 
on the topic.  Both Italy, as EU President, and Javier Solana 
have made it clear that the EU is ready to play a 
constructive role whenever it would be useful. 
 
GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 
------------------ 
8. (C)  Aragona also raised the Global Partnership initiative 
with U/S Bolton.  He noted that President Putin will be in 
Rome for a state visit in early November, followed by the 
EU-Russia Summit.  Italy is looking for ways to advance the 
program in order to finalize the chemical and nuclear 
framework agreements for the visit.  While Italy has one 
concrete project in the chemical field getting underway, the 
nuclear initiatives are not as far along, Aragona said.  U/S 
Bolton said the liability issue continues to be a serious 
stumbling block, particularly in the Russian MFA and Finance 
Ministry, and must be resolved before new projects begin. 
Russia wants to shift liability to the US (or other 
participants), in part because sovereign immunity is not well 
developed within Russia's court system.  This approach will 
not work because it is inconsistent with USG practice in 
every other country, U/S Bolton explained. 
 
9. (U) U/S Bolton has cleared this message. 
Skodon 
 
 
NNNN 
 2003ROME03926 - Classification: SECRET 


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