US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1559

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001559 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH MAOISTS PRESENT 
INCREASED RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1552 
     B. KATHMANDU 1423 
     C. KATHMANDU 1216 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  The third round of negotiations between the 
Government of Nepal (GON) and Maoist insurgents, scheduled to 
take place on August 17 in the southwestern city of 
Nepalgunj, could prove a watershed in the fitful peace 
process.  We expect this round to be more substantive--and 
thus potentially more problematic--than the two earlier 
sessions held under the previous interim government.  The 
Maoists will likely find the newest team of GON negotiators 
better prepared, more proactive and less yielding than its 
predecessor.  If the Maoists believe that they will be unable 
to wring further concessions from the GON through 
negotiations, hardliners within the insurgent leadership 
could push to break the ceasefire.  The role of India could 
be decisive in pressuring the Maoists to stay in talks.  It 
will be important for the USG and others in the international 
community to express strong public and private support for 
GON efforts in the peace process.   End summary. 
 
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A LEANER, MEANER GON TEAM 
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2.  (C)  The August 17 round of talks between the Government 
of Nepal's (GON) new negotiating team and its Maoist 
counterpart likely will prove both more substantive and more 
contentious than either of the two previous sessions (held on 
April 27 and May 9) under the government of former Prime 
Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand.  Throughout the course of 
the earlier rounds, Chand's five-person team, hobbled by 
internal political rivalries, inexperience, and, perhaps, a 
lack of clear direction from the Palace, failed to develop 
either a comprehensive set of goals for the negotiations or a 
cohesive strategy aimed at obtaining them.  This flaccid 
negotiating style, unfortunately, played into the hands of 
the more aggressive Maoist talk team, whose numerous, often 
lengthy demands dominated the agenda, which a passive GON 
side often accepted without any counter-proposals of its own. 
 The political cost of this ad hoc, disorganized approach to 
negotiating became painfully apparent in the May 9 round when 
the GON team let itself be bulldozed into agreeing to a 5 km 
restriction for Royal Nepal Army (RNA) soldiers--only to have 
to repudiate the ill-advised concession publicly after a 
storm of protest from the indignant and unconsulted RNA 
leadership. 
 
3.  (C)  The new two-man team appointed by PM Surya Bahadur 
Thapa seems better prepared, better focused, and to be taking 
greater initiative than its feckless predecessor.  GON 
negotiators (Information Minister Kamal Thapa and Finance 
Minister Prakash Lohani) held a series of informal meetings 
with Maoist leaders before setting a date for fresh talks. 
While agreeing to fulfil some concessions made in the 
previous two rounds (i.e., the release of certain Maoist 
prisoners), the GON team held firm on rejecting other, 
additional demands, such as personal participation of the 
King in the peace talks, restrictions on the RNA, and 
abrogation of an antiterrorism training agreement with the 
USG (Ref B).  Rather than allowing unrealistic Maoist demands 
drive the agenda, the Thapa/Lohani team has seized the 
initiative by preparing its own set of political proposals 
intended to respond in part to key Maoist demands (Ref A). 
The ill-defined framework for the previous rounds made it 
easy for the Maoists to hijack the discussions by inserting 
unrealistic surprise demands and threatening to break off 
talks unless they were met.  The establishment of a Peace 
Secretariat within the GON (Ref C), which has drafted a set 
 
SIPDIS 
of procedures for the talks that the GON will ask the Maoists 
to endorse at the August 17 meeting, should help keep the 
agenda within stipulated boundaries, lessening chances for 
the insurgents to commandeer the discussions. 
 
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MAOIST NEGOTIATING TACTICS: 
DEMAND, DENY, DECAMP 
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4.  (C) The Maoists clearly used the 2001 ceasefire to 
rebuild their depleted strength and prepare for the next 
stage of more intense conflict--taking on the RNA.  Not 
surprisingly, many--including many in the RNA--believe that 
the insurgents' behavior during the current ceasefire, which 
has seen Maoist extortion, intimidation, recruitment, and 
training shoot into overdrive, suggests they are equally 
insincere in pursuing a peaceful settlement this time.  Some 
see the recent uptick in Maoist violations of the 
ceasefire--especially the abductions and murders of RNA 
soldiers--as an attempt to provoke the security forces into 
breaking the peace first.  Negotiations, some believe, are 
just one part of a long-term Maoist strategy to gain power by 
alternately wresting political concessions from the GON 
through talks and tactical advantage through armed conflict. 
According to this view, the Maoists decided to accept a 
ceasefire last January primarily in order to rebuild 
diminished popular support and because they had determined 
that the GON was prepared to grant them significant 
concessions, and will continue negotiations only as long as 
they perceive they can gain political advantage from 
participating.  The Maoists' confrontational negotiating 
techniques--demand the maximum advantage, deny the slightest 
concession, and repeatedly threaten to walk out on the 
flimsiest of pretexts--has served them well thus far, cowing 
the previous GON team into granting substantial commitments 
(release of prisoners, restricting the RNA) without gaining 
anything in exchange. 
 
