US embassy cable - 03HARARE1599

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001599 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ZI 
SUBJECT: BISHOP RECOUNTS STATUS OF TALKS INITIATIVE 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1594 (B) HARARE 1571 (C) HARARE 1532 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER WIN DAYTON; REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: On behalf of the bishops' troika (reftels), 
Trevor Manhanga of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe on 
August 8 gave Charge a status report on the bishops' 
initiative to get political talks renewed.  Manhanga 
dismissed criticism of the initiative by certain ZANU-PF 
elements and asserted that Mugabe himself continued to be 
open to the effort.  Emphasizing that Mugabe personally had 
encouraged the bishops to canvass the international 
community, Manhanga inquired about USG views generally and 
benchmarks for international re-engagement in particular.  He 
advised that he would seek quiet facilitation of the process 
by other Africans, including the South African Government, 
which had offered to be supportive.  The bishops continue to 
wait for ZANU-PF's overdue submission of proposed agenda 
items for the talks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) At the bishops' initiative, Manhanga called on the 
Charge at the Embassy August 8 to exchange views on the 
bishops' effort to bring MDC and ZANU-PF to the negotiating 
table.  At the outset, Manhanga expressed appreciation for 
USG concern and assistance in exploring options for political 
reconciliation in Zimbabwe.  He apologized for the absence of 
his colleagues, who were unable to break away from 
commitments in Mutare.  He said the group was seeking to meet 
separately with Ambassador Sullivan (presently on leave), the 
British High Commissioner, and other international 
representatives.  Certain ZANU-PF elements would try to use 
such contact to attack the process but Mugabe himself had 
urged them to meet with the international community, 
including the British and South Africans.  Thus, such calls 
were "discreet" but "not clandestine."  He observed that, in 
any event, Zimbabwe's problems could not be addressed in 
isolation and that there would be stages at which advice and 
assistance from the international community would be helpful. 
 
 
3.  (C) By way of background, Manhanga recounted that the 
bishops' initiative was born several months ago, when several 
began discussing what could be done about the country's 
political polarization and rapid economic collapse.  At that 
time, they approached several ZANU-PF senior officials, among 
whom was ZANU-PF Information Secretary Nathan Shamuyarira, 
who promised to convey their interest to Mugabe.  They 
subsequently met further with Shamuyarira and Chairman John 
Nkomo, who arranged a meeting with Mugabe.  The Mugabe 
meeting lasted two hours.  After 45 minutes of criticizing 
familiar targets, Mugabe became "very amiable" and made clear 
that he supported a dialogue.  Mugabe described three related 
impediments to talks: the MDC election challenge, MDC views 
of his legitimacy, and the MDC's "parrotting" of foreign 
perspectives.  He encouraged the bishops to relay his 
interest to the MDC and see what might ensue. 
 
4.  (C) The following week, the bishops met with Morgan 
Tsvangirai and other MDC principals.  The MDC group 
 
SIPDIS 
identified familiar objectives: level playing field, 
reduction of political violence, etc.  They said they were 
prepared to drop the issue of legitimacy and the court 
challenge, although they would preserve the challenge for 
now.  The bishops relayed the positions to Shamuyarira and 
the parties agreed to submit proposed agenda items. 
 
5.  (C) Manhanga confirmed press reports that the bishops had 
intended to hold the MDC agenda letter (ref B) unopened until 
ZANU-PF submitted its letter and review them for the first 
time together.  He reported that Tsvangirai had apologized 
for the press leak of the MDC submission, which he conceded 
came from an MDC source.  Manhanga did not know who leaked 
the document or why it had been leaked. 
 
6.  (C) Manhanga said that free and fair elections were a 
long term objective for the bishops, but that atmospherics -- 
political arrests, disrupted rights of assembly, etc. -- 
would have to be addressed first.  The bishops did not intend 
to raise such issues, which invariably would be addressed by 
the process in any event.  For now, though, time was required 
to get conditions ripe for an election, including 
constitutional and electoral "dispensations."  As to 
potential power-transferring or power-sharing mechanisms, 
Manhanga said these would be up to the parties. 
 
7.  (C) Referring to internal ZANU-PF divisions, Manhanga 
said that Mugabe,s choice of party moderates to engage on 
the initiative indicated Mugabe,s sincerity and was a good 
sign.  In any event, however, any ZANU-PF "roadmap" was 
likely to be "fractious" at best.  Emphasizing the potential 
importance of affording Mugabe a "dignified exit," Manhanga 
urged that interested parties not permit details on the fate 
of "one man" obstruct a process that could yield benefits for 
all. 
 
8.  (C) According to Manhanga, the bishops were seeking 
certain African luminaries who might influence Mugabe 
constructively.  He opined that Kenneth Kaunda might be able 
to exert a positive influence, for example.  Mandela and 
Mbeki would be inappropriate, although the South African 
government already was being supportive.  In an August 4 
visit to the bishops, an Embassy counselor reported that the 
South African government was pleased with developments and 
urged that the bishops advise if it could be helpful. 
Manhanga said that they would go to the South Africans and 
other Africans for help if ZANU-PF dragged its feet past 
August 13 (August 11 and 12 are local holidays) on the agenda 
submission.  Getting some kind of "irrevocable momentum" soon 
was crucial; the longer the initiative,s status remained in 
"the twilight zone," the easier it would be for opposition 
efforts to gain traction. 
 
9.  (C) In concluding, Manhanga emphasized the importance of 
international support for the process.  At this nascent 
stage, some identification of international benchmarks tying 
specific events to stepped up international engagement would 
offer important incentive to the players.  "What has to 
happen for good will and positive actions to be shown?"  It 
might help significantly if the bishops could convey such 
information to Mugabe, Manhanga asserted.  He inquired about 
USG views. 
 
10.  (C) The Charge said that the USG hoped to see the 
process take off.  He related USG support for the bishops, 
longer-term objective of free and fair elections and 
concurred that establishing conditions to permit such 
elections was crucial.  The USG would monitor progress 
carefully and do what it could to help within the constraints 
of its strained relationship with the government.  In view of 
certain elements of ZANU-PF,s hostility to the USG and their 
rejection of the bishops, role, USG posture would remain 
discreet for now. 
 
11.  (C) COMMENT:  Manhanga probably is right that momentum 
will need to be established swiftly if the troika,s efforts 
are to bear fruit.  Even if they wither, Mugabe may yet 
pursue other avenues of dialogue -- ones over which he feels 
he maintains more control.  Mugabe may indeed be prepared to 
consider the possibility of stepping down, but we remain 
skeptical that he and his closest supporters have abandoned 
hopes of scripting a ZANU-PF succession scenario of some 
kind. 
WHITEHEAD