US embassy cable - 99JAKARTA5955

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AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH XANANA GUSMAO

Identifier: 99JAKARTA5955
Wikileaks: View 99JAKARTA5955 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Jakarta
Created: 1999-12-01 10:52:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR PREF SOCI MOPS UN ID
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
O 011052Z DEC 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1763
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY LISBON 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 
USMISSION GENEVA 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005955 
 
ROME FOR VATICAN 
USUN FOR PIPER CAMPBELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/04 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREF, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH XANANA GUSMAO 
 
1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2. (C) AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH, 
AMBASSADOR GELBARD AND PARTY MET A WARM AND ELABORATE 
RECEPTION AT XANANA GUSMAO'S COMPOUND IN AILEU, EAST 
TIMOR ON NOVEMBER 23. AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE STRESSED 
U.S. DETERMINATION TO RESOLVE THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN 
WEST TIMOR AND ARRANGED FOR XANANA TO RECORD A 
STATEMENT REFUTING MILITIA DISINFORMATION AND URGING 
THE REFUGEES TO RETURN. HE ADVISED XANANA THAT HE 
WOULD BE DEALING WITH A MUCH IMPROVED GOI DURING HIS 
UPCOMING VISIT TO JAKARTA.  XANANA MADE CLEAR HIS 
RESISTANCE TO "BEING FORCED TO ACCEPT MILITIA LEADERS 
AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED."  THE CNRT LEADER ALSO 
REMAINED CONCERNED THAT UNTAET AND THE NGO'S WERE NOT 
ADEQUATELY CONSULTING HIS PEOPLE.  XANANA INDICATED 
THAT HE AND HIS ADVISORS NOW WERE THINKING ABOUT A 
QUICKER TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE. 
 
WARM RECEPTION 
 
3.  (C) DUE TO XANANA GUSMAO'S ILLNESS (THE 
CNRT LEADER WAS FEVERISH AND COUGHING -- WE 
ARRANGED FOR A U.S. MILITARY DOCTOR TO VISIT 
HIM ON NOVEMBER 24), AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND 
PARTY ASCENDED VIA UNTAET HELICOPTER TO 
XANANA'S CURRENT HEADQUARTERS AT AILEU, A COOL 
MOUNTAIN TOWN 50 KM SOUTH OF DILI.  SEVERAL 
HUNDRED ARMED AND SMARTLY UNIFORMED FALINTIL 
GUERRILLAS STOOD AT ATTENTION AT THE LARGE 
FIELD WHERE THE HELICOPTER LANDED, MANY WITH 
LONG HAIR PROTRUDING FROM THEIR RED BERETS. 
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE WAS GREETED BY XANANA, 
WHO WAS FLANKED BY UDT (TIMORESE DEMOCRATIC 
UNION) LEADER JOAO CARRASCALAO AND ALSO 
ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY FALINTIL COMMANDER MATAN 
RUAK. AFTER PASSING THROUGH HUNDREDS OF 
ONLOOKERS AND SEVERAL ROWS OF WOMEN DRESSED IN 
A VARIETY OF COLORFUL EAST TIMORESE 
TRADITIONAL GARMENTS, AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND 
PARTY JOINED XANANA AND HIS AIDES ON A COVERED 
STAGE TO WATCH AN IMPRESSIVE PROGRAM PRESENTED 
BY TRADITIONAL DANCERS REPRESENTING VARIOUS 
FALINTIL REGIONS.  SOME NOT SO TRADITIONAL 
DANCING BY THE 8 TO 10 YEAR OLD SET (TO 
CURRENT POP HITS PLAYED ON A SCRATCHY TAPE) 
CONTRIBUTED TO THE FESTIVE, RELAXED 
ATMOSPHERE.  XANANA CALLED THE PROCEEDINGS 
"OUR FIRST STATE VISIT." 
 
