US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1620

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NEPAL: REPEATED VIOLATIONS, INCREASED ATTACKS RENDER CEASEFIRE ALL BUT NON-EXISTENT

Identifier: 03KATHMANDU1620
Wikileaks: View 03KATHMANDU1620 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2003-08-26 11:10:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER PGOV ASEC CASC NP Maoist Insurgency
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/IP/SA 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, ASEC, CASC, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  REPEATED VIOLATIONS, INCREASED ATTACKS 
RENDER CEASEFIRE ALL BUT NON-EXISTENT 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 1611 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
--------- 
 
1.  (C) Since the beginning of August, increased violence and 
armed engagements between Government of Nepal (GON) security 
forces and Maoist insurgents have left the seven-month-old 
ceasefire a ceasefire in name only.  Representatives of the 
GON and security forces believe that the Maoists are 
provoking attacks in the hopes that the Government will 
officially break the ceasefire, thereby shifting the blame 
from the Maoists themselves.  The August 25 attack on the 
convoy of former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba seems to 
have been calculated to elicit just such a GON reaction.  For 
now, we believe the GON will try to maintain the status 
quo--keeping the door open to another round of peace talks 
while responding militarily to almost daily attacks.  The 
Maoists, on the other hand, seem bent on ratcheting up 
terrorist violence without explicitly breaking the ceasefire. 
 End summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
AUGUST IS THE HOTTEST MONTH? 
----------------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  Although Maoist conscription, abductions, extortion 
and intimidation have violated the January 29 ceasefire 
constantly almost since its inception, the number and 
intensity of armed engagements between Government of Nepal 
(GON) security forces and the insurgents have escalated 
rapidly since the beginning of August.  A brief chronology of 
such incidents, as reported in the local press, follows below: 
 
August 1:  1 civilian policeman killed in Amarapuri, 
Nawalaparisi 
 
August 4:  1 Maoist killed in Dailekh 
August 4:  3 policemen, 1 Royal Nepal Army (RNA) soldier, one 
civilian killed in Maoist landmine in Gopetar, Panchthaar 
August 4:  District Police Office in Ramechhap attacked 
 
August 6:  1 policeman, 1 RNA soldier killed 
 
August 10:  5 Maoists killed in Masuriya, Kailali 
August 10:  1 Maoist killed in Khokling, Taplejung 
 
August 11:  1 policeman killed in Barabhise, Sindhupalchowk 
August 11:  1 Maoist killed in Nagma, Kalikot 
 
August 12:  1 RNA soldier killed while on leave in Thansing, 
Nuwakot 
 
August 14:  1 civilian killed in crossfire in Thamlung, 
Taplejung 
August 14:  3 Maoists killed in Tehrathum 
 
August 16:  1 policeman killed in Dolakha 
 
August 17:  17-19 Maoists killed in Doramba, Ramechhap 
 
August 19:  2 Maoists killed in Dokhu, Taplejung 
August 19:  2 policemen killed in Siraha 
 
August 24:  10 Maoists killed in Nothan, Lamjung 
August 24:  10 Maoists killed in Chitti, Kaski 
 
August 25:  Maoists destroy paper factory in Dhanusha 
August 25:  Suspected Maoists fire on vehicle of former Prime 
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in Kailali 
August 25:  1 Maoist killed in Marmung, Gulmi 
 
August 26:  3 Maoists killed in Brahmadev, Darchula 
 
3.  (C)  According to security forces, many of the 
engagements occur when local Maoist commanders attempt to 
enforce a controversial 5 km-limit on the RNA that the 
insurgents contend the GON accepted at the May 9 round of 
negotiations.  (Note:  The RNA maintains that no such 
agreement was made and patrols as needed throughout the 
country.  End note.)  There is some suspicion that the 
Maoists may be energizing sympathetic audiences in the NGO 
community to portray these engagements--when they do not turn 
out well for the Maoists--as human rights violations. 
 
