US embassy cable - 03GUATEMALA2040

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GUATEMALA 002040 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR WHA/AS NORIEGA AND DAS FISK FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KDEM, PHUM, ETRD, GT 
SUBJECT: GETTING AHEAD OF THE POLICY CURVE IN GUATEMALA 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Hamilton for reason 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 1. (C) Summary:  We need to be planning now as to how we 
would respond to a variety of contingencies during the 
campaign and as a result of the November 9 elections.  I 
believe we have in place most of the policy elements we need: 
a sound public position on the Rios Montt candidacy in the 
May 27 Boucher statement (relations with a Rios Montt 
government would not be "cordial"); a robust ($2.4 million) 
program of support to the elections, including both national 
and international (OAS) election observation; grants to 
monitor possible misuse of state resources; support to the 
elections tribunal and a campaign to educate the rural poor 
in particular that the ballot is genuinely secret.  Among 
these, the OAS mission may require plus-ing up from its 
current $640,000 budget.  Although legal challenges to the 
candidacy of General Rios Montt are still being filed, the 
political opposition, sensibly, has decided to oppose him at 
the polls, not pull out of the elections.  But in persistent, 
loud cries of fraud, the opposition and civil society are 
laying the groundwork for challenging the legitimacy of a 
putative Rios Montt victory, however remote that appears now. 
(He stands at 11% in the polls, with disapproval ratings 
above 60%.)  Our major challenge during the elections is to 
encourage a high rate of participation.  We are doing that 
through campaigns to convince the public the ballot is secret 
and that the safeguards against election-day fraud are 
adequate. 
 
2. (C) Rios Montt is determined to run and, if wins in a 
reasonably fair process, we should recognize his victory and 
deal with him, albeit coolly, and by putting down tough 
markers on organized crime, corruption, human rights and 
reform of the military.  We need not/not be concerned that he 
would refuse to deal with us: to the contrary, our problem 
will be fending off a charm offensive designed to gain 
legitimacy through U.S. acceptance of him.  If he wins in a 
badly flawed election, however, we should re-jigger CAFTA to 
exclude Guatemala and go to the OAS to seek new elections (as 
in the Dominican Republic in 1994) or, at the very minimum, 
an OAS-monitored reform process (as in Peru in 2000).  We 
should set the stage for that contingency by having the OAS 
election mission report to the OAS Permanent Council in 
October. 
 
3. (C) We should also plan for the more likely outcome: a 
credible victory by, say, Oscar Berger or Alvaro Colom (a win 
by any of the others is improbable).  We should embrace such 
a government publicly and provide significant new resources 
for rule of law and anti-corruption programs, peace accords 
implementation and other bilateral aid programs.  However, 
our responses would be handicapped by the historically low 
levels of DA and ESF currently being planned for Guatemala, 
especially relative to its more politically stable neighbors. 
Therefore, I urge that WHY FY 2004 DA and ESF allocations be 
flexible, in order to preserve the option of increasing them 
significantly.  Whoever wins, we need to support the 
Commission (in formation) to investigate clandestine groups 
and use our military-to-military programs to push the 
Guatemalan military toward reform.  End summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
4. (C) The intense political confrontation that has 
characterized the four years of the Portillo Government has 
effectively polarized the ruling FRG and its opposition -- 
which includes practically all sectors of Guatemalan society. 
 This has led to an increasingly poisonous electoral 
environment with growing violence (12 provincial party 
activists dead already), mutual hostility, and cries of fraud 
by the opposition to discredit FRG candidate Efrain Rios 
Montt.  Manipulation by the FRG and/and the opposition 
temporarily transferred the electoral debate to the 
judiciary, effectively damaging the credibility of both the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, and generating 
more public cynicism. Guatemala's now past that impasse, by 
virtue of the Constitutional Court's July 30 slam dunk of the 
Supreme Court, ordering the registration of Rios Montt. 
Although legal challenges to his candidacy are still being 
filed, the likelihood that one would at this point succeed is 
remote.  The opposition and civil society -- sensibly -- have 
decided to contest his candidacy at the polls, not to boycott 
the elections.  Although the Guatemalan Constitution thus 
takes a hit, the political result (assuming the General 
loses) may be better for Guatemala. 
 
