US embassy cable - 03THEHAGUE2129

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OSCE POLICE TRAINING IN IRAQ: DUTCH CIO NEEDS UNSC COVER

Identifier: 03THEHAGUE2129
Wikileaks: View 03THEHAGUE2129 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2003-08-25 08:04:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: UK IZ NL OSCE KINL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002129 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR FOR DAS BRADTKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6 
TAGS: UK, IZ, NL, OSCE, KINL 
SUBJECT: OSCE POLICE TRAINING IN IRAQ: DUTCH CIO NEEDS UNSC 
COVER 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 240159 
     B. THE HAGUE 2096 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel  Reason 1.5 (d) 
 
1. Dutch OSCE coordinator Dan Everts briefed DCM on the 
outcome of his late August 22 meeting with FM de Hoop 
Scheffer on reftel demarche.  Everts said that while the FM - 
like Everts - supported the idea of OSCE assistance to police 
training in Iraq, he could not simply decide to send an 
assessment mission on his own authority (or at the request of 
a member state).  Everts said that the FM shared the view 
that other key members (e.g., the Russians, Germans, French 
and Italians) needed to be brought on board first or the 
initiative would go nowhere. The proposal to send a mission 
out of area to Iraq would be controversial; to act without 
getting support in key capitals would guarantee resistance in 
an organization that operates only by consensus. 
 
2. DCM responded that there was a precedent for OSCE 
out-of-area operations in Afghanistan and insisted that the 
spadework was already underway in Vienna.  We would no doubt 
work capitals as well.  An assessment team could bring back 
the information needed to frame the issue for decision within 
the OSCE.  Events repeated that the issue was not any lack of 
willingness on the Dutch part - the FM saw the value of the 
mission.  It was simply not something that the CIO could do 
on his own hook without causing other members to dig in their 
heels.  Even Afghanistan, which "had not been easy and is not 
really going anywhere", was an OSCE partner for cooperation. 
 
3. Everts said that the CIO judged that the best prospect for 
getting to "Yes" in the OSCE would be if the UN Security 
Council provided a mandate.  A request from the UNSC would 
moot the question of why the OSCE would get involved beyond 
the borders of even a partner country.  Pressed further by 
DCM, Everts suggested that, if not the UNSC, perhaps a call 
by the G-8 would be sufficient to provide the kind of 
multilateral "blessing" needed to launch this effort, and 
would make it an easier sell by signaling all OSCE members 
that the key countries were already on board. 
SOBEL 

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