U.S. WANTS TO HELP 
 
4. (C) FOLLOWING BRIEF REMARKS BY XANANA AND 
OTHERS IN THE LOCAL TETUN LANGUAGE, AMBASSADOR 
HOLBROOKE WAS ASKED TO SPEAK.  HOLBROOKE 
SALUTED THE EAST TIMORESE FOR HAVING ACHIEVED 
PEACE AND FREEDOM AFTER A LONG AND COURAGEOUS 
STRUGGLE AND DREW APPLAUSE WITH HIS REMARK 
THAT EAST TIMOR WOULD SOON BE THE FIRST NEW 
NATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.  HOLBROOKE 
RECALLED THAT HE HAD JUST SEEN THE REFUGEES IN 
WEST TIMOR, WHO WERE BEING TOLD LIES ABOUT THE 
SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.  HOLBROOKE ADDED THAT 
IF ONLY THE REFUGEES IN WEST TIMOR COULD SEE 
THIS PEACEFUL SCENE IN AILEU, THEY WOULD 
RETURN.  WHILE THE EAST TIMORESE HAD GAINED 
THEIR FREEDOM THEMSELVES, THE U.S. AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WANTED TO HELP IN 
CREATING A NEW STABLE DEMOCRACY.  THE 
LEADERSHIP MUST COME FROM THE EAST TIMORESE 
THEMSELVES, HOWEVER. 
 
A NEW SITUATION IN JAKARTA 
 
5. (C) MOVING TO XANANA'S CURRENT RESIDENCE 
FOR A MORE PRIVATE DISCUSSION, HOLBROOKE AND 
A/S ROTH STRESSED TO XANANA THAT HE WAS NOW 
DEALING WITH A VERY DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT IN 
JAKARTA, ONE WHICH STILL INCLUDED SOME BAD 
ELEMENTS BUT WHICH ALSO HAD A PRESIDENT AND 
FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WERE STRESSING TOLERANCE, 
AND AN ATTORNEY GENERAL ANXIOUS TO INVESTIGATE 
THE ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
INDONESIA HAS CHANGED.  HOLBROOKE URGED XANANA 
TO REMEMBER THAT HE HAD SOME FRIENDS IN 
JAKARTA, INCLUDING PRESIDENT WAHID.  XANANA 
CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS MEETING PRESIDENT WAHID 
IN JAKARTA ON NOVEMBER 30. 
 
FOCUS ON REFUGEES 
 
6. (C) HOLBROOKE TOLD XANANA THAT THERE WERE 
FOUR ISSUES DRIVING THE INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR 
DYNAMIC: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN JAKARTA 
BETWEEN THE REFORMERS AND THE STATUS QUO 
SUPPORTERS; THE SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR, WHERE 
AT LEAST ONE-EIGHTH OF THE EAST TIMORESE 
POPULATION REMAINED TRAPPED; THE CNRT'S 
RELATIONS WITH JAKARTA; AND THE ACEH 
SITUATION.  HOLBROOKE SAID THE FOCUS OF HIS 
TRIP HAD BEEN THE PEOPLE IN THE CAMPS IN WEST 
TIMOR.  DISINFORMATION AND INTIMIDATION WERE 
PREVENTING PEOPLE FROM RETURNING HOME.  IN ONE 
INSTANCE, THREE DAYS AGO, 1000 REFUGEES HAD 
SIGNED UP TO DEPART AND ONLY 350 SHOWED UP, A 
CLEAR INDICATION OF THE SCALE OF INTIMIDATION. 
 
NEED TO GET MESSAGE OUT 
 
7. (C) HOLBROOKE TOLD XANANA THAT HE MUST 
URGENTLY BROADCAST HIS MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE 
IN THE CAMPS VIA ALL POSSIBLE MEANS AND 
ADVISED HIM TO INSIST TO THE GOI DURING HIS 
UPCOMING VISIT TO JAKARTA THAT THERE WOULD BE 
NO GOOD RELATIONS UNTIL THE CAMPS WERE 
CLEARED.  (COMMENT:  AT HOLBROOKE'S URGING, 
XANANA CONVEYED SUCH A MESSAGE URGING REFUGEES 
NOT TO BELIEVE RUMORS OF CONTINUING CONFLICT 
IN EAST TIMOR AND ASSURING THEM THEY HAD 
NOTHING TO FEAR, VIA THE MEDIA COVERING THIS 
EVENT.  END COMMENT.) 
 
