US embassy cable - 03RANGOON978

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2013 
TAGS: EFIN, ETRD, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMESE DEPUTY FM: "U.S-BURMA RELATIONS AT ROCK 
BOTTOM" 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Burma's Deputy Foreign Minister (DFM) told 
us on August 12 that the country's ruling generals are deeply 
upset with new U.S. sanctions and concerned about their 
impact on the Burmese economy, but feel confident they can 
mitigate any negative consequences.  He said that the 2003 
Burma Freedom and Democracy Act and Executive Order 13310 had 
sent U.S.-Burma relations to "rock bottom" and that there 
needed to be a cooling off period before progress on 
bilateral issues could resume.  The DFM demurred on our 
request to see detained NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and 
declined to specify a timetable for the release of ASSK or 
other detained NLD leaders.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) The Chief of Mission met at her request on August 12 
with Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win to discuss a 
variety of bilateral issues and to inquire about his July 
travels throughout the region.  The DFM said that SPDC 
Chairman General Than Shwe had sent him as a personal envoy 
to "let friends know about the situation (in Burma) and to 
address their concerns."  He did not offer specific details 
about his meetings with regional leaders, but intimated that 
his discussions in Japan and Malaysia had been difficult.  He 
said he received a "sympathetic" hearing in Brunei, 
Singapore, and the Philippines, noting that Philippine 
President Arroyo had made herself personally available 
"despite serious domestic challenges." 
 
ASSK Transfer? 
-------------- 
 
3. (C) The DFM said that he had faithfully reported to the 
SPDC generals the content of his July discussions in New York 
with EAP DAS Matt Daley, including his message that the GOB 
would transfer detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi 
(ASSK) to her Rangoon compound for continued "protective 
custody" if the authorities were not in a position to release 
her altogether.  The COM urged the DFM to obtain permission 
for her to visit ASSK and to immediately release NLD 
executive committee members under house arrest.  When the 
Pol/Econ chief pressed for a specific timeline to transfer or 
release ASSK, the Deputy FM cringed and said "I will not push 
(the generals) on this issue."  The COM urged the DFM to 
arrange for her to meet personally with General Khin Nyunt 
(SPDC Secretary One) with whom she would directly pursue the 
issue of ASSK's detention. 
 
The Generals Finally Get the Message 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) The DFM said he had told DAS Daley in New York that 
the GOB hoped to return to the political status quo that 
existed before the May 30 "incident" (note: the premeditated 
attack on ASSK and her convoy), but that the Burma Act and 
Executive Order had sent U.S.-Burma relations to rock bottom. 
 The Deputy FM described the SDPC generals as "very upset" 
with the sanctions and said they were deeply offended by a 
photo of the Oval Office signing ceremony and the "apparent 
joy" of those present (President Bush and several Members of 
Congress).  The Deputy FM said that as a result of the 
sanctions, nothing at the moment could be accomplished 
bilaterally, particularly on those issues discussed with DAS 
Daley.  He said the GOB did not feel compelled to make 
concessions because of the sanctions, but noted that his 
government was realistic and expected there to be a serious 
impact on the economy.  He added, though, that the GOB is 
"confident we can mitigate the consequences" of the new 
sanctions. 
 
5. (C) The COM told the Deputy FM that it was indeed the 
intent of the E.O. to make the Burmese leadership concerned, 
noting that it is incumbent upon the GOB to release ASSK and 
other NLD detainees in order create the conditions necessary 
for a return to dialogue.  She added that the Deputy FM 
should tell the senior SPDC leadership that despite the 
severity of the executive order, there are provisions to lift 
sanctions if conditions warrant, which demonstrates the hope 
of the USG that the SPDC will act accordingly.  DFM Khin 
Maung Win replied that "we need a cooling down period" and 
said he was not in a position to comment on the status of the 
NLD leaders, but that his availability to meet with the COM 
was a sign that "the door is open to dialogue" (note: the GOB 
has been more unresponsive than usual over the past month to 
our requests for meetings with senior officials). 
 
6. (C) The COM also inquired about visits to Burma by U.N. 
envoys, noting in particular that the U.S. fully supports the 
return of UNCHR Special Rapporteur Pinherio and his human 
rights team to follow up on his most recent mission.  The DFM 
said he had spoken that morning with U.N. Special Envoy 
Razali and, although Razali had expressed his desire to 
return to Burma immediately, the DFM said it was a "matter of 
timing" before any visits of either U.N. envoy could be 
arranged. 
 
 
Comment:  Flatfooted? 
--------------------- 
 
7. (C) We have long suspected that GOB officials are 
reluctant to deliver bad news to the ruling generals.  Deputy 
Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win's repeated references to the 
ire of the SPDC leaders over new U.S. sanctions leads us to 
believe that no one adequately prepared the isolated generals 
for the broad impact of the import ban and the assets freeze. 
 The DFM himself seemed surprised that, in his words, the 
executive order had cast a wider net than the Burma Act 
passed by Congress.  The GOB has been very slow to recover 
from the initial impact of the sanctions (and they have 
repeatedly declined our open offer for a briefing on the 
technical aspects of the executive order).  Perfectly 
illustrating the GOB's state of ignorance regarding 
sanctions, the Deputy FM inquired "off the record" as to how 
his business "friends" could apply for a general license to 
gain access to funds frozen in U.S. bank accounts.  That, we 
told him, is just the point: the sanctions are intended to 
send a clear and unambiguous message that the time is over 
for business as usual.  End comment. 
Martinez