5. (C) An unintended casualty of the warnings of potential 
fraud has been the discrediting of the elections themselves. 
A July poll shows that two-thirds of Guatemalans have no 
interest in the elections and don't believe they will change 
anything in Guatemala.  Voter turnout (traditionally low) 
will surely suffer, benefiting the party best able to turn 
out its core supporters (probably the FRG).  By convincing 
the population that electoral fraud is already in progress, 
the opposition is setting the stage to challenge the results 
of the election in the event they lose.  There is a risk that 
the new government, whoever wins, may lack the legitimacy of 
being recognized by all political actors. 
 
6. (C) The polls currently give pro-business GANA candidate 
Oscar Berger a 40% to 11% lead over FRG candidate Efrain Rios 
Montt (though conventional wisdom and past experience tell us 
that the polls underestimate the rural vote, where the FRG 
has its strength).  Alvaro Colom, of the centrist National 
Union for Hope Party (UNE), could sneak into a second round 
runoff against Berger, in which case he could emerge the 
victor.  Guatemala's unbroken tradition of not reelecting the 
party in power and the large number of voters who say they 
would never vote for the former dictator add to the view that 
the chances of Rios Montt winning the presidency are not 
high.  However, with three months left in the campaign and 
little popular enthusiasm for the other candidates, we can 
not rule out the possibility of a genuine Rios Montt victory. 
 
7. (C) Guatemala's history has led the political actors to 
view elections as a winner-take-all, zero sum game.  The FRG 
is desperate to hold onto power, in part to protect itself 
from investigations into Portillo-era corruption and to 
ensure continued access to resources.  The opposition also 
sees this as its last chance to prevent "Colombianization," 
and therefore it is do or die for them, too.  Guatemala lacks 
good mediating institutions, as no one institution is above 
the political fray, able to communicate, and serve as a go 
between for all sides.  The church, which plays this role in 
some Latin American societies, suffers from weak leadership. 
The international community has played this role effectively 
since the negotiation of the Peace Accords, but at the cost 
of Guatemalans not developing their own institutions to play 
this role.  The OAS is best positioned to serve as a 
go-between, as it has the best combination of communication 
to both sides.  The U.S. has these credentials as well.  But 
there are risks for us if we get into the middle of this, as 
neither side is open to concessions and each wants us to 
impose its will on the other. 
 
8. (C) On the up side, Guatemala has a good electoral law, 
and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) is viewed as 
professional and honest.  The magistrates are politically 
divided (2 of 5 are hard-core FRG) and the three non-FRG are 
hardly made of stern stuff, but the staff is highly 
professional and neither the FRG nor the opposition question 
the impartiality of how the TSE will carry out the elections. 
 The register of voters ("padron electoral") is in reasonably 
good shape, and the use of indelible ink will control against 
double voting.  Each party is entitled to poll watchers who 
can prevent fraud at the ballot box.  One national and two 
international election observation missions and at least two 
quick counts will check fraud in the vote tabulation. 
 
9. (C) The greatest concern of the opposition is the 
potential for misuse of state resources for electoral ends. 
In our view, that concern is much exaggerated, as the 
Guatemalan state is chronically resource-scarce and has few 
programs (fertilizers, ex-PAC payments and school lunches 
aside) that in many countries lend themselves to electoral 
manipulation.  Anticipating this problem, we have awarded 
several grants to NGO's to monitor and report publicly on 
misuse of state resources.  They are already reporting 
publicly.  We are also demarching the government about some 
troubling early indications of possible misuse of state 
resources; replacement of the professional, apolitical head 
of Guatemala's national disaster relief organization (CONRED) 
by an FRG political hack and Guatemala's recent move to pull 
out of a joint customs operation with El Salvador, to set up 
its own customs (and revenue-generating) control.  Both 
decisions were taken by the FRG hard-liner Vice President 
Reyes Lopez, when President Portillo was out of the country. 
Publicity, effective work of the TSE and a robust election 
observation effort are the best ways to keep fraud in check. 
 