AGREEMENT RAISES PRESSURE ON GOI 
 
8. (C) XANANA EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A DEAL TO 
PERMIT THE REFUGEES TO RETURN MIGHT FORCE HIS 
PEOPLE "TO ACCEPT THE MILITIA COMMANDERS AS IF 
NOTHING HAD HAPPENED."  HOLBROOKE ASSURED 
XANANA THAT THE AGREEMENT SIGNED AT THE BORDER 
ON NOVEMBER 22 DID NOT REQUIRE XANANA TO MAKE 
ANY SUCH DEAL. HOLBROOKE ADDED THAT HIS PARTY 
HAD UPPED THE PRESSURE ON THE INDONESIAN 
MILITARY BY TAKING THEM INTO THE CAMPS 
ACCOMPANIED BY THE INDONESIAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL PRESS.  WHILE IT REMAINED TO BE 
SEEN WHETHER THE INDONESIAN COMMITMENTS WOULD BE 
IMPLEMENTED, THE CAMP VISIT WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP 
WHICH RAISED THE PRESSURE ON THE INDONESIANS. 
 
A FASTER TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE? 
 
9. (C) AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE ASKED XANANA IF 
HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT WHEN INDEPENDENCE 
SHOULD BE ACHIEVED.  XANANA SAID HIS AND HIS 
ADVISORS' CURRENT THINKING WAS "WHY WAIT SUCH 
A LONG TIME?"  XANANA ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE 
EASIER AND FASTER FOR AN INDEPENDENT 
GOVERNMENT TO ARRIVE AT STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
THAN IS THE CASE WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION OF 
CONFUSING MANDATES. (COMMENT. ON NOVEMBER 22 
ACTING UNTAET DEPUTY DAVID HARLAND TOLD POLOFF 
THAT TOP UNTAET OFFICIALS ALSO WERE SERIOUSLY 
CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF A QUICKER 
TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE THAN ORIGINALLY 
ENVISIONED.  END COMMENT.) 
 
TIMING IMPORTANT 
 
10. (C) AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE SAID THE FIRST 
ISSUE IS FOR THE EAST TIMORESE TO BUILD UP THE 
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEM. THEN 
THEY CAN DECIDE WHEN TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT 
MEMBER OF THE UN.  XANANA AND DE MELLO MUST 
CONSULT CLOSELY TO ARRIVE AT THIS DECISION. 
THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER WAS DECIDED 
AND PROVIDE ASSISTANCE BEFORE AND AFTER 
INDEPENDENCE.  TIMING WAS IMPORTANT: WAITING 
TOO LONG WOULD PROVOKE RESISTANCE WHILE MOVING 
TO INDEPENDENCE BEFORE EAST TIMOR WAS PREPARED 
ALSO WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES.  XANANA 
SAID THAT PRESENT UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING 
HUMAN RESOURCES COMPLICATED ANY DECISION ON 
TIMING FOR INDEPENDENCE.  AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE 
SAID THAT WHILE NO DECISION NEED BE MADE RIGHT 
AWAY, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN FOCUSSING ON 
THE ISSUE BECAUSE THE UN'S TIMETABLE FOR THE 
TRANSITION WOULD BE A KEY DETERMINING FACTOR 
IN A NUMBER OF AREAS. 
 
WHICH CURRENCY? 
 
11. (C) IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE'S 
QUERY, XANANA SAID THAT "FOR POLITICAL 
REASONS" THE CNRT WAS CONSIDERING USING THE 
PORTUGUESE ESCUDO AS EAST TIMOR'S CURRENCY. 
HOLBROOKE POINTED OUT THAT THE ESCUDO WOULD BE 
REPLACED BY THE EURO IN ANOTHER 18 MONTHS AND 
HE SUGGESTED THAT A DECISION ON CURRENCY BE 
LEFT TO THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS.  XANANA SAID 
THE IMF HAD BEEN AMENABLE TO USING THE 
AUSTRALIAN OR SINGAPORE DOLLAR OR THE RUPIAH. 
 
FUTURE GOVERNANCE 
 
12. (C) AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE ASKED ABOUT PLANS FOR A 
GOVERNING COUNCIL DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. 
XANANA SAID HE AND SRSG DE MELLO (WHO ARRIVED FROM 
DILI TO JOIN THE MEETING AT THIS POINT) HAD AGREED IN 
PRINCIPLE ON A TRANSITION ADVISORY COUNCIL.  XANANA 
SAID THE CNRT WOULD DISBAND AT INDEPENDENCE WITH THE 
POLITICAL PARTIES BECOMING THE MAIN ACTORS. 
 
GELBARD 

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