US embassy cable - 85TELAVIV15214

ISRAELI WHITE PAPER ON PLO OUTLOOK AND GOALS

Identifier: 85TELAVIV15214
Wikileaks: View 85TELAVIV15214 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tel Aviv
Created: 1985-10-21 21:21:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: PTER IS US
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
R 212121Z OCT 85
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3137
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 TEL AVIV 15214 
 
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 
 
E.O. 12356: N/A 
TAGS:  PTER, IS, US 
SUBJECT:  ISRAELI WHITE PAPER ON PLO OUTLOOK AND GOALS 
 
1.  THE GOI HAS LAUNCHED AN EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY 
CAMPAIGN TO DOCUMENT THE GOALS AND METHODS OF THE 
PLO.  MFA SOURCES HAVE PROVIDED US WITH A PAPER ON 
"THE PLO'S OUTLOOK AND GOALS IN THE WAKE OF THE 
HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT" WHICH IS BEING MADE PUBLIC 
AS PART OF THAT CAMPAIGN.  THE TEXT IS BELOW IN PARA 
2.  KEY POINTS (SUPPORTED BY QUOTATIONS FROM PLO 
SOURCES) ARE: 
 
- -- ARAFAT'S GOALS IN THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT 
ARE DESCRIBED AS: 
 
-        -- PREVENTING HUSSEIN FROM ENTERING THE 
PEACE PROCESS ON HIS OWN. 
 
-        -- PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A RETURN OF THE 
PLO TO JORDAN. 
 
-        -- ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. RECOGNITION WITHOUT 
ACCEPTANCE OF 242 AND 338. 
-- 
- -- THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT "DOES NOT DEVIATE 
FROM PLO POLICY". 
 
- -- THE PLO'S GOAL REMAINS "THE DESTRUCTION OF 
ISRAEL". 
 
- -- "THE ARMED STRUGGLE" REMAINS CENTRAL TO PLO 
POLICY. 
 
- -- THE PLO REJECTS JORDANIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT. 
 
- -- THE PLO SEES "LAND FOR PEACE" AS ONE STAGE, 
LEADING TO THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. 
 
2.  BEGIN TEXT: 
 
"CHAPTER 1:  THE POLITICAL DIMENSION - THE PLO'S 
OUTLOOK AND GOALS IN THE WAKE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT 
AGREEMENT (11 FEB 1985) 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT AND ITS MEANING AS 
VIEWED BY THE PLO 
 
1.  ARAFAT SIGNED THE AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN FOR 
THREE PRIMARY REASONS: 
 
A.  TO ENSURE THAT HUSSEIN WOULD NOT ENTER INTO 
SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL; 
 
B.  TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF 
A PLO PRESENCE IN JORDAN, FROM WHENCE THE 
ORGANIZATION WAS EXPELLED IN 1970. 
 
C.  TO WIN US RECOGNITION, WITHOUT HAVING TO ACCEPT 
THE US' PRECONDITIONS, NAMELY, ACCEPTING UN 
RESOLUTION 242 AND RECOGNIZING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO 
EXIST, AND TO ACHIEVE US AGREEMENT TO THE CONVENING 
OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE PLO WILL 
HAVE A STATUS EQUAL TO THAT OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS. 
 
THE EXPULSION OF THE TERRORISTS FROM LEBANON, 
INITIALLY BY THE IDF AND LATER BY SYRIA, BROUGHT THE 
PLO TO ONE OF THE LOWEST POINTS IN ITS HISTORY; NOT 
ONLY WERE PLO MEMBERS DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE 
EAST, BUT WHEN ARAFAT WANTED TO CONVENE THE PALESTINE 
NATIONAL COUNCIL, HE HAD A DIFFICULT TIME FINDING AN 
ARAB COUNTRY WILLING TO HOST IT AND, IN THE END, ONLY 
JORDAN AGREED TO DO SO.  FOR ARAFAT, THE AGREEMENT 
WITH HUSSEIN THEREFORE MEANS FIRST AND FOREMOST THE 
RETURN OF THE TERRORISTS TO JORDAN AND THE GRADUAL 
STRENGTHENING OF THEIR PRESENCE THERE, WITH THE 
INTENTION BEING THAT JORDAN SERVE AS A BASE FOR 
INCREASED TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAELI TARGETS, 
FOR THE INCITEMENT OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE 
TERRITORIES AGAINST ISRAELI RULE, AND FOR THE 
STRENGTHENING OF THE PLO'S POSITION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARENA.  IN HIS BOOK, 'THE JORDANIAN 
AGREEMENT', WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN AMMAN IN JULY 
1985, KHALED AL-HASSAN, HEAD OF THE INFORMATION 
DIVISION OF 'FATAH', SPEAKS OF THIS GOAL: 
 
