US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1577

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001577 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA 
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: THIRD ROUND OF TALKS ENDS WITHOUT AGREEMENT 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 1565 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Amidst increased violence over the past 
several days, the third round of peace talks between the 
Government of Nepal and the Maoists concluded on August 19 
without agreement.  Both sides left open the possibility of 
returning for a fourth round of talks.  However, a growing 
number of people within Nepal's security forces believe the 
cease-fire is fatally fragile.  The Maoists' refusal to 
compromise on its demand for a constituent assembly is 
consistent with the insurgents' past practice of attempting 
to gain concessions from the government without compromising 
their own position.  The Maoist leadership's ideological 
rigidity and belief in the weakness of the current government 
may lead the Maoists to break the cease-fire unilaterally. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) The third round of peace talks between the Government 
of Nepal and the Maoists ended without agreement after a 
third day of meetings concluded on August 19 (reftel).  While 
the GON agreed to two of three basic Maoist demands, namely 
an interim government and roundtable conference, the Maoist 
team torpedoed the negotiations by refusing to compromise on 
the remaining demand for a constituent assembly.  The meeting 
disbanded with the understanding that the facilitators to the 
negotiations would recommend a date for the next round of 
talks.  Press reports have suggested that at least a week 
will pass before the facilitators decide upon a date. 
 
3. (C) The negotiating teams permitted journalists to attend 
the third day of talks, August 19, in Dang District in the 
mid-Western Terai.  From statements made by the GON and 
Maoist negotiators that day, one senior Nepali journalist, in 
a telephone conversation with the DCM, reported his 
impression that the "talks are now dead."  The journalist 
also reported that Dang was crawling with young Maoist cadre 
with guns in an attempt to demonstrate Maoist military might 
to the GON talk team and media representatives. 
 
4. (C) Some NGOs and donor governments, including the UK, 
U.S. and India, have reacted favorably to the GON concept 
paper (reftel).  Nepal's political parties, however, have 
complained publically that the paper does not take into 
consideration their agenda.  On the other hand, some 
political leaders within both the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML 
have indicated privately their agreement with the principles 
outlined in the GON's concept paper.  This paper outlines the 
GON's strategy for major social and political reforms and 
clearly states its core principles of maintaining a 
constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy.  The 
Maoists' outright rejection of the GON's paper has caused a 
growing number of people within Nepal's security forces to 
believe that the cease-fire is hanging only by a slender 
thread.  Many military and police officials have indicated 
that they believe the chances of a unilateral break in the 
cease-fire by the Maoists are high.  Estimates of when a 
break will occur range from a few days to a few weeks (the 
latter corresponding to the end of monsoon rains.) 
 
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Comment: Why the Maoist Insistence a Constituent Assembly? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
5. (C) Why have the Maoists' categorically refused to 
compromise on its demand for a constituent assembly when the 
GON has offered so much?  Although the answer is not clear, 
the following factors likely play a role: 
 
-- First, if we take seriously what Maoists leaders have said 
in other contexts, there is every reason to believe that 
negotiations with the government are seen merely as a 
tactical ploy to further the Maoist goals of revolution and 
single-party rule.  A constituent assembly is viewed as a 
bourgeois-democratic issue, not a communist one, and 
therefore has no long-term validity. 
 
-- Second, throughout the current cease-fire the Maoist 
leadership has displayed consistent contempt for the code of 
conduct to which it has agreed.  Likewise, Maoist activities 
to date suggest that the insurgents are not looking for a 
compromise solution through political reform but would accept 
only total surrender by the state. 
-- Third, the Maoists appear to be locked into an inflexible 
ideological mind-set.  The Maoist leadership has looked often 
to historical examples, such as the Shining Path and the 
Russian Bolsheviks, as guides for its military and political 
strategy.  An American academic specializing in insurgencies 
who has spoken at length with Baburam Bhattarai indicates 
that the Maoists' ideology appears to be based heavily on 
out-dated Marxist-Leninism, with Stalin regarded as an icon. 
This scholar reports that, if pushed on specific political 
and social policies, the Maoists fall back readily to 
dogmatism.  Moreover, he said, Bhattarai continues to claim 
that communism is the solution to all problems while at the 
same time he is searching for new communist models for 
guidance on issues to which his old-style dogma offers no 
answers. 
 
-- Fourth, the Maoist leadership regards the government as 
illegitimate and weak.  The Maoists' negotiating strategy 
reportedly resembles most closely that of Gerry Adams, who 
used the argument that IRA rebels did not have to lay down 
their arms because the government was illegitimate and 
maintained an armed force.  The rebels, by this reasoning, 
have a non-negotiable right to an army as well. 
 
6. (C) Although both sides may agree to return for another 
round of talks, it appears that the Maoists are merely biding 
their time and do not intend to seek a peaceful solution to 
the conflict.  End Comment. 
 
MALINOWSKI