US embassy cable - 03SANAA1971

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 001971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM, TERFIN 
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI ON AL-MOAYED, TRAINING AND 
COLE ESCAPEES 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull, Reasons 1.5 (b & d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Interior Minister Alimi again pressed 
Ambassador August 5 for US agreement to return Sheikh 
al-Moayed to Yemen for trial, in response to FBI invitation 
for Yemeni officials to visit New York and review evidence 
following al-Moayed's extradition.  Ambassador and 
Legatt-Designate reiterated firm USG intent to extradite and 
urged Yemeni government to cooperate in al-Moayed case and 
urge al-Moayed himself to cooperate.  Current training of 
Interior forces was assessed favorably by both sides and 
future training discussed generally.  Legatt-Designate 
proposed formation of a joint task force to pursue Cole 
escapees.  Alimi was cool to the idea, but agreed to study 
it. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador, Legatt-Designate Gaudin, Special Agent 
Fernandez and RSO Laas met Interior Minister Alimi for nearly 
two hours August 5, to follow up previous discussion with 
President Saleh and invitation for Yemeni officials to come 
to New York to meet with American prosecutors and review the 
al-Moayed case subsequent to his extradition. 
 
3. (C) To start, Ambassador praised Alimi on excellent crime 
scene exercise which he had attended that morning on the 
outskirts of Sanaa.  Ambassador praised Yemeni participants 
for their enthusiasm and qualifications.  He also praised FBI 
trainers for their expertise.  Ambassador noted that this 
training had direct relevance to our counter terrorism 
efforts and was funded by the Diplomatic Security Bureau of 
the State Department.  Alimi welcomed the training and said 
it would serve as one of the bases for the new CT capability 
that he was forming within the Ministry of Interior. 
 
4. (C) Discussion turned to extradition of al-Moayed. 
Minister Alimi said he, PSO Chief Qamish and President Saleh 
had all considered the letter of the Legatt-designate (Para 
8) which contained particulars of the US case and an 
invitation for Yemeni officials to come to New York City to 
review all evidence and cooperate with US prosecutors.  Alimi 
said the facts in the letter broke little new ground.  The 
Yemenis continue to consider al-Moayed a relatively 
unimportant player and one best handled in the Yemeni courts. 
 He reiterated previous Yemeni offers to work with US 
authorities in bringing al-Moayed to justice in Yemen.  In 
response, Ambassador and Legatt-designate reiterated US 
determination to extradite al-Moayed and cautioned the 
Minister that previously seemingly unimportant terrorists 
subsequently played important roles in facilitating attacks. 
Extensive discussion ensued and Alimi indicated that it is 
unlikely Yemeni authorities will accept the invitation. 
Ambassador stressed that cooperation on al-Moayed's part and 
between the US and Yemen offered the best opportunity to deal 
with the political fallout of the al-Moayed case. 
 
5. (C) Discussion eventually turned to future training of 
Interior Ministry CT Unit.  Legatt-Designate sketched 
training programs that have been successfully done in 
Indonesia and Pakistan.  In so doing, he noted that such 
training falls within the purview of the State Department ATA 
Program, but he would recommend that the FBI support such 
training if agreed. RSO noted funding for such training would 
have to be obtained.  Ambassador said that US would explore 
the possibility based on the Minister's interest. 
Legatt-designate then noted that the FBI hopes to have slots 
for one or two Yemenis at the FBI Academy and suggested that 
the Yemeni facilitator in the current training program, Major 
Qatan, would be an excellent candidate. 
 
