US embassy cable - 03ABUJA1385

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  08/12/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, NI 
SUBJECT: MOGEROA - ENTERING A SEASON OF POLITICAL 
TURBIDITY 
 
Classified by Charge Rick Roberts.  Reasons:  1.5 
(B&D). 
 
 
1.  (S)  SUMMARY:  Politically, Nigeria is tense and 
this probably will not significantly abate in the near 
future.  Opposition politicians and much of the 
general populace remain disenchanted with the results 
of the April elections and the irregularities that 
attended them.  Many opposition figures suspect that 
Obasanjo wants to amend the constitution to allow 
himself a third term.  The North feels estranged 
believing that ANPP Presidential candidate Muhammedu 
Buhari was cheated and that Obasanjo is placing 
Yorubas and Southerners in key positions in the 
military and government at the expense of Northerners. 
Meanwhile, the economy is experiencing arythmia; the 
non-oil sector have not seen national growth and 
government coffers are unusually lean due to lost oil 
revenue caused by the Warri crisis.  Fuel and the 
prices of many imported commodities are high. 
Recently the media has been filled with headlines and 
editorials about political instability.  Given this 
milieu, many people have been expressing concern that 
the potential for military intervention cannot be 
ignored.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
THE CLEAR MANDATE THAT WASN'T 
----------------------------- 
 
 
2.  (C)  President Obasanjo won the presidential 
election with 62 percent of the vote.  His ruling PDP 
swept the gubernatorial races (28 of 36), as well as 
the national and state assemblies.  On the surface, 
the results would indicate that Obasanjo and the 
ruling PDP were popular.  However, that is not the 
case.  Neither Obasanjo nor the PDP distinguished 
themselves during the previous four years in office. 
Their 2003 electoral landslide was not solely the 
product of an accurate vote tabulation.  Electoral 
malpractice was involved.  While probably winning more 
votes than Buhari, his nearest competitor, Obasanjo 
did not genuinely attract 60 percent of the 
electorate. 
 
 
3.  (C)  Moreover several PDP incumbent governors have 
performed poorly during their tenure.  If the 
elections had been fair, a number of incumbent 
governors in the PDP as well as the AD and ANPP would 
have gotten pink slips from the electorate.  Given the 
anti-incumbent sentiment, the PDP, probably should 
have suffered a net loss of seats.  Instead, the PDP 
scored a significant net gain in the 2003 elections. 
This has lead some Nigerians and, not exclusively 
opposition figures, to remark that the 2003 edition 
overall was the most soiled exercise in the country's 
checkered electoral history.  (Comment:  While such 
statements are inherently impossible to prove, that 
they are being voiced by a significant number of 
partisan and relatively neutral observers is 
significant.  As such, this sentiment represents an 
unignorable political reality).  END COMMENT. 
 
 
4.  (C)  The PDP could have doused the brewing tension 
by opting for a "political solution," that would have 
entailed an agreement between the GON and PDP on one 
hand and moderates in the key opposition parties on 
the other to work through the Independent National 
Electoral Commission or the electoral tribunals to 
shift some elected offices to the opposition.  In 
exchange, the opposition would have "accepted" 
Obasanjo's victory and those of most other PDP 
candidates, thus still preserving PDP majorities in 
most instances. 
 
 
5.  (S)  There were numerous conversations between PDP 
officials and opposition figures, particularly the 
Igbo-based APGA and southerners in the ANPP. 
President Obasanjo participated in sensitive 
discussions with the APGA national chairman about 
"transferring" several National Assembly and perhaps 
two gubernatorial seats to APGA.  However, these talks 
ultimately were desultory.  The PDP decided that the 
price of relinquishing even some of their most 
controversial seats was too dear to pay for reducing 
the opposition's indignation and anger.  Thus, the 
foundation for today's tense political climate was 
laid.  Perceived PDP electoral conniving compounded by 
the sense that the PDP was flaunting its purloined 
victories set the groundwork for today's current 
political frictions. 
 
