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| Identifier: | 03GUATEMALA2080 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03GUATEMALA2080 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Guatemala |
| Created: | 2003-08-14 17:37:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV SNAR GT |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 002080 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2013 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SNAR, GT SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PORTILLO Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JOHN R. HAMILTON, REASONS 1.5 ( B) 1. (C) Summary: In an August 13 meeting with the Ambassador and DCM, President Portillo promised to veto a badly flawed law on the new civilian presidential security force, to reinstate the highly-regarded, recently-fired head of the national disaster relief agency, to look into a decision taken in his absence to stand down joint customs control with El Salvador on their mutual border and to take vigorous action against any misuse of state resources in the election. End Summary. 2. (C) The meeting, whose main purpose was to introduce newly arrived DCM Bruce Wharton, took place the President's personal residence. He was relaxed, friendly and looked fit after losing what he claimed was 18 pounds in six weeks. After pleasantries and at the mention in passing by the President of the new civilian presidential security service (SAAS), designed to replace the presidential military guard (EMP), the Ambassador said there was deep concern among donor country diplomatic missions over a number of amendments to the proposed law, whose net effect is to inappropriately reinsert the military into the business of protecting and supporting the president. Portillo nodded soberly in agreement with the concerns and said he intended to veto the law, if it arrived in his office in its current form. He noted he was meeting the next day with Congress President General Rios Montt and intended to raise the issue; he seemed hopeful that the mischievous amendments, which he attributed to military officers lobbying friends in the Congress on their own, could be beaten back. But he reiterated his determination not to let the flawed legislation become law. 3. (C) Turning to elections, the Ambassador said he knew from previous conversations that the President wanted Guatemala's elections to be judged free and fair by the international community. Much depended on the political parties and the elections tribunal to preclude any possibility of election-day fraud. But a major concern among civil society, opposition and the press is misuse of state resources. The responsibility to prevent such abuse is primarily the President's, the Ambassador said. In that regard, two recent developments were troubling. One was the firing of the highly regarded head, Alejandro Maldonado, of Guatemala's national disaster relief agency (CONRED), which USAID and SOUTHCOM had supported to the tune of at least US$1 million in just the last year. The new chief was a political hack with no visible qualifications; even more troubling had been the naming of a retired military officer, well and unfavorably unknown to us, as CONRED's chief of operations. All of this pointed at potential misuse of CONRED resources, especially as the fired individual had repeatedly resisted pressure from the Vice President to hire ruling party (FRG) members and to let contracts with FRG supporters. 4. (C) The second troubling development was a decision the Vice President apparently had taken to withdraw Guatemala from the joint customs inspection stations with El Salvador along their common frontier. We had learned about this, the Ambassador said, only because he Salvadoran foreign minister had checked with San Salvador Charge Phil French to confirm Vice President Reyes contention that he had made the decision under pressure from the U.S., supposedly to beef up narcotics controls. It simply was not true that we had sought the change or had even expressed a view at all, the Ambassador said, and the decision invited suspicion that customs revenues would be siphoned off into FRG coffers. 5. (C) Portillo was well aware of the CONRED issue, said he had met that day with Maldonado whom he thought highly of, and that he had taken the decision to reinstate Maldonado effective September 1. "Why September 1," the President asked -- "because I am leaving for a ten-day trip to Taiwan and if I reinstate Maldonado before then, the Vice President will undo my decision while I am gone." But Portillo only laughed merrily when the Ambassador suggested that he send the VP to Taiwan instead of going himself and went on to complain that VP Reyes had given him nothing but grief their whole time in office together. Portillo said he was hearing about the customs issue for the first time, did not like the sound of it and would get on it first thing in the morning. He went on to say that he was determined that there would be no misuse of state resources in the election and that he had told his cabinet that any employee, high or low, who violated that prohibition would be fired and prosecuted. The Ambassador also told Portillo that GANA VP candidate Eduardo Stein had told him two weeks ago of GANA's interest in keeping a direct channel of communication to the FRG open during the campaign. Portillo, showing interest, said he would pass this on to Rios Montt. Note: The Ambassador briefed Stein on the exchange the next morning, Stein reiterating GANA's interest in a channel of communication. The President also mentioned that, in response to continuing legal challenges to Rios Montt's candidacy, the FRG is likely to seek to file legal actions to prevent GANA candidate Berger's registration. 6. (C) Finally, the Ambassador made a pitch for the President's help in securing Congressional approval of the CN Maritime Agreement, signed June 17. Portillo indicated he would. 7. (C) Comment: As usual, Portillo gave every appearance of caring about the concerns we raised as much or more than we do. He does not invariably follow through, but perhaps he will this time, on the SAAS, CONRED and Customs issues at least. HAMILTON
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