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| Identifier: | 99JAKARTA5955 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 99JAKARTA5955 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Jakarta |
| Created: | 1999-12-01 10:52:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV PHUM PINR PREF SOCI MOPS UN ID |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
O 011052Z DEC 99 FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1763 INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY CANBERRA AMEMBASSY LISBON AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY TOKYO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON USMISSION GENEVA USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005955 ROME FOR VATICAN USUN FOR PIPER CAMPBELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/04 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREF, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH XANANA GUSMAO 1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D). SUMMARY ------- 2. (C) AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH, AMBASSADOR GELBARD AND PARTY MET A WARM AND ELABORATE RECEPTION AT XANANA GUSMAO'S COMPOUND IN AILEU, EAST TIMOR ON NOVEMBER 23. AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE STRESSED U.S. DETERMINATION TO RESOLVE THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR AND ARRANGED FOR XANANA TO RECORD A STATEMENT REFUTING MILITIA DISINFORMATION AND URGING THE REFUGEES TO RETURN. HE ADVISED XANANA THAT HE WOULD BE DEALING WITH A MUCH IMPROVED GOI DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO JAKARTA. XANANA MADE CLEAR HIS RESISTANCE TO "BEING FORCED TO ACCEPT MILITIA LEADERS AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED." THE CNRT LEADER ALSO REMAINED CONCERNED THAT UNTAET AND THE NGO'S WERE NOT ADEQUATELY CONSULTING HIS PEOPLE. XANANA INDICATED THAT HE AND HIS ADVISORS NOW WERE THINKING ABOUT A QUICKER TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE. WARM RECEPTION 3. (C) DUE TO XANANA GUSMAO'S ILLNESS (THE CNRT LEADER WAS FEVERISH AND COUGHING -- WE ARRANGED FOR A U.S. MILITARY DOCTOR TO VISIT HIM ON NOVEMBER 24), AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND PARTY ASCENDED VIA UNTAET HELICOPTER TO XANANA'S CURRENT HEADQUARTERS AT AILEU, A COOL MOUNTAIN TOWN 50 KM SOUTH OF DILI. SEVERAL HUNDRED ARMED AND SMARTLY UNIFORMED FALINTIL GUERRILLAS STOOD AT ATTENTION AT THE LARGE FIELD WHERE THE HELICOPTER LANDED, MANY WITH LONG HAIR PROTRUDING FROM THEIR RED BERETS. AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE WAS GREETED BY XANANA, WHO WAS FLANKED BY UDT (TIMORESE DEMOCRATIC UNION) LEADER JOAO CARRASCALAO AND ALSO ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY FALINTIL COMMANDER MATAN RUAK. AFTER PASSING THROUGH HUNDREDS OF ONLOOKERS AND SEVERAL ROWS OF WOMEN DRESSED IN A VARIETY OF COLORFUL EAST TIMORESE TRADITIONAL GARMENTS, AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND PARTY JOINED XANANA AND HIS AIDES ON A COVERED STAGE TO WATCH AN IMPRESSIVE PROGRAM PRESENTED BY TRADITIONAL DANCERS REPRESENTING VARIOUS FALINTIL REGIONS. SOME NOT SO TRADITIONAL DANCING BY THE 8 TO 10 YEAR OLD SET (TO CURRENT POP HITS PLAYED ON A SCRATCHY TAPE) CONTRIBUTED TO THE FESTIVE, RELAXED ATMOSPHERE. XANANA CALLED THE PROCEEDINGS "OUR FIRST STATE VISIT." U.S. WANTS TO HELP 4. (C) FOLLOWING BRIEF REMARKS BY XANANA AND OTHERS IN THE LOCAL TETUN LANGUAGE, AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE WAS ASKED TO SPEAK. HOLBROOKE SALUTED THE EAST TIMORESE FOR HAVING ACHIEVED PEACE AND FREEDOM AFTER A LONG AND COURAGEOUS STRUGGLE AND DREW APPLAUSE WITH HIS REMARK THAT EAST TIMOR WOULD SOON BE THE FIRST NEW NATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. HOLBROOKE RECALLED THAT HE HAD JUST SEEN THE REFUGEES IN WEST TIMOR, WHO WERE BEING TOLD LIES ABOUT THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. HOLBROOKE ADDED THAT IF ONLY THE REFUGEES IN WEST TIMOR COULD SEE THIS PEACEFUL SCENE IN AILEU, THEY WOULD RETURN. WHILE THE EAST TIMORESE HAD GAINED THEIR FREEDOM THEMSELVES, THE U.S. AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WANTED TO HELP IN CREATING A NEW STABLE DEMOCRACY. THE LEADERSHIP MUST COME FROM THE EAST TIMORESE THEMSELVES, HOWEVER. A NEW SITUATION IN JAKARTA 5. (C) MOVING TO XANANA'S CURRENT RESIDENCE FOR A MORE PRIVATE DISCUSSION, HOLBROOKE AND A/S ROTH STRESSED TO XANANA THAT HE WAS NOW DEALING WITH A VERY DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT IN JAKARTA, ONE WHICH STILL INCLUDED SOME BAD ELEMENTS BUT WHICH ALSO HAD A PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WERE STRESSING TOLERANCE, AND AN ATTORNEY GENERAL ANXIOUS TO INVESTIGATE THE ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR TO DEMONSTRATE THAT INDONESIA HAS CHANGED. HOLBROOKE URGED XANANA TO REMEMBER THAT HE HAD SOME FRIENDS IN JAKARTA, INCLUDING PRESIDENT WAHID. XANANA CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS MEETING PRESIDENT WAHID IN JAKARTA ON NOVEMBER 30. FOCUS ON REFUGEES 6. (C) HOLBROOKE TOLD XANANA THAT THERE WERE FOUR ISSUES DRIVING THE INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR DYNAMIC: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN JAKARTA BETWEEN THE REFORMERS AND THE STATUS QUO SUPPORTERS; THE SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR, WHERE AT LEAST ONE-EIGHTH OF THE EAST TIMORESE POPULATION REMAINED TRAPPED; THE CNRT'S RELATIONS WITH JAKARTA; AND THE ACEH SITUATION. HOLBROOKE SAID THE FOCUS OF HIS TRIP HAD BEEN THE PEOPLE IN THE CAMPS IN WEST TIMOR. DISINFORMATION AND INTIMIDATION WERE PREVENTING PEOPLE FROM RETURNING HOME. IN ONE INSTANCE, THREE DAYS AGO, 1000 REFUGEES HAD SIGNED UP TO DEPART AND ONLY 350 SHOWED UP, A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE SCALE OF INTIMIDATION. NEED TO GET MESSAGE OUT 7. (C) HOLBROOKE TOLD XANANA THAT HE MUST URGENTLY BROADCAST HIS MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE IN THE CAMPS VIA ALL POSSIBLE MEANS AND ADVISED HIM TO INSIST TO THE GOI DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO JAKARTA THAT THERE WOULD BE NO GOOD RELATIONS UNTIL THE CAMPS WERE CLEARED. (COMMENT: AT HOLBROOKE'S URGING, XANANA CONVEYED SUCH A MESSAGE URGING REFUGEES NOT TO BELIEVE RUMORS OF CONTINUING CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR AND ASSURING THEM THEY HAD NOTHING TO FEAR, VIA THE MEDIA COVERING THIS EVENT. END COMMENT.) AGREEMENT RAISES PRESSURE ON GOI 8. (C) XANANA EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A DEAL TO PERMIT THE REFUGEES TO RETURN MIGHT FORCE HIS PEOPLE "TO ACCEPT THE MILITIA COMMANDERS AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED." HOLBROOKE ASSURED XANANA THAT THE AGREEMENT SIGNED AT THE BORDER ON NOVEMBER 22 DID NOT REQUIRE XANANA TO MAKE ANY SUCH DEAL. HOLBROOKE ADDED THAT HIS PARTY HAD UPPED THE PRESSURE ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY BY TAKING THEM INTO THE CAMPS ACCOMPANIED BY THE INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS. WHILE IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE INDONESIAN COMMITMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED, THE CAMP VISIT WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP WHICH RAISED THE PRESSURE ON THE INDONESIANS. A FASTER TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE? 9. (C) AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE ASKED XANANA IF HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT WHEN INDEPENDENCE SHOULD BE ACHIEVED. XANANA SAID HIS AND HIS ADVISORS' CURRENT THINKING WAS "WHY WAIT SUCH A LONG TIME?" XANANA ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER AND FASTER FOR AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT TO ARRIVE AT STRATEGIC DECISIONS THAN IS THE CASE WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION OF CONFUSING MANDATES. (COMMENT. ON NOVEMBER 22 ACTING UNTAET DEPUTY DAVID HARLAND TOLD POLOFF THAT TOP UNTAET OFFICIALS ALSO WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF A QUICKER TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE THAN ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED. END COMMENT.) TIMING IMPORTANT 10. (C) AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE SAID THE FIRST ISSUE IS FOR THE EAST TIMORESE TO BUILD UP THE GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEM. THEN THEY CAN DECIDE WHEN TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF THE UN. XANANA AND DE MELLO MUST CONSULT CLOSELY TO ARRIVE AT THIS DECISION. THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER WAS DECIDED AND PROVIDE ASSISTANCE BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE. TIMING WAS IMPORTANT: WAITING TOO LONG WOULD PROVOKE RESISTANCE WHILE MOVING TO INDEPENDENCE BEFORE EAST TIMOR WAS PREPARED ALSO WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. XANANA SAID THAT PRESENT UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING HUMAN RESOURCES COMPLICATED ANY DECISION ON TIMING FOR INDEPENDENCE. AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE SAID THAT WHILE NO DECISION NEED BE MADE RIGHT AWAY, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN FOCUSSING ON THE ISSUE BECAUSE THE UN'S TIMETABLE FOR THE TRANSITION WOULD BE A KEY DETERMINING FACTOR IN A NUMBER OF AREAS. WHICH CURRENCY? 11. (C) IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE'S QUERY, XANANA SAID THAT "FOR POLITICAL REASONS" THE CNRT WAS CONSIDERING USING THE PORTUGUESE ESCUDO AS EAST TIMOR'S CURRENCY. HOLBROOKE POINTED OUT THAT THE ESCUDO WOULD BE REPLACED BY THE EURO IN ANOTHER 18 MONTHS AND HE SUGGESTED THAT A DECISION ON CURRENCY BE LEFT TO THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS. XANANA SAID THE IMF HAD BEEN AMENABLE TO USING THE AUSTRALIAN OR SINGAPORE DOLLAR OR THE RUPIAH. FUTURE GOVERNANCE 12. (C) AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE ASKED ABOUT PLANS FOR A GOVERNING COUNCIL DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. XANANA SAID HE AND SRSG DE MELLO (WHO ARRIVED FROM DILI TO JOIN THE MEETING AT THIS POINT) HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE ON A TRANSITION ADVISORY COUNCIL. XANANA SAID THE CNRT WOULD DISBAND AT INDEPENDENCE WITH THE POLITICAL PARTIES BECOMING THE MAIN ACTORS. GELBARD
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