10. (C) The use of violence, which has increased in recent 
weeks, could become a tactic to keep the large swing vote at 
home, and there is no easy cure for that.  But as Codel 
Ballenger did during their August 4-6 visit here, we will 
continually hold up the example in our public diplomacy of 
war-era El Salvador, where as many as 85% of registered 
voters voted, despite threats.  Public and private 
admonitions to the FRG to control violence have received much 
attention.  We will use CAFTA and every other incentive and 
disincentive at our disposal to induce decent FRG (and 
opposition) behavior. 
 
How do we respond if a large portion of the opposition and 
civil society starts to boycott the elections? 
-------------------------------------------- 
11. (C) There have been calls by some segments of civil 
society to boycott the elections, claiming that the 
Constitutional Court decision in favor of Rios Montt has 
already vitiated the process.  None of the political parties 
has joined this movement, in part because at this point they 
believe the election will favor them.  Short of abuse so 
blatant as to totally discredit continuation of the election, 
we should urge continued participation, i.e., not leaving the 
field to the FRG.  We will stay in close 
coordination/communication with the observation missions. 
The Embassy placed an op ed piece under the Ambassador's 
signature in the August 8 press calling attention to 
safeguards against fraud and urging voter participation, 
rejection of cynicism and apathy.  We have also inserted that 
message into the op ed by Assistant Secretary Noriega. 
Washington needs to give the same message to visiting 
delegations and explain our position to the Washington NGO 
community and to Congressional staff. 
 
How do we deal with a Rios Montt government, if that comes to 
pass? 
---------------------------------------- 
12. (C) If current trends remain constant, Rios Montt will 
not win the election.  However, we should not discount the 
possibility that it could happen.  Under the assumption that 
Rios Montt were elected in elections that were reasonably 
free/fair, we should adopt a distinctly cool, cautious 
approach, putting down stringent markers.  Our biggest 
problem will not/not be to repair damage to relations with 
the FRG, but rather to deal with their charm offensive, their 
wish to cooperate with us and to be embraced by us as their 
avenue to internal and international legitimacy.  At a 
minimum, the Ambassador could be instructed to put down 
markers in a meeting following the second round of the 
elections (December 28).  Sending a special emissary from 
Washington is another possibility, although the optics of a 
special emissary (squaring that with the May 27 Boucher 
statement) are difficult.  But we should not send a 
high-level delegation to the inauguration.  We can take as a 
given the FRG/Rios Montt's profession of wanting to fully 
cooperate on drugs, counter-terrorism, alien smuggling and 
most international issues.  They will also be committed to 
CAFTA.  But we should insist on their breaking all ties with 
organized crime, fully supporting CICIACS (the commission to 
investigate so-called clandestine groups), purging the police 
of corrupt elements, reforming military intelligence and 
making every possible effort to put an end to threats against 
the human rights community. 
 
13. (C) Whether his victory under these circumstances would 
irreparably prejudice Congressional approval of CAFTA is 
Washington's call. On the assumption that it would, we have 
considered whether a direct private appeal -- possible 
through a private emissary -- would yet dissuade Rios Montt 
from running.  We are convinced that it would not and that, 
if it became public, could only make us look ingenuous for 
having attempted it. Rios Montt did not go through the huge 
effort to pack and pressure the Constitutional Court, and to 
mount the July 24-25 protests only to withdraw now.  He wants 
to run, his wife and family want him to run, and his 
followers in the FRG are convinced that they will virtually 
disappear as an institution if he does not head the ticket. 
 
