US embassy cable - 03OTTAWA703 (original version)

CANADA ON NORTH KOREAN AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS (original version)

Identifier: 03OTTAWA703
Wikileaks: View 03OTTAWA703 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ottawa
Created: 2003-03-13 23:14:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL KNNP PARM KN IR CA NPT
Redacted: This cable was redacted by Wikileaks. [Show redacted version] [Compare redacted and unredacted version]
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T OTTAWA 000703 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NP/RA, NP/MNA, NEA/AGT, EAP/K, WHA/CAN AND IO/T 
BRUSSELS FOR USEU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL, KNNP, PARM, KN, IR, CA, NPT 
SUBJECT: CANADA ON NORTH KOREAN AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS 
 
REF: (A) STATE 61830 (B) STATE 65141 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Mary Witt, 
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Canada shares our strong concerns about the North 
Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, and believes that Iran 
will be emboldened if North Korea abandons the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  We discussed reftel messages 
with Marc Vidricaire, Director of the Nuclear and Chemical 
Disarmament Implementation Agency (IDN); Ron Stansfield, IDN 
Senior Policy Advisor; and Joanne Khouryati, North Korea Desk 
Officer.  In the case of North Korea, Foreign Minister Graham 
issued a statement in January deploring the DPRK's intention 
to withdraw from the NPT, and reaffirming the central 
importance of the NPT.  Canada has expressed its concerns to 
North Korea privately through its missions in Beijing and at 
the UN, but has little leverage on its own.  Aside from 
continued humanitarian food aid, Canada-North Korea relations 
are at a standstill.  North Korean officials were searching 
for an Embassy site in Ottawa, but the GoC asked them not to 
return when they left in December. 
 
2. (S) Canada prefers to try to pressure North Korea through 
multilateral institutions, but is not encouraged with how 
that is proceeding.  Vidricaire commented that if the UN 
Security Council is not prepared to take credible action - 
and he expects Russia and China to oppose such action - then 
the DPRK will get the wrong message.  The DPRK will still be 
a major focus of the NPT PrepCom in April, but inaction by 
the UNSC will confuse the issue.  Given the importance of 
turning the DPRK around, Vidricaire urged us to consider some 
compromise formula whereby the U.S. and North Korea would 
meet bilaterally on the margins of a multilateral meeting. 
(NOTE: Canada's Assistant Deputy Minister for Asia-Pacific, 
David Mulroney, will be in Washington on March 