5.  (C) For those who suspect the Maoists have no true 
interest in a political settlement and are cynically using 
the negotiations only to wring concessions from the GON, the 
August 17 round of talks may prove a litmus test. 
Unfortunately, neither the 2001 negotiations nor the two 
rounds held earlier during the current ceasefire offer any 
indication of how the Maoists may react to a more confident, 
less accommodating GON posture across the table.  The Maoists 
are undoubtedly under pressure, both from hardliners within 
their own organization and from restless, idle cadres in the 
field to demonstrate that they can continue to make gains by 
negotiating.  Keeping the Maoists at the table will depend, 
in part, on the nature of the political reforms the GON side 
plans to offer the Maoists as a compromise (Ref A).  Also 
important will be whether the mainstream political parties 
support the GON proposals and negotiating position.  Finally, 
whether India maintains the "pressure" cited by Maoist 
negotiator Bhattarai as a principal reason that he agreed to 
a third round (Ref A) will be crucial. 
 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
----------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  Many observers believe that if indeed the Maoists 
break the ceasefire, the conflict can be expected to be even 
more violent than before.  It is thus more important than 
ever that the USG, along with the rest of the international 
community, express strong public and private support for GON 
efforts in the peace process.  Embassy's August 14 press 
release applauding announcement of the third round (text 
e-mailed to SA/INS) was well received by the GON (and, we 
hope, by the Maoists as well).  Other helpful measures could 
include the following: 
 
a)  Negotiation Support:  Many observers blame the GON's lack 
of negotiating expertise for the lack of progress so far.  We 
will continue to pursue a source of USG funding (perhaps 
beginning with reprogramming unobligated ESF funds ) for 
quiet technical assistance to the Peace Secretariat and/or 
GON negotiators.  We would want to continue helping the 
Secretariat to build its institutional capacity even if talks 
 
SIPDIS 
break down. 
 
b)  Political Parties:  The Maoists had hoped to use the 
ceasefire to win support from the mainstream political 
parties--an effort that has clearly failed.  At the same 
time, however, the parties' opposition to the interim 
government obviously undermines the GON position during the 
negotiations.  The parties--perhaps more than the Maoists 
themselves--remain the wild card in the peace process, 
potentially able to scuttle any settlement reached between 
GON and insurgents if they feel it threatens narrowly defined 
partisan (rather than national) interests.  The GON 
negotiators' pledge to share their political proposals with 
the parties before the talks begin is an encouraging step 
toward winning crucial multi-partisan support.  We, along 
with other key Embassies (such as the UK and India), should 
redouble our efforts to persuade both the parties and the 
GON/Palace to present a united front against the Maoists 
during these sensitive negotiations. 
 
c)  Maintain Firm Posture toward the Maoists:  The Maoist 
leadership has publicly acknowledged that U.S. security 
assistance played a pivotal role in persuading them to accept 
a ceasefire.  While publicly applauding efforts toward peace, 
we should keep up our firm posture against Maoist violence 
and terror.  We will make clear both in public and private 
communications that the Maoists must demonstrate their 
sincerity by renouncing violence and ceasing threats against 
American citizens and interests, including U.S.-sponsored 
development projects.  We will continue to press the GON to 
raise, as it has promised to do in the August 17 session, the 
safety and security of American citizens in its talks with 
the Maoists.  If the Maoists do revert to their past 
terrorist practices, especially if they target U.S. 
interests, interagency deliberations on whether they qualify 
for U.S. anti-terrorist sanctions should resume. 
 
d)  International Support:  The Maoists are acutely sensitive 
to international opinion and would likely attempt to portray 
any decision to break the ceasefire as having been "forced" 
on them by the GON.  Because of its overwhelming influence in 
Nepal, India's posture during these negotiations is 
absolutely crucial to dissuading the Maoists from breaking 
the peace.  We will urge our diplomatic colleagues in 
Kathmandu--some of whom maintain contact with the Maoist 
leadership--to stress through both public and private 
channels that the Maoists must persevere in the peace 
process.  In particular, we will press our British and Indian 
colleagues to maintain their own levels of security 
assistance to the GON and urge the Indians to keep up 
pressure on the Maoists.  We recommend that parallel 
demarches be made in Washington and in London and New Delhi. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C)  The tone set during the August 17 round may help 
determine the longevity of a peace process that appears more 
and more fragile.  If the Maoists find enough political 
advantage in the GON proposals to placate the hardliners in 
their ranks, and if the Indians continue to exert helpful 
pressure on the Maoists, negotiations will likely continue. 
Absent either of these critical elements, we expect the road 
toward peace to grow increasingly rocky. 
MALINOWSKI