US embassy cable - 03SANAA2125

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SANAA EAC MEETING - AUGUST 20, 2003

Identifier: 03SANAA2125
Wikileaks: View 03SANAA2125 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2003-08-24 07:05:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SANAA 002125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, EAC 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - AUGUST 20, 2003 
 
Classified By: CHARGE ALAN G. MISENHEIMER, for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 1.  (S/NF)  Begin Summary:  The Charge convened an EAC 
meeting on August 20 to assess the recent bombings in Baghdad 
and Jerusalem and how this could affect security for official 
and unofficial Amcits in Yemen.  Also discussed was a recent 
internet news item concerning terrorism and security in 
Yemen.  Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting 
included:  POL/ECON, CONS, ADMIN, PD, RSO, ORCA, DAO, OMC, 
AND SOC YEMEN.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C)  The Charge briefed the EAC on the August 19, 2003 
bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem, and discussed with 
attendees any implications for the security situation in 
Yemen.  The EAC decided that there were no immediate or 
obvious connections to be drawn between the bombings and an 
increased threat in Yemen.  EAC attendees collectively had no 
specific indications or warnings of an immediate threat to 
Amcits or American installations in Yemen. 
 
3.  (C)  The Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO) 
briefed that he had discussed the attacks with the Local 
Guard Force (LGF) supervisor and had directed an increase in 
vigilance among LGF staff.  The ARSO also discussed the issue 
with counterparts in the Central Security Organization and 
the Political Security Organization.  Both organizations had 
been directed earlier in the day by their higher command to 
increase Yemeni guard vigilance around the American Embassy 
and housing installations. 
 
4.  (C)  The EAC decided that a warden message to the U.S. 
community was not warranted.  While a warden message and/or 
other responsive measures might become necessary, there was 
as yet no specific indications of a heightened threat to 
Amcits or U.S. interests. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  In a separate issue, the Charge passed out copies 
and discussed a August 16, 2003 internet news item from the 
DEBKAfile.com site.  The story was passed to him by the 
director of the local United Nations (UN) office.  The story 
indicated that Yemen, as well as Kenya and Saudi Arabia, had 
been targeted during the week of August 10 for devastating 
mega-terror offensives.  ORCA reported no information to 
substantiate such lurid predictions.  OMC indicated that he 
knew of the site and that it was consistently sensationalist. 
 While the UN director told the Charge that he would keep an 
eye on the site and forward any other information of 
interest, the EAC agreed that the Embassy would continue to 
rely on its own sources of information regarding security 
issues. 
MISENHEIMER 

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