6. (C) Legatt-Designate then noted Ambassador's previous 
demarche to President Saleh on urgency to recapture escaped 
Cole suspects as well as BG Robeson's similar Demarche to 
Alimi August 4.  Legatt-Designate proposed that a joint task 
force be formed with the sole purpose of recapturing 
prominent Cole escapees.  FBI participants would bring their 
expertise and capabilities to the effort.  Such a step would 
signal from the Yemeni side complete determination to bring 
these wanted individuals to justice.  In response, Alimi 
expressed Yemeni determination to recapture the escapees.  He 
noted the significant changes that have occurred in Yemeni 
security services in the wake of the escape.  The issue 
currently was to develop leads, follow-up and re-arrest. 
Ambassador pointed out that development of leads was exactly 
where the FBI could help and extraordinary efforts are now 
required in this regard.  Alimi said he would study the 
proposal. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT:  Minister Alimi was obviously conflicted in 
this meeting.  The al-Moayed case presents significant 
political costs here, and the Minister is accurately 
reflecting President Saleh's strong personal preference that 
al-Moayed be returned to Yemen.  The Minister is also 
responsible for security of Americans in Yemen and will have 
to manage any threats that result from an extremely unpopular 
handover.  That said, Minister Alimi appreciates acutely the 
benefits Yemen accrues from CT cooperation with the US and 
will work to keep that cooperation on track despite 
inevitable political and security fallout from al-Moayed's 
extradition. 
 
8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF FBI LETTER TO MINISTER ALIMI: 
 
His Excellency 
Dr. Rashad al-Alimi 
Minister of Interior 
Sana'a 
Excellency: 
 
It is our pleasure to invite three members of your government 
to visit the Federal Bureau of Investigation's New York City 
Office.  The purpose of the invitation is to discuss the 
pending United States criminal case against two Yemeni 
citizens, Mohamed al-Moayad and Mohamed Zayed.  We would like 
to extend this offer for your visit upon completion of all 
extradition proceedings involving al-Moayad and Zayed.  It is 
believed that this visit will further the spirit of 
cooperation between our two agencies in combating the global 
war against terrorism.  This request for you to visit the 
United States is at the expense of our government.   A more 
complete and full disclosure of the facts involved in the 
case will be made available to you upon your arrival in New 
York City. 
 
A summary of the case is outlined below: 
 
It initially was reported to the FBI that al-Moayad was 
involved in supplying money, arms and recruits to mujahideen 
fighters, i.e., men fighting for extremist Muslim groups such 
as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the separatists in Chechnya 
and Kashmir.  Al-Moayad also stated, in substance, that he 
has supplied al-Qaeda with arms and communication equipment 
in the past. 
 
Al-Moayad identified five individuals in New York who were 
sending money from the United States to al-Moayad.  Al-Moayad 
provided contact telephone numbers for these individuals. 
Al-Moayad indicated that he received money for the jihad that 
was collected at a mosque in Brooklyn, NY. 
 
Al-Moayad suggested meeting in Frankfurt, Germany because he 
and the secretary who was to accompany him could easily get 
visas to Germany.  Al-Moayad also explained that he 
(al-Moayad) had business to conduct in Germany.  Al-Moayad 
specifically referenced plans to purchase 
counter-surveillance equipment from a German company, known 
as PK Electronic International GmbH and Co KG, located in 
Hamburg, Germany.  Al-Moayad showed a typewritten invoice 
from PK International reflecting al-Moayad's proposed 
purchase of equipment.   The buyer was listed as Ali Ibrahim 
Elhayek, whom al-Moayad identified as the individual making 
the purchases on al-Moayad's behalf.  Al-Moayad claimed that 
he wanted the equipment to enable him to conduct 
counter-surveillance against Yemeni internal security 
authorities, whom al-Moayad believed might be monitoring him. 
 The invoice reflects the purchase of, among other things, a 
"Mini Transmitter Detector," a "Wrist Watch Transmitter," a 
"Wrist Watch Camera Set," "Audio Surveillance Device," 
"Quartz Controlled Ball Point Pen," "Photographic 
Surveillance System with Camera and Adapter" and a "Universal 
Tapping Detector." 
 
The names of people living in the United States were then 
investigated by the FBI.  It was determined that the persons 
in the U.S. were involved in helping al-Moayad. 
 
On January 7, 2003, Mohamed Zayed and Mohammed al-Moayad 
arrived in Frankfurt, Germany.  On the previous day, an FBI 
source had a telephone conversation, which was not recorded, 
with Mohamed Zayed, in which he told the source that 
al-Moayad and Zayed almost cancelled their trip because of an 
incident that had occurred in Frankfurt on January 5, 2003, 
during which the pilot of a small airplane threatened to fly 
into a building, but that al-Moayad thought the meeting in 
Frankfurt was too important. 
 