14. (C) If Rios Montt wins in an election that does not meet 
minimum standards, however, we should seek to invoke the 
Inter-American Charter (or Resolution 1080) to seek new 
elections (as in the Dominican Republic in 1994) or, at a 
bare minimum, a resolution that would set up some sort of 
OAS-brokered dialogue (as in Peru in 2000) that would 
effectively put a Rios Montt government under international 
observation.  We should lay the groundwork now for that 
contingency by asking the Secretary General to report to the 
Permanent Council on the election process, once the OAS 
election mission makes its first report at the beginning of 
October.  We could take that step sooner, should some new, 
dramatic event alter the political landscape.  The 
assassination of a major candidate or prominent public 
figure, for example, would surely constitute such an event 
and, in that case, we should respond immediately and 
positively to a request for FBI investigative assistance.  We 
should also lower the boom on a fraudulent Rios Montt victory 
by revocation of GSP trade preferences and re-jiggering of 
the CAFTA to exclude Guatemala.  All sorts of lesser 
responses to an unacceptably flawed election should be 
planned in advance, including recall of the Ambassador and 
non-attendance at a Rios Montt inauguration.  The objective 
would be not to let a Rios Montt victory through fraud stand 
unchallenged. 
 
How to engage with a good government? 
------------------------------------- 
15. (C) We should also plan now for a good outcome which, at 
this stage, appears more likely.  We will want to send a 
high-level delegation to the inauguration (with a delegation 
head who will symbolize our commitment to CAFTA/economic 
prosperity; anti-corruption or aid on rule of law/public 
security issues).  We should review our bilateral programs to 
see where they could be bolstered in the short term.  Renewed 
Guatemalan commitment to the Peace Accords could be rewarded 
with increased assistance and a high-level delegation to a 
mid-year Consultative Group Meeting.  NAS and ICITAP programs 
should be increased.  The ATA anti-kidnapping training (an 
assessment team was just here) is small, but could be of 
invaluable assistance to a new government desperate to clamp 
down on organized crime.  We should also offer VIP protective 
detail training  Assuming no military misbehavior during the 
campaign, the SouthCom Commander should visit in February or 
March, to inaugurate the New Horizons exercise and to bolster 
a new Government in the eyes of its military. 
 
Using CICIACS to undermine the influence of organized crime 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
16. (C) Irrespective of who wins the elections, the next 
government will be forced early on to confront organized 
crime.  We believe the establishment of CICIACS (the 
Guatemalan/UN/OAS joint commission against clandestine 
groups) offers the greatest hope for investigating and 
containing the role of organized crime in politics and the 
economy, and putting an end to the threats of against human 
rights workers.  We should give serious consideration to 
providing new USG funding beyond the $500,000 currently 
contemplated.  We should also consider assigning a recently 
retired prosecutor or some similarly qualified person as a 
USG liaison to CICIACS during the duration of its work.  We 
need to start an inter-agency process now/now to give CICIACS 
a product, shortly after its work starts, that details the 
essence of what we know about clandestine groups and 
organized crime in Guatemala.  We should also consider 
detailing a U.S. security expert to CICIACS itself. 
 
Conclusion 
---------- 
17. (C) In conclusion, we face a difficult but by no means 
impossible situation in Guatemala, and the opportunities to 
advance our interests significantly are at least as good as 
are the possibilities that things will get worse.  A major 
concern I have is that Guatemala-bashing and a tendency to 
write Guatemala off have taken such strong hold in Washington 
that, through budget planning, we may already have precluded 
options for coming robustly to the support of a new, credible 
government.  I urge that ESF and DA allocation decisions for 
FY2004 be marked with an asterisk for the moment, pending the 
outcome of these elections, with a view toward upping them 
considerably if a government we want to support comes to 
office in January.  In the meantime, we have good 
communication with all the actors.  That includes not only 
the opposition, but the Portillo government and the FRG 
itself.  We will use every possible incentive and warning of 
disincentives to coax them into acceptable election behavior. 
HAMILTON