-   'THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE RETURN OF THE 
PLO TO AN AREA WHICH BORDERS ON THE HOMELAND, AND TO 
AN ESCALATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE, WHICH IS ONE OF 
THE FIXED PRINCIPLES OF THE PALESTINIAN ACTION 
STRATEGY.  THE ONLY POSSIBLE PLACE IS JORDAN, SINCE 
THE BORDERS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND LEBANON HAVE BEEN 
CLOSED FOR REASONS WHICH THERE IS NO NEED TO GO 
INTO.  THE RETURN TO JORDAN IS A STRATEGIC INTEREST 
AND NEED OF BOTH PALESTINE AND JORDAN.  THE RETURN TO 
JORDAN NECESSITATES AN AGREEMENT TO ORDER RELATIONS 
(BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES??)'. 
 
2.  THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT CONTAINS NEITHER 
CONCESSIONS NOR MODERATION ON BASIC PLO POSITIONS. 
IN OTHER WORDS, THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT DEVIATE FROM 
PLO POLICY AS APPROVED BY THE ORGANIZATION'S 
AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS - AND ESPECIALLY THE 
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL - AND AS ENSHRINED IN THE 
DECISIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMITS.  INDEED, A STATEMENT 
WHICH THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ISSUED ON 18 
FEBRUARY 1985, AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT, 
SAID THE FOLLOWING: 
 
-   'THE JOINT ACTIVITY OF JORDAN AND THE PLO IS 
BASED ON PALESTINIAN LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED 
IN THE DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, 
ESPECIALLY AT ITS 16TH AND 17TH SESSIONS, ON ARAB 
LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE DECISIONS OF 
THE ARAB SUMMITS, IN PARTICULAR RABAT AND FEZ, AND ON 
INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE 
DECISIONS OF THE UN.' 
 
SINCE THIS STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED, SIMILAR DECISIONS 
HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY A NUMBER OF PLO AND 'FATAH' 
INSTITUTIONS. 
 
3.  THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT HAS NOT PRODUCED ANY 
CHANGE IN THE PLO'S STRATEGIC AIM, WHICH REMAINS THE 
DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
'DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR' STATE ON ISRAEL'S RUINS, WITH 
THE ACHIEVING OF THIS AIM BEING CARRIED OUT IN 
STAGES.  EVIDENCE FOR THIS CAN BE FOUND IN THE 
DECLARATIONS OF THE AL-HASSAN BROTHERS, CONFIDANTS OF 
ARAFAT: 
 
A.  HANI AL-HASSAN, ARAFAT'S POLITICAL ADVISOR:  'AS 
LONG AS THE PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC STATE HAS NOT BEEN 
ESTABLISHED ON ALL OF PALESTINE, THERE CAN BE NO 
ABSOLUTE AND FINAL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN 
PROBLEM.  I AM SPEAKING ALSO OF THOSE LANDS WHICH 
WERE PALESTINIAN BEFORE 1948, FROM THE RIVER TO THE 
SEA; THIS IS THE STRATEGIC GOAL.  CLEARLY, SUCH A 
GOAL IS NOT ATTAINED ALL AT ONCE, BUT RATHER IN 
STAGES.' (AL-SAYAD, 15.4). 
 
B.  KHALED AL-HASSAN:  'THE CONFLICT IS LONG AND 
ALL-ENCOMPASSING, AND ITS OUTCOME WILL BE DETERMINED 
ONLY BY THE ELIMINATION OF EITHER ARAB NATIONALISM, 
OR ZIONISM.  THERE IS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THESE 
TWO MOVEMENTS, WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE 
ELIMINATION OF ONE OF THEM.  HOWEVER, SINCE WE SEE NO 
POSSIBILITY OF QUICKLY ACHIEVING THE FINAL AIM, WE 
OPERATE THROUGH THE POLICY OF STAGES, UPON WHICH THE 
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL DECIDED IN 1974' (AL-ANBA, 
KUWAIT, 24.5). 
-- 
4.  THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT HAS PRODUCED NO 
CHANGE IN THE PLO'S VIEW OF TERROR, WHICH IT REFERS 
TO S THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE'.  FOR EXAMPLE: 
 
-   1.  HANI AL-HASSAN:  'THE ARMED STRUGGLE SOWS, 
AND THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE REAPS, AND HE WHO SOWS 
NOT, REAPS NOT' (RADIO MONTE CARLO, 16.3). 
 