 
6.  (C)  Tension also could have been alleviated had 
the PDP attempted to consult with opposition leaders 
and civil society leaders on key issues of substantive 
governance, trying to form a national consensus around 
some core issues.  Instead, in June, President 
Obasanjo took two very unpopular decisions.  First, he 
announced the commissioning of a panel to review the 
constitutional provisions on local governments.  This 
immediately raised suspicions that Obasanjo was 
setting the stage for a later constitutional amendment 
that would scrap the present two-term limit, thus 
allowing him to run in 2007 for a third time.  Second, 
he raised fuel prices.  While the move had economic 
justification; its implementation was callous and 
apolitic.  Obasanjo had neither consulted widely nor 
put his arms around his public explaining to them why 
this measure was necessary.  The price hike reinforced 
the impression of arrogance and insensitivity in Aso 
Villa.  GON handling of the ensuing national strike by 
organized labor and the loss of lives that accompanied 
the strike further reinforced the perception that 
President Obasanjo was out of step with the economic 
challenges that faced the average Nigerian. 
 
 
7.  (C)  As if the level of political friction was not 
sufficient drama, the economic news was not much 
better.  The crisis in Warri has clipped government 
revenue by approximately 20 percent.  The non-oil 
sector continues to sputter.  Agricultural production 
remains insulated by bureaucratic, infrastructural and 
financial from significant growth.  Unemployment is 
high, as are the prices of many food staples.  There 
is a general sense that the national economy is 
veering in the wrong direction or, at the very least, 
not moving nearly fast enough in the right one. 
 
 
8.  (C)  The edge of August may represent another 
dramatic moment. The National Labor Congress, buoyed 
by the efficacy of the July fuel strike, has 
threatened to strike at month's end unless the GON 
honors its promise to increase wages by 12.5 percent. 
The strike threat only adds to a feeling of 
uncertainty and decline that the GON seems unable to 
arrect, at the moment. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
NORTH AND SOUTHEAST:  REALLY NOT HAPPY 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
9.  (C)  The North continues to emit the strongest 
anti-Obasanjo sentiment.  Northerners see Obasanjo's 
personnel selections in government and the military as 
vehicles to marginalize them while promoting Yoruba 
and southern interests.  The last set of retirements 
within the military were predominantly Northerners who 
thought they had more years left before they hung-up 
their uniforms for the last time.  While each state 
can claim a cabinet minister, Northerners decry that 
the choke positions went to Southerners.  Even among 
Yoruba cabinet selectees, they say Obasanjo 
discriminated by failing to name one Yoruba Muslim. 
Additionally, Northerners bemoan the fact that access 
to government contracts, an important lifeline for the 
Northern economy, has been stifled.  There is a sense 
that the regional economy is purposely being starved 
to make people pledge loyalty to Obasanjo before they 
get a drop of government largesse. 
 
 
10.  (C)  Northerners thought to be pro-Obasanjo have 
been roundly criticized.  In a rare manifestation of 
disrespect and anger, youths threw stones at the 
usually revered Emir of Kano recently.  At the 
beginning of the year former Head of State Babangida 
was viewed as a hero and always followed by an adoring 
throng in his Northern travels.  Recently, he too was 
jostled and stoned.  His felony was his non-support of 
ANPP candidate Buhari and alleged tacit support for 
Obasanjo in the 2003 election.  Now, many of the rank 
and file Northerners, especially the young adult 
males, see Babangida as a sell-out and they oppose 
him. 
 
 
11.  (C)  The beneficiary of all of this is Buhari. 
People may not be familiar with Buhari's substantive 
policy positions.  However, they see him as the 
personification of order and discipline.  They see him 
as the "anti-Obasanjo," the man who can bring a sense 
of direction to replace the growing fear that Nigeria 
is adrift.  There is also a touch of religion and 
regional chauvinism among the Buhari supporters.  They 
see a national leadership under Buhari as a chance to 
return the reins of national power to the North, its 
historic home. 
 
 
12.  (C)  Buhari, thus far, has channeled his 
electoral grievances through the courts.  However, 
there will come a moment of decision for either Buhari 
or the courts that is freighted with political 
significance.  If the courts decide in favor of 
Buhari, the entire election and Obasanjo's presidency 
are in doubt and may have to be redone.  By putting 
the country in such uncharted waters, such a decision 
would cause a monumental political crisis. 
 