On January 7, 2003, al-Moayad and Mohamed Zayed met a second 
FBI source and the four men went to dinner.  At the direction 
of the FBI agents, source one and two did not discuss the 
purpose of their trip and the meeting in Frankfurt at the 
dinner. 
 
On January 8, 2003 Mohamed Zayed, al-Moayad, source one and 
source two, had breakfast together and then met in source 
two's hotel room to discuss business.  During a two-hour 
meeting, which was recorded, source two advised al-Moayad 
that source two was interested in providing money to support 
the jihad against America and Zionist governments.  Al-Moayad 
told source two, in part and substance, that al-Moayad had 
met with Usama bin Laden and discussed matters with bin Laden 
and that bin Laden says that al-Moayad is his "sheikh" or 
spiritual leader.  Al-Moayad also said that jihad" was 
al-Moayad's field and that he is connected to terrorist 
organizations and has prior knowledge of terrorist 
activities.  In response to a question by source two, 
al-Moayad said he would make inquiries as to whether source 
two's men could train with terrorist fighters.  Towards the 
end of the meeting, al-Moayad said he would provide source 
two with names of people in the United States who could 
transfer money from source two to al-Moayad.  The meeting 
concluded with the four men agreeing to meet again to 
continue their discussions. 
 
During the January 8, 2003 meeting, source two and al-Moayad 
were the primary speakers, with source one serving as a 
translator.  Mohamed Zayed was present for the entire meeting 
and occasionally interjected in the conversation by prompting 
al-Moayad's responses to questions from source two.  For 
example, at one point, when al-Moayad was having difficulty 
remembering the name of one of his terrorist contacts, Zayed 
supplied the name.  Zayed also nodded his head in apparent 
agreement to certain statements made during the meeting.  At 
the outset of the meeting, Zayed questioned the presence of 
source two's pager on the coffee table, appearing to express 
concern about the possibility of cameras and recording 
equipment in the room.  At one point during the meeting, 
al-Moayad said they should swear on the Quran that they will 
trust each other with respect to the matter of the money and 
keep it secret, remembering that Allah is watching.  In 
response, all four men, including Mohamed Zayed, stood up and 
placed their hands on the Quran.  At another point during the 
meeting, al-Moayad pointed to Zayed and told source two that 
money could be sent through "Mohammed." 
 
In the evening of January 8, 2003, source two met with 
al-Moayad and Mohamed Zayed in a hotel room.  During that 
meeting, which was recorded, the three men discussed the use 
of codes when speaking with each other on the telephone. 
 
On January 9, 2003, Mohamed Zayed and al-Moayad again met 
with both sources.  During this conversation, which was 
recorded, source two asked al-Moayad to identify the group or 
groups to which source two's money would go, specifically 
whether source two's money would go to al-Qaeda, or other 
groups.  Al-Moayad responded that the money would be used to 
support the mujahideen fighters of both al-Qaeda and other 
groups.  Source two asked what the defendant Mohamed Zayed's 
role was and whether he was someone source two could deal 
with directly if something happened to al-Moayad.  Al-Moayad 
responded that Zayed was someone he trusted.  Source two 
asked Zayed directly if source two gave Zayed his (source 
two's) money, would Zayed give it to the people to whom 
source two wanted it to go.  Zayed swore to Allah that he 
would.  Later in the meeting, Zayed suggested that possibly 
arrangements could be made with members of terrorist groups 
to allow source two to send money directly to a terrorist 
group. 
 
Over the course of the meetings in Germany, al-Moayad 
reiterated to source one that individuals in Brooklyn, New 
York could be used to facilitate the transfer of money to 
al-Moayad. 
 
It is believed that the opportunity to review the evidence of 
the case in its entirety will assist you in fighting the 
threat imposed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. 
 Additionally, it is hoped that at the completion of the 
review, both your agency and ours, can continue to work 
together to locate evidence against al-Moayad and other like 
minded persons in the U.S., Yemen, and abroad. 
 
 
                              Sincerely, 
 
                              Stephen Gaudin 
                              Legal Attache (Designate) 
END TEXT. 
 
HULL