US embassy cable - 03SANAA1990

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001990 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2011 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MCAP, YM, DPRK 
SUBJECT: YEMENI MILITARY LEADERS BRIEF AMBASSADOR ON DPRK 
CONTACTS 
 
Classified By: AMB EDMUND J. HULL FOR REASONS 1.5 (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On 8/10 Yemen's Chief of Staff and Defense 
Minister informed the Ambassador that President Saleh had 
taken the decision to end Yemeni military cooperation with 
North Korea.  At Yemen's invitation a senior DPRK delegation, 
possibly including the deputy ministers of defense and 
industry, will soon visit Sanaa to discuss modalities.  Yemen 
will seek redress of "technical problems" with SCUD missiles 
delivered in December, possibly involving the return of 
defective missiles to North Korea and refund of payment.  The 
Yemenis made clear that these steps are being taken in 
response to the requests of the USG, particularly U/S 
Bolton's June visit, and Japan.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, OMC Chief and CT 
Coordinator, called on Chief-of-Staff Qasimi and MinDef Aliwa 
August 10 to discuss an impending visit to Yemeni by a North 
Korean delegation to discuss military cooperation.  The 
meeting was a follow-up to MoD's meeting with BG Robeson 
August 4, in which Aliwa first informed the Ambassador that 
DPRK officials would visit soon. 
 
3. (C) Following an initial discussion of Yemen's 
increasingly effective counter-terrorism efforts, the 
Ambassador turned to the main topic of the meeting: North 
Korea.  Ambassador noted that he had requested the meeting to 
receive the ROYG's briefing on the impending visit of DPRK 
officials to review aspects of military cooperation between 
the two countries.  He reminded Qasimi and Aliwa of the USG's 
deep concern over North Korea's past cooperation with Yemen, 
as underscored during the June visit of Under Secretary 
Bolton. 
 
4. (C) Aliwa stated that Yemen had understood U/S Bolton's 
message, and for that reason had informed the U.S. Embassy of 
the pending DPRK visit -- which would possibly include the 
Deputy Ministers of Defense and Industry -- and welcomed the 
opportunity to provide details.  Aliwa stated that Yemen had 
benefited from the low prices North Korea charged for its 
military goods and services.  Nevertheless, at the urging of 
the USG, Japan and others, the ROYG had taken a "political 
decision" to end all cooperation with the DPRK.  Talks with 
the visiting North Korean officials would concentrate on 
modalities of doing so.  Aliwa said that President Saleh had 
personally made the decision and directed that he (Aliwa) 
brief the Ambassador.  He added that Yemen would need U.S. 
help to compensate for the loss of affordable North Korean 
services, particularly with regard to construction of a 
naval/coast guard facility at Hodeidah. 
 
5. (C) Chief of Staff Qasimi reviewed three areas of past 
bilateral cooperation between Yemen and the DPRK: 
 
-- SCUD missiles, which had been provided under an old 
contract.  Qasimi stressed that Yemen would not/not undertake 
any upgrades to its current stock of missiles, and revealed 
for the first time that the shipment of SCUDs received last 
December had "technical problems."  He said Yemen had not 
formally accepted the defective missiles, and that addressing 
this problem would be one focus of the impending DPRK visit. 
Qasimi noted that one option was to return the missiles to 
North Korea and seek a refund if no other solution could be 
found.  Aliwa suggested, in jest, that the U.S. might want to 
buy the missiles.  In response to a direct question from the 
Ambassador, he said there was no/no possibility of any SCUDs 
being exported from Yemen to a destination other than North 
Korea. 
 
-- A small ammunition factory in Abyan (southern Yemen), 
which had been producing small caliber ammunition since the 
1970s. 
 
-- A "coastal project" which had as yet had not been 
implemented.  This involved several aspects, including 
construction of docks, a repair workshop and buildings for 
the residence of naval/coast guard personnel.  The terms had 
been attractive for Yemen, as the North Korea had offered 
financing over a period of more than 10 years. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador urged the Yemeni military leadership to 
think holistically about planning facilities for the navy and 
coast guard to avoid duplication and inefficiency.  He 
stressed that Yemen should develop its own domestic 
capabilities and minimize dependence on outside assistance, 
such as North Korea had provided.  Qasimi agreed, but noted 
that the ROYG had approached China, which was currently 
performing a study of possible coastal defense construction. 
Ambassador pointed out that cooperation with China did not 
carry the same sensitivity for the United States as did 
cooperation with North Korea.  Qasimi and Aliwa both asked 
that the USG urge Japan to provide financial assistance to 
help Yemen meet its coastal defense needs.  Aliwa asked that 
the USG also ask Yemen's Gulf neighbors to offer support. 
Qasimi expressed frustration with Saudi Arabia, which was 
providing financial support to improve security along the 
land border between the two countries but no help on 
confronting the maritime threat, which in fact was greater. 
 
7. (C) Ambassador also raised the recent EP-3 incident, which 
is reported via a separate channel. 
 
8. (C) Comment: Clearly the ROYG at the highest level 
received and have understood U/S Bolton's message on North 
Korea.  Post will continue to work this issue closely with 
the Yemeni leadership as the ROYG works toward ending its 
cooperation with the DPRK.  Embassy is currently studying 
ways to assist Yemen in developing coastal facilities.  We 
have a plan to use currently available funding for facilities 
that serve the Yemen Coast Guard and Navy.  Through military 
channels, we are requesting experts to look at the 
requirements holistically with the objective of a 
cost-effective approach that precludes recourse to North 
Korea. 
 
HULL