----------------- 
ATTACK ON DEUBA 
----------------- 
 
4.  (C) Besides open engagements with the security forces, 
the Maoists upped the ante with a targeted attack on the 
convoy of former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in Kailali 
on August 25 (Reftel).  In a conversation with the Ambassador 
on August 26, Deuba said that he was en route to a political 
rally in Dang at the time of the attack.  He had received no 
specific direct threats (although a vernacular newspaper had 
reported on August 18 that the Maoists were planning to 
target Deuba because he is an "American puppet"), but the 
police had warned him that the area was dangerous and had 
urged him not to travel by road.  At an uninhabited and 
heavily wooded area along the East-West Highway (where 
several incidents had occurred previously), suspected Maoists 
opened fire on the lead vehicle in Deuba's convoy, a police 
car.  According to Deuba, the first vehicle was hit three 
times by gunfire, while his own vehicle was hit in the tire. 
No one was injured in the incident, and Deuba said he was 
planning to continue his political program in Dang later that 
same day.  He attributed the attack to Maoist displeasure 
with his recent public statements criticizing them, as well 
as his history of successfully marshaling international 
support to oppose the Maoists.  On August 26 Prime Minister 
Surya Bahadur Thapa condemned the attack as a violation of 
the ceasefire that "raised serious doubts about the Maoists' 
commitment to the peace process." 
 
-------------------------------------- 
TURNING UP THE HEAT ON BIG BUSINESSES 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Besides armed hostilities, Maoist extortion on large 
businesses, including some high-profile foreign investments, 
has rapidly escalated.  Besides the arson that destroyed the 
paper mill in Dhanusha on August 25 (Reftel), a prominent 
local businessman told us that the Maoists have threatened to 
shut down a large jute mill that he owns in Morang.  The 
Maoists also have levied exorbitant demands for "donations" 
on the operators of two separate hydropower projects with 
German and Norwegian investment.  The Nepali plant manager 
for the Khimti Power Plant in Dolakha District, in which the 
Norwegian government holds a 73 percent share, reported 
receiving a demand for 20 million Nepali rupees 
(approximately USD 270,000), or 50 percent of the royalties 
the plant pays to the GON.  According to the manager, the 
Maoists justified their demand by claiming that they were a 
political force equal in power to the GON and thus entitled 
to an equal amount of revenue from the project.  The Maoists 
also threatened the personal safety of the director and that 
of his family unless he provided an additional USD 2,500 from 
his own pocket.  (So far, the Bhote Koshi power project, 
which is composed of more than 98 percent U.S. investment, 
has received no such threats.)  The Maoists are reportedly 
putting the touch on members of mainstream political parties 
as well.  One source in the Nepali Congress reported 
extortion demands ranging from USD 300-2,700.  The parties 
are reluctant to publicize the threats out of fear of Maoist 
retaliation. 
 
---------- 
WHY NOW? 
---------- 
 
6.  (C) We view the increased incidence of armed engagements 
as a calculated attempt by the Maoists to provoke the GON 
into ending the ceasefire--thereby, at least in the Maoists' 
logic, forfeiting the moral high ground of continuing 
negotiations and pursuing peace.  The assassination attempt 
on Deuba is a particularly flagrant effort to achieve that 
aim.  The Maoists have likely determined that they will be 
unable to obtain GON commitment to (or multi-party support 
for), a constituent assembly but are unwilling to 
appear--especially to the international community--to be the 
intransigent party.  Instead, the Maoists appear to be 
pursuing a policy of escalating violence, gradually 
increasing the pressure on the GON without ever closing the 
door to further negotiations--on their terms.  So far, the 
GON has not reacted to Maoist provocation except to respond 
to individual attacks.  While the RNA has proven itself ready 
to return Maoist fire, it is just as unwilling as its 
adversaries to pronounce the peace process officially dead. 
We expect the current situation--a nominal ceasefire with an 
increasing level of violent confrontations--to continue in 
the near term. 
 
 
 
MALINOWSKI 

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