US embassy cable - 99RIYADH3810

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 003810 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, SA 
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 1999 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 204472 
 
1.   THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS 
SET FORTH IN REFTEL. 
 
A.   DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EACH COUNTRY 
TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1999, INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT 
PROSECUTIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM.  PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE 
GIVEN TO HOST COUNTRY ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST 
OR AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG CONTINUES ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS 
BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 WHICH KILLED 19 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL. 
THE SAG HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT IT IS STILL LOOKING FOR THREE 
SAUDI SUSPECTS LINKED TO THE BOMBING.  THE THREE ARE WANTED FOR 
QUESTIONING AND ARE BELIEVED TO BE OUTSIDE OF THE KINGDOM.  THE SAG 
IS STILL HOLDING A NUMBER OF SAUDI CITIZENS IN DETENTION IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING.  NO PROSECUTION OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC 
LEGAL ACTION BEGAN IN 1999 REGARDING ANY SUSPECTS INVOLVED IN THE 
BOMBING.  THERE WERE NO OTHER KNOWN TERRORIST CASES OR ACTIONS THAT 
CAME BEFORE THE JUDICIARY IN 1999. 
 
B.   DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION 
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR? 
PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 
U.S. REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES. 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG REQUESTED THAT CANADA DEPORT SAUDI CITIZEN HANI 
AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1997.  CANADIAN OFFICIALS DETAINED AL- 
SAYEGH IN MARCH 1997 ON CHARGES OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JUNE 
1996 KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK.  CANADA DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO THE 
UNITED STATES AFTER DOCUMENTS LINKING HIM TO SAUDI HIZBOLLAH WERE 
PRESENTED TO THE COURT.  THE SAG THEN REQUESTED THE EXTRADITION OF 
AL-SAYEGH FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.  FOLLOWING A LENGTHY 
PERIOD OF REVIEW, HEARINGS BEFORE AN IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 
(INS) JUDGE, AND SEVERAL APPEALS TO FEDERAL COURTS IN 1999, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINALIZED THE EXTRADITION CASE IN LATE 
SEPTEMBER AND THE U.S. DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 
OCTOBER 11, 1999.  THERE HAVE BEEN MEDIA REPORTS THAT THE SAG HAS 
REQUESTED THAT THE TALEBAN GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN EXTRADITE 
SAUDI-BORN TERRORIST FINANCIER AND ORGANIZER USAMA BIN LADEN.  BIN 
LADEN, WHO WAS STRIPPED OF HIS SAUDI CITIZENSHIP IN 1994, WAS 
INDICTED ON NOVEMBER 5, 1998 BY A U.S. FEDERAL GRAND JURY IN NEW 
YORK, WHICH ALLEGED THAT HE AND OTHERS ENGAGED IN AN INTERNATIONAL 
CONSPIRACY TO ATTACK U.S. FACILITIES AND TO KILL U.S. CITIZENS 
INCLUDING IN NAIROBI, KENYA AND DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA ON AUGUST 
7, 1998.  SAG OFFICIALS HAVE DENIED THE REPORTS OF THE EXTRADITION 
REQUEST. 
 
C.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT 
PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. 
 
RESPONSE: NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO THE SAG'S 
PROSECUTION OF PERSONS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS 
WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA.  HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS FEW EXTRADITION TREATIES 
OUTSIDE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE LEAGUE'S 
ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT, WHICH CONTAINS EXTRADITION ARTICLES. 
 
D.   DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION. 
THESE WOULD INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A 
TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST 
GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS. 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING THE KING, CROWN PRINCE, 
MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, 
ISLAMIC ULAMA, AND OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY 
CONDEMNS TERRORISM IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, INCLUDING BY REFUTING 
IDEOLOGICAL/RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRORISM.  IN A NOVEMBER 
1999 INTERVIEW THE CROWN PRINCE AGAIN STATED THAT TERRORIST ACTIONS 
ARE UN-ISLAMIC AND CALLED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONCERTED EFFORT TO 
WIPE OUT THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM.  THE SAG CONTINUES TO 
INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING AND HAS CONTINUED TO 
COOPERATE WITH THE USG IN ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING. 
 