-   2.  NABIL SHA'AT MEMBER OF THE 'FATAH' CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE:  'SOLELY POLITICAL SOLUTIONS CANNOT BE 
SOUGHT WITHOUT CONTINUING ARMED STRUGGLE' (ASH-SHARQ 
AL-AWSAT, 18.8). 
 
B.  MOREOVER, THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE' IS OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE; IT MUST BE CONTINUED, EVEN ESCALATED AS, 
FOR EXAMPLE: 
 
-   1.  ABU JIHAD, HEAD OF THE MILITARY ARM OF 
'FATAH' AND RESPONSIBLE FOR WEST BANK AFFAIRS:  'THE 
CONDUCT OF SEA WARFARE BY PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IS AN 
EXPRESSION OF THE FIRM DECISION TO CONTINUE AND 
ESCALTE THIS ARMED STRUGGLE, WHATEVER THE 
DIFFICULTIES MAY BE . . . POLITICAL ACTIVITY WAS 
NEVER AN OBSTACLE TO THE CONTINUATION OF MILITARY 
ACTIVITY, BUT RATHER A MEANS TO ADVANCE AND DEVELOP 
IT' (AL-ANBA, 24.2). 
 
-   2.  AHMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN, ARAFAT'S SPOKESMAN: 
'THE REVOLUTIONARY MARCH WILL CONTINUE, DESPITE THE 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES, IN ORDER THAT THE ARMED 
STRUGGLE ADVANCE WITH RANKS UNIFIED, AS THE ARMED 
STRUGGLE IS THE ONLY WAY TO PALESTINE.  THERE IS NO 
OTHER ROUTE TO PALESTINE EXCEPT FOR ARMED STRUGGLE' 
(FILASTIN ATH-THAWRA, 16.3). 
 
-   3.  THE FATAH 'REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL':  'ARMED 
STRUGGLE IS THE PRIMARY FORM OF THE PALESTINIAN 
STRUGGLE TO REALIZE NATIONAL GOALS.  ON THE BASIS OF 
THIS STRUGGLE, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HEREBY 
DECIDES TO APPROVE THE PLAN, WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY 
THE CENTRL COMMITTEE, TO ESCALATE THE ARMED STRUGGLE 
IN THE OCCUPIED LAND' (CONCLUDING STATEMENT AT THE 
END OF DISCUSSIONS IN TUNIS, 6.4). 
 
-   4.  HANI AL-HASSAN:  'THE FUTURE WILL IN THE END 
PROVE THAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF CONTINUING THE ARMED 
STRUGGLE, BECAUSE IF WE ARE NOT, THAN NEITHER SHALL 
WE BE SUITABLE CLAIMANTS TO REPRESENT THE PALESTINIAN 
PEOPLE' (ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 16.4). 
 
-   5.  ARAFAT:  'THE MOST RECENT GUERILLA ACTION, 
WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT OFF THE COAST OF PALESTINE 
(SINKING OF THE ATAVARIUS ???) WAS NOT THE LAST, 
RATHER IT CONSTITUTES THE BEGINNING OF A SERIES OF 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WHICH WILL HURT ISRAEL' (AL-RAI 
AL-'AM, 25.4). 
 
-   6.  KHALED AL-HASSAN:  'WHAT IS NEEDED TODAY IS A 
CHANGE IN THE SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF MILITARY ACTION 
INSIDE ISRAEL.  I AM NOT CALLING FOR SIMPLY ANOTHER 
SUICIDE ACTION, RATHER, AN ACTION WHICH WILL HAVE A 
VERY MAJOR IMPACT ON THE ENEMY FROM THE MATERIAL, 
MORALE, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY POINTS OF VIEW' 
(AL-ANBA, 12.6). 
 
-   7.  THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AND THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE OF 'FATAH':  'STEPS MUST BE TAKEN WHICH CAN 
LEAD TO THE CREATION OF SUITABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE 
INTENSIFICATION OF THE PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE, IN 
ALL ITS FORMS, IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS' (DECISION 
AT THE CLOSE OF THEIR MEETING, 23.9). 
 
5.  THE JORDANIANS, AND IN THEIR WAKE THE AMERICANS 
AND EUROPEANS, INTERPRETED THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT 
AGREEMENT AS A PLO CONCESSION ON SEVERAL CENTRAL 
POINTS: 
 
-   A.  ITS APPARENT ACCEPTANCE OF UN RESOLUTION 242. 
 
-   B.  ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 'LAND FOR 
PEACE'. 
 
-   C.  ITS ABANDONING THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT 
PALESTINIAN STATE. 
 
-   D.  ITS CONCEDING THE RIGHT TO SOLE 
REPRESENTATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. 
 
