US embassy cable - 03AMMAN5501

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005501 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CENTCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, KPAL, IZ, SY, JO 
SUBJECT: PM ABUL RAGHEB VISITS DAMASCUS TO RAISE IRAQ, 
INFILTRATIONS, SUPPORT FOR MILITANTS 
 
 
Classified By: CDA David M. Hale for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (S)  PM Abul Ragheb delivered a message to Bashar al-Asad 
August 26 complaining of arms and explosives smuggling and a 
border incursion.  Bashar professed readiness to resolve 
these issues, and to support the Iraqi Governing Council 
(GC).  END SUMMARY 
 
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ABUL RAGHEB ASKS BASHAR ABOUT IRAQ... 
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2.  (S)  Prime Minister Ali Abul Ragheb told the Charge and 
EconCouns August 28 that he had visited Damascus August 26 
and spent an hour and fifteen minutes with President Bashar 
al-Asad.  The PM said that Syrian PM Miro and the Jordanian 
Ambassador to Syria sat in on the meeting.  Bashar told Abul 
Ragheb that there were "good people" in the Iraqi GC with 
whom he could work.  Bashar was, at the same time, concerned 
about internal stability in Iraq, particularly by the 
possibility of Turkish intervention to end Kurdish/Turkoman 
tensions.  He also expressed concern over smuggling of 
weapons and explosives from Iraq into Syria (he did not 
comment on illicit trade into Iraq, or movement of Iraqi 
regime figures).  He said that an organized network of both 
Iraqis and Syrians appeared behind the smuggling.  Syria's 
long border with Iraq, he complained, is very hard to police. 
 Overall, Abul Ragheb said Bashar's views on Iraq had been 
"very positive and constructive." 
 
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...BORDER ISSUES... 
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3.  (S)  Abul Ragheb said he had expressed to Bashar 
Jordanian concern over smuggling of guns (one thing, Abul 
Ragheb said), RPGs and explosives (quite another, the PM 
commented) from Syria into Jordan.  The two agreed that 
Jordanian GID chief Saad Kheir would meet with Hassan Khalil, 
his Syrian counterpart, in the near future to continue 
discussions on the issue.  Abul Ragheb complained to Bashar 
that Syrian forces continue to occupy 125 square kilometers 
of Jordanian territory (and that Jordanian forces occupy 3-4 
square kilometers of Syrian territory).  Abul Ragheb said 
that the issue is complicated, with nationals of the two 
states owning land across borders in the disputed parcels of 
land.  He said that he had raised with Bashar the report of a 
1992 commission that had been convened to find a solution to 
the claims and counter-claims, and suggested that the report 
be the basis for a permanent settlement. 
 
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... AND CONTINUED SARG SUPPORT FOR MILITANTS 
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4.  (S)  Abul Ragheb said that he had also, at USG request, 
raised continued Syrian support for Palestinian militant 
groups and lack of Syrian support for the roadmap.  He said 
he had told Bashar that Syria's attitude undercuts Jordanian 
support for the roadmap.  Bashar, in response, said he had 
nothing against the roadmap, but was ready to negotiate with 
Israel only on the basis of land for peace and UNSCR 242. 
Bashar expressed rhetorical support for Palestinian 
resistance against Israeli occupation, and argued that very 
little terrorist activity originated in or came through 
Syria, claiming Syria had no interest in promoting 
Palestinian Islamic groups.  Abul Ragheb commented that 
"Baathis are good at analysis, but don't do anything." 
 
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MIRO TO STAY ON AS PM? 
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5.  (C)  Asked about signs of a cabinet change in Syria, Abul 
Ragheb said he had heard that Miro might form a reshuffled 
cabinet.  In any event, they agreed to hold a PM-led 
Syria-Jordan Binational Commission in November -- which Abul 
Ragheb took at least as a sign of short-term confidence by 
Miro. 
 
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COMMENT 
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6.  (S)  Abul Ragheb delivered a clear message to Bashar on 
several fronts, but was the first to acknowledge that Bashar 
was unlikely to change his behavior. 
 
7.  (U)  CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
HALE