E.   DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1999 BY 
THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
FORA. 
 
RESPONSE: INTERNALLY, THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR 
TOWERS BOMBING.  IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN NUMEROUS MEASURES TO 
STRENGTHEN PROTECTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, 
PARTICULARLY AFTER THE AUGUST 1998 BOMBINGS OF U.S. EMBASSIES IN 
EAST AFRICA, A THREAT AGAINST U.S. FACILITIES IN OCTOBER 1998, AND 
AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF DESERT FOX IN DECEMBER 1998. 
ADDITIONALLY, IN JANUARY 1998, THE SAG JOINED THE ARAB LEAGUE 
INTERIOR MINISTERS IN THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF AN ANTI-TERRORIST 
COOPERATION ACCORD.  THE AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED BY THE COUNCIL OF 
INTERIOR MINISTERS IN RIYADH IN SEPTEMBER 1998.  AT A NOVEMBER 1999 
MEETING OF THE GULF COOPERATION STATES (GCC), THE INTERIOR 
MINISTERS OF MEMBER STATES, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, DECIDED TO FORM 
A COMMITTEE TO WORK OUT A STRATEGY TO FIGHT TERRORISM.  THE 
COMMITTEE IS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE COOPERATION AND SECURITY 
COORDINATION AMONGST MEMBER STATES AND SHOULD ENABLE MORE 
COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THREAT INFORMATION.  PRINCE SULTAN, 
MINISTER OF DEFENSE, STATED DURING HIS NOVEMBER 1999 VISIT TO 
WASHINGTON THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE 
UNITED STATES TO DEFEAT TERRORISM. 
 
F.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING 
(BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS 
AND THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC 
RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC 
PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR THE 
PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR 
TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON 
TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG DOES NOT POLITICALLY OR FINANCIALLY SUPPORT 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES.  ITS 
REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE 
VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT 
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES.  HOWEVER, IT IS 
NOT CLEAR THAT THESE REGULATIONS ARE CONSISTENTLY ENFORCED.  THERE 
CONTINUE TO BE ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT PRIVATE FUNDS IN 
SAUDI ARABIA.  THE SAG LEADERSHIP CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM 
AND TERRORIST ACTS AS BEING CONTRARY TO ISLAM. 
 
G.   HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT 
OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE?  (THE SEVEN 
GOVERNMENTS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF 
TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND 
SUDAN.) 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING ANY OF THE 
SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S TERRORISM LIST REGARDING A TERRORIST 
ISSUE. 
 
H.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1998, POSITIVE OR 
NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, 
INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC.  WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE? 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS CONTINUED TO HAVE A HEIGHTENED AWARENESS OF 
THE TERRORIST THREAT AFTER THE AUGUST 1998 BOMBINGS OF U.S. 
EMBASSIES IN KENYA AND TANZANIA.  IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST AFRICA 
ATTACKS, AS WELL AS THE ATTACKS ON SAUDI SOIL IN 1995 AND 1996 
AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS AND PERSONNEL, SAG OFFICIALS WORLDWIDE HAVE 
STATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM.  THE SAG, AT THE 
DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CROWN PRINCE, HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH 
THE U.S. TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA.  THE 
SAG, IN CONCERT WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GCC, HAS FORMED AN ANTI- 
TERRORISM COMMITTEE, CALLED THE SECURITY STRATEGY COMMITTEE, AIMED 
AT COORDINATING INFORMATION AND COOPERATION AMONG MEMBER STATES. 
THE SAG IS FULLY COMPLYING WITH THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE U.N. 
SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST THE TALEBAN REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN, 
INCLUDING THE TERMINATION OF ARIANA AIRLINE FLIGHTS TO JEDDAH.  THE 
SAUDIS HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED ON THE TALEBAN TO EXPEL USAMA BIN 
LADEN FROM AFGHAN TERRITORY SO THAT HE MAY BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE IN 
ANOTHER COUNTRY. 
 