THE PLO REJECTS THESE JORDANIAN INTERPRETATIONS AND 
INSISTS THAT NO CHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE IN ITS 
POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES.  FOLLOWING ARE THE CLAIMS 
AND COUNTER-CLAIMS: 
 
-   A.  UN RESOLUTION 242 
 
-        (1)  THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT DETERMINES 
IN SECTION 1:  'LAND IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE, AS CITED 
IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTIONS.' 
 
-        (2)  IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN 
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE ON 31.5, KING HUSSEIN SAID: 
'THE PALESTINIANS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 
338 . . . AS A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.' 
 
-        (3)  HOWEVER, THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 
IN ITS APPROVING OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT 
(18.2), REJECTED RESOLUTION 242. 
 
-        (4)  ARAFAT HIMSELF CONDITIONED THE 
ACCEPTANCE OF 242 ON AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF THE 
PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (INTERVIEW 
WITH THE 'WASHINGTON POST', 15.5).  WHEN ASKED (BY A 
CORRESPONDENT FROM THE 'WALL STREET JOURNAL', 7.6), 
TO REITERATE KING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENTS ((2) ABOVE), 
HE RESPONDED:  'NO, NO I WON'T REPEAT IT.  I'M NOT A 
MONKEY.  I GIVE MY OWN POLITICAL DECLARATIONS'. 
 
-        (5)  THE PLO DOES NOT ACCEPT THE 
ABOVE-MENTIONED CLAUSE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT 
AGREEMENT AS REFERRING EXPLICITLY TO 242, BUT RATHER 
TO ALL UN AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS DEALING 
WITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, COLLECTIVELY.  THUS, 
FOR INSTANCE, KHALED AL-HASSAN, SAID:  'THE REJECTION 
OF 242 AS THE ONLY BASIS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION 
MOST DEFINITELY STILL EXISTS.  BUT RESOLUTION 242, 
WHEN TAKEN TOGETHER WITH A SERIES OF OTHER DECISIONS, 
IS NOT TO BE REJECTED . . . ALL THESE DECISIONS 
TOGETHER MEAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT 
PALESTINIAN STATE, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, 
RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, AND RECOGNITION OF THE PLO' 
(AL-ANB, 11.6). 
 
B.  'LAND FOR PEACE' 
 
(1)  IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 
INSTITUTE (19.3), TAHER AL-MASRI, THE JORDANIAN 
FOREIGN MINISTER, SAID:  'THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT IS THAT IT OBLIGATES, 
PUBLICLY, THE PLO, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TO ACCEPT THE 
PRINCIPLE OF 'LAND FOR PEACE'. 
 
(2)  HOWEVER, THE PLO'S INTERPRETATION OF 'LAND FOR 
PEACE' IS DIFFERENT THAN THE JORDANIAN 
INTERPRETATION.  ABU JIHAD SAID THE FOLLOWING IN 
KUWAIT (18.5):  'THE PLO'S FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO 
THE 'LAND FOR PEACE' QUESTION IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT 
OF JORDAN'. 
 
(3)  THE PLO DOES NOT SEE THE FORMULATION 'LAND FOR 
PEACE' AS SIGNIFYING AN EXCHANGE - MAKING PEACE WITH 
ISRAEL IN RETURN FOR GETTING BACK THE TERRITORIES - 
RATHER AS PART OF THE 'THEORY OF STAGES', THAT IS TO 
SY THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ON ALL LAND 
FROM WHICH ISRAEL WITHDRAWS, AS A STEP TOWARD THE 
CREATION OF A SECULAR-DEMOCRATIC-PALESTINIAN STATE ON 
THE ENTIRE TERRITORY.  THE PLO VIEWS THE FORMULATION 
'LAND FOR PEACE' AS PARALLELLING DECISIONS OF THE 
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE FEZ SUMMIT.  THUS, 
ARAFAT SAID:  'LAND FOR PEACE - ON THIS THERE IS ARAB 
AGREEMENT AT FEZ' (ROZ AL-YUSUF, 12.5).  KHALID AL 
HASSAN SAID THE FOLLOWING:  'EVERYONE WHO ACCEPTED 
THE DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, AND 
THE THEORY OF STAGES, AND ALL WHO ACCEPTED THE FEZ 
DECISIONS, WHICH WERE APPROVED BY BY THE PALESTINE 
NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), CANNOT OPPOSE THE SENTENCE 
'LAND FOR PEACE', AS AT ITS HEART IS THE 'THEORY OF 
STAGES'' (AL-ANBA, 12.6). 
 