 
13.  (C)  This is an unlikely turn of events.  The 
more likely outcome would be that Buhari's petition is 
ultimately denied by the courts.  In that instance, 
Buhari has told us he would huddle with his followers 
to determine next steps.  However, he has been 
consistently adamant that he will not discontinue his 
challenge against Obasanjo.  It is likely that Buhari 
may resume his call for "mass action" against the 
government. 
 
 
14.  (C)  Meanwhile, anger in the Southeast is brewing 
because the Igbo-dominated APGA did well among the 
voters but not with INEC vote counters.  APGA was 
probably deprived of at least two gubernatorial seats 
and perhaps as much as a score National Assembly 
seats.  Fueled by this frustration, Igbo opposition 
leaders have hastily created institutions such as the 
Igbo National Assembly, a symbol of non-acceptance of 
the National Assembly and also of heightened ethnic 
political fervor. 
 
 
15.  (C)  Northern and Southeastern opposition 
political figures have discussed cooperating 
politically against the Obasanjo administration and 
the PDP.  Thus far, regional, ethnic and religious 
differences have limited this cooperation to little 
more than discussion and some public statements. 
However, this could change depending on perceptions of 
Obasanjo's performance in the coming week and months. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
THE DELTA - A CAULDRON 
--------------------------- 
 
 
16.  (C) Nowhere has Nigeria's political and economic 
distemper been on display better than in the Delta - 
in Warri.  Ijaw militants have held 20 percent of 
Nigeria's oil production at ransom to their nebulous 
demands for local antinomy.  In some ways, they are 
the Nigeria oil sector's equivalent of the early days 
of Columbia's drug baron.  As such, this is an 
uncharted rebellion against the federal government. 
Moreover, oil bunkering (theft) in the Delta has 
reached such proportions that the equivalent of 10 
percent of legitimate oil production is being siphoned 
through illicit channels.  The wealth and political 
power that this signifies could be considerable.  That 
the central government has been unable to resolve 
neither the Ijaw-instigated Warri crisis nor bunkering 
makes the central government seem week.  This apparent 
vulnerability may encourage other challenges in the 
Delta and elsewhere unless the GON takes firm action 
that weds law enforcement with dire policy 
consideration of the root political and economic 
causes of the turbulence in areas of the Delta. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
PEOPLE ARE TALKING/THE MEDIA IS WRITING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
17.  (C) In private conversations and in the print 
media, the multiple political crisis facing Nigeria 
are being widely bruited.  Editorials in leading daily 
newspaper and weekly magazines about "political 
instability" and a crisis of leadership are regular 
media gruel right now.  One magazine even featured a 
front cover story on a coup plot allegedly foiled in 
May.  Few Nigerians wants a return of the military; 
however people are privately talking about it as a 
growing possibility if the affairs of state continue 
as they are. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
18.  (C)  The political climate in Nigeria tends to be 
cyclical.  Currently, the country is in a low trough; 
some might say a depression.  Because of Nigeria's 
political antecedents, some observers are speculating 
that the chance for military intervention is slowly 
moving from slight to moderate.  They fear that 
perhaps the "red light" against military intervention 
may be replaced by an amber one in the months and 
perhaps weeks to come unless Obasanjo and his 
government improve their performance. 
 
 
19.  (C)  Unfortunately, Obasanjo has gotten off to a 
discordant and edgy start.  Being his second time 
around, he should have done better, knowing that this 
honeymoon would be shorter.  The palpable and 
widespread frustration has turned the alleged 
electoral mandate into pulp and ash.  Despite the 
level of unpopularity and concern, a military 
intervention is unlikely.  However, Obasanjo has stiff 
military political opposition that he must face.  To 
get Nigeria out of this current doldrum, he will have 
to show political and diplomatic acuity, thus far 
lacking. 
 
 
20.  (C)  Obasanjo needs to seek a political modus 
vivendi with moderates in the political opposition. 
Then he needs to energize his government to 
effectively work a few key but important issues like 
agriculture and employment.  Third, he must find a way 
to safeguard the GON revenue stream by ending the 
threat to the central government posed by elements in 
the Delta.  None of these will be easy, but unless he 
makes some heading in these areas, we will continue to 
hear about Nigeria's instability. 
 
 
ROBERTS