US embassy cable - 03ABUJA1372

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF, DRL AND INL 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, EPET, KCRM, PHUM, SNAR, NI 
SUBJECT: ADVANCING THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES IN NIGERIA: USE 
OF FORCE GUIDELINES FOR POLICE AND MILITARY 
 
 
REF: ABUJA 
 
 
Classified by Charge d'affaires Dawn Liberi; reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
This is an action cable; action request for AF in para 10. 
 
 
1.(U) The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human rights 
seek, among other things, to bring companies in the 
extractive industry and governments of countries in which 
these companies operate into conformity with international 
human rights standards regarding the deployment and behavior 
of public and private security forces. 
 
 
2.(C) Our discussions with the three multinational companies 
in Nigeria who are Voluntary Principles stakeholders -- 
ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil and Shell -- have revealed that 
none has codified use of force guidelines in either their 
internal policies for Nigeria or bilateral agreements with 
the GON.  One company claims it has been advised against 
producing use of force guidelines by its U.S.-based corporate 
lawyers, who counsel that such a formal move could expose the 
company to undue liabilities. 
 
 
MISUSE OF FORCE 
--------------- 
 
 
3.(C) The need for guidelines in Nigeria is evident, however. 
Even when attempting to do the right thing, the Police often 
are in the wrong in how they do it. Police training is poor; 
(see septel for report on Policing in the Niger Delta) 
however, police personnel are empowered to resort to lethal 
force in situations where most other police forces would use 
less drastic means.  The standard weapon issued to the 
average police constable is an automatic rifle, such as an 
AK-47.  Moreover, policemen and women have little 
understanding of a "force continuum" or the principle of 
applying minimum force to meet the threat faced.  Little 
middle ground exists between passivity and the use of extreme 
force. 
 
 
4.(C) In the oil-producing Delta region, improper use of 
force has been frequent.  Most police and army personnel are 
deployed there to protect oil company interests against 
threats that often emanate from the Delta communities.  In an 
environment where tensions and frustrations are high, the 
police, army and the local populace develop a mutually 
hostile view that reinforced the penchant for these security 
elements to resort to excessive force.  Domestic and 
International Human Rights organizations have reported 
extensively on the Delta and have documented many of these 
cases. 
 
 
5.(C) The oil companies operating in the Delta region 
recognize however, sometimes reluctantly, that they must 
assume partial responsibility for the behavior of the police 
force deployed for their protection.  Company interests 
dictate this because when human rights incidents occur at the 
hands of police or military assigned to oil installations, it 
is the companies that receive intense negative publicity.  As 
a consequence, in recent discussions with Mission officers, 
the companies have shown greater interest in addressing the 
training needs of the police -- who most often are the first 
people to encounter disgruntled members of their host 
communities.  In particular, they also recognize the utility 
for formal commitments and adherence to use of force 
guidelines by both the GON and the companies themselves. 
 
 
SHELL OUT IN FRONT 
------------------ 
 
 
6. While Shell does not have a formal agreement with the GON, 
it does have a global (not Nigeria-specific) set of use of 
force Guidelines.  It also has developed "Rules for Guidance 
in the Use of Firearms by the Police" which it has put down 
on a small (3" X 5") two-sided, laminated card for 
distribution to Nigerian police personnel assigned to Shell 
installations.  On one side are the guidelines, including 
minimal force practices to handle disturbances. 
Supplementing the Shell guidelines is Nigerian Police Force 
Order Number 237,  an internal use of force SOP, to which 
police members must adhere. This Force Order 237 is 
paraphrased on the other side of the Shell guidelines. 
 
 
7.(C) The effort to disseminate and train Nigerian police 
pursuant to the guidelines is admirable.  The link to 
Nigerian Police Force order Number 237, however, raises 
concerns.  INL/ICITAP police advisors have found Force Order 
237 to be inconsistent with standards established by the 
ICRC, the UN Convention on Human Rights, UN Code of Conduct 
for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Guidelines on Use of 
Force, and the African Charter, all of which the GON 
subscribes to.  Force Order 237 allows police to use lethal 
force against any "riotous" crowd of 12 or more, whether they 
are armed or not.  The Force Order further instructs police 
personnel to shoot demonstrators below the knees and to 
"neutralize group ringleaders.  Although Shell did not 
include these provisions in paraphrasing the Force Order, we 
believe the order should not be mentioned in the Company's 
guidelines. 
 
 
ROADMAP AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
 
8.(C) To promote adherence to the Voluntary Principles, the 
Mission believes the USG should encourage the companies to 
enter formal agreements with the GON or to develop internal 
use of force guidelines that could be used for Nigerian 
military and police personnel assigned to oil installations. 
Agreements are preferred; they would allow companies to 
obtain control over the security personnel deployed to their 
facilities, including the right to reject personnel who have 
been involved in past human rights incidents. 
 
 
9.(C) After the companies have gotten on board, we would then 
initiate close collaboration with top GON police and military 
leaders aimed at producing formal GON commitments to the 
guidelines for security forces found in the Voluntary 
Principles.  We should encourage the GON to revise or rewrite 
Force Order 237 to eliminate its inconsistencies with several 
international human rights charters and conventions.  We 
could provide technical assistance to accomplish this.  We 
are under no delusion.  These reforms will be strenuously 
resisted in some quarters and may take sustained efforts and 
a long time to accomplish. 
 
 
10.(C) Action Request:  Post would like the Department's 
comments on the two step approach stated in para 8 and 9. 
 
 
LIBERI