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| Identifier: | 03SANAA2125 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03SANAA2125 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Sanaa |
| Created: | 2003-08-24 07:05:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Tags: | ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SANAA 002125 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2013 TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, EAC SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - AUGUST 20, 2003 Classified By: CHARGE ALAN G. MISENHEIMER, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: The Charge convened an EAC meeting on August 20 to assess the recent bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem and how this could affect security for official and unofficial Amcits in Yemen. Also discussed was a recent internet news item concerning terrorism and security in Yemen. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: POL/ECON, CONS, ADMIN, PD, RSO, ORCA, DAO, OMC, AND SOC YEMEN. End summary. 2. (C) The Charge briefed the EAC on the August 19, 2003 bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem, and discussed with attendees any implications for the security situation in Yemen. The EAC decided that there were no immediate or obvious connections to be drawn between the bombings and an increased threat in Yemen. EAC attendees collectively had no specific indications or warnings of an immediate threat to Amcits or American installations in Yemen. 3. (C) The Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO) briefed that he had discussed the attacks with the Local Guard Force (LGF) supervisor and had directed an increase in vigilance among LGF staff. The ARSO also discussed the issue with counterparts in the Central Security Organization and the Political Security Organization. Both organizations had been directed earlier in the day by their higher command to increase Yemeni guard vigilance around the American Embassy and housing installations. 4. (C) The EAC decided that a warden message to the U.S. community was not warranted. While a warden message and/or other responsive measures might become necessary, there was as yet no specific indications of a heightened threat to Amcits or U.S. interests. 5. (S/NF) In a separate issue, the Charge passed out copies and discussed a August 16, 2003 internet news item from the DEBKAfile.com site. The story was passed to him by the director of the local United Nations (UN) office. The story indicated that Yemen, as well as Kenya and Saudi Arabia, had been targeted during the week of August 10 for devastating mega-terror offensives. ORCA reported no information to substantiate such lurid predictions. OMC indicated that he knew of the site and that it was consistently sensationalist. While the UN director told the Charge that he would keep an eye on the site and forward any other information of interest, the EAC agreed that the Embassy would continue to rely on its own sources of information regarding security issues. MISENHEIMER
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