I.   DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH 
THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, REQUESTS TO THE 
HOST GOVERNMENT FOR SPECIFIC COOPERATION AND EFFORTS BY THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR 
ACTIVITIES. DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION 
WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH 
THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE SPECIFIC REQUESTS. 
 
RESPONSE: BEGINNING WITH THE 1996 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA OF A USG 
INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM FOLLOWING THE 1995 OPM/SANG 
BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG ENTERED INTO UNPRECEDENTED, 
COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND 
SECURITY ISSUES WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST AND THE 
PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES.  THIS INTEREST AND 
PARTICIPATION HAS CONTINUED AND SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THROUGHOUT 
1999.  THE USG AND SAG CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI 
INTERESTS IN THE REGION.  CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO 
OCCURRED.  U.S. AND SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE MET IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE TRANS-NATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY.  COOPERATION BETWEEN 
THE USG AND SAG INCREASED FURTHER AFTER THE 1998 EAST AFRICA 
BOMBINGS.  THE FBI COORDINATES ITS INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE 
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY STAFFED LEGAL 
ATTACHE OFFICE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. 
 
J.   IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING 
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN 
ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES CITIZENS 
OR INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON: 
 
     (I) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES IN APPREHENDING, CONVICTING, AND 
PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACT; 
AND 
     (II) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE 
UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE: (I)  THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, CONVICT, AND PUNISH 
THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS 
BOMBINGS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS.  IN THIS REGARD, ON APRIL 
22, 1996 FOUR SAUDI NATIONALS PUBLICLY CONFESSED TO COMMITTING  THE 
OPM/SANG BOMBING OF NOVEMBER 1995.  THEY WERE EXECUTED ON MAY 31, 
1996.  THE SAG HAS COOPERATED WITH THE USG, ALTHOUGH EARLY 
COOPERATION WAS NOT AT THE LEVEL EXPECTED BY USG OFFICIALS.  SAUDI 
OFFICIALS AND THE FBI CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY ON MANY 
INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH BOMBINGS AND CONSULT CLOSELY 
WITH EACH OTHER ON THE STATUS OF THE KHOBAR BOMBING INVESTIGATION. 
SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG, ESPECIALLY 
THE FBI, IN COORDINATING THE OCTOBER EXTRADITION OF HANI AL-SAYEGH 
IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS 
BOMBING. 
 
          (II)  THE SAG CONTINUES TO DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS 
FOLLOWING THE OPM/SANG, KHOBAR TOWERS, EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS, AND A 
SPECIFIC THREAT TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN OCTOBER 1998.  IT MADE 
AVAILABLE TO COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN AIRBASE AT AL 
KHARJ, WHERE MOST U.S. SERVICEMEN IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, 
AND A RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, SOUTH OF RIYADH 
FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL.  THE SAG SPENT MILLIONS OF 
DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS TO ENHANCE 
SECURITY.  THE SAG ALSO WORKED WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL TO 
ENHANCE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG FACILITIES IN SAUDI 
ARABIA, INCLUDING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES 
GENERAL IN JEDDAH AND DHAHRAN.  USG AND SAG OFFICIALS FROM THE 
HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE SAFETY 
OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
 
K.   IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION DURING 
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF TERRORISM 
AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO 
WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN 
PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE 
HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION ON THREATS 
DIRECTED AT U.S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONTINUES TO LIAISE 
CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST 
AMERICANS IN THE KINGDOM.  REPORTED THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO 
THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE PLACEMENT 
OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, AND OTHER VISIBLE 
DETERRENTS. 
 
 
FOWLER