C.  AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE 
 
-- (1)  THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT STATES (CLAUSE 
3):  'THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD EXERCISE THEIR 
INALIABLE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WHEN THE 
JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS MANAGE TO ACHIEVE THIS 
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN ARAB CONFEDERATION THAT IS 
INTENDED TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO STATES OF 
JORDAN AND PALESTINE.' 
 
-- (2)  THE JORDANIANS PRESENT THIS CONFEDERATION NOT 
AS COMPRISING TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, RATHER AS A 
FEDERATION HAVING ONE SOVEREIGN, ONE ARMY, AND ONE 
GOVERNMENT, WHICH IN FACT MEANS THE PLO'S GIVING UP 
THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. 
 
-- (3)  IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 
INSTITUTE (19.3), JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TAHER 
AL-MASRI SAID:  'THE MEANING OF THE 
JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT IS THAT THE PLO NO 
LONGER DEMANDS AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE'. 
 
-- (4)  HOWEVER, THE PLO PRESENTS THE CONFEDERATION 
AS BEING COMPOSED OF TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, WITH THE 
INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE HAVING TO COME INTO 
BEING 'BEFORE' THE ESTABLISIMENT OF THE 
CONFEDERATION.  THUS, KHALED AL-HASSAN SAID:  'THE 
CONFEDERATION WILL BE BETWEEN TWO SOVEREIGN STATES. 
A PALESTINIAN STATE WILL BE ESTABLISHED 'BEFORE' THE 
CONFEDERATION, EVEN IF THE CONFEDERATION IS 
ESTABLISHED FIVE MINUTES AFTER INDEPENDENCE' 
(COTIDIENNE DE PARIS, 25.3). 
 
-- (5)  THE PLO LEADERS EMPHASIZE THAT IN ADDITION TO 
THE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN, HUSSEIN SENT A 'MEMORANDUM 
OF CLARIFICATION' ON 4.3, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE 
'PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
RESIDES IN A UNITED STATE OF PALESTINE HAVING A 
CONFEDERAL CONNECTION TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF 
JORDAN'. 
 
-- (6)  THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S DECLARATION 
THAT THE PLO GAVE UP THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT 
PALESTINIAN STATE (SEE ABOVE, (3)), WHICH HE REPEATED 
AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON (5.6), DURING 
HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO THE US, PRODUCED ANGRY REACTIONS 
FROM THE PLO: 
 
-   (A)  ABU IYAD:  'ACCORDING TO THE KING'S 
DECISIONS, AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE MUST 
FIRST BE DECLARED, AND ONLY AFTERWARDS WILL THE 
CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN BE ESTABLISHED' (REUTER, 
6.6). 
 
-   (B)  KADDOUMI:  'THE PALESTINIANS MUST REALIZE 
THEIR RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION, 
AND ONLY AFTERWARDS WILL THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE 
DECIDE IF IT IS INTERESTED IN CONFEDERATION WITH 
JORDAN' (IN STOCKHOLM, 6.6). 
 
-   (C)  HANI AL-HASSAN:  'THE AMMAN AGREEMENT IS 
EXCEEDINGLY CLEAR; IT SPEAKS OF ARAB CONFEDERAL UNION 
BETWEEN TWO STATES -- JORDAN AND PALESTINE' 
(AL-BIYADER AL-SIYASI, 15.6). 
 
D.  PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION 
 
(1)  THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT STATES IN CLAUSE 
5:  'PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD WITHIN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, TO BE 
ATTENDED BY THE FIVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT 
MEMBER-STATES AND ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, 
INCLUDING THE PLO, WHICH IS THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S 
SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE WITHIN A JOINT 
DELEGATION -- A JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN 
DELEGATION.' 
 
(2)  SOME SAW THE REFERENCE TO A JOINT DELEGATION AS 
A DEVIATION FROM THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT 
(1974), WHICH GRANTED THE PLO SOLE RIGHT TO REPRESENT 
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. 
 
(3)  BUT THE PLO REJECTS THIS REASONING AND INSISTS 
THAT IT ALONE HAS THE RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE 
PALESTINIANS.  THE 'FATAH' CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S 
'MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING' (20.3) SAID AS 
FOLLOWS:  'THE PLO, AS A SOLE AND LEGAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, IS THE BODY 
RECOGNIZED BY THE ARABS AND THE WORLD AS HAVING SOLE 
LEGITIMACY TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT GRANTING POWER OF 
ATTORNEY, OR AGREEMENT, OR PERMISSION TO ANY OTHER 
PARTY TO PARTICIPATE WITH IT IN REPRESENTING THE 
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN ALL MATTERS." 
 
 
END TEXT. 
 
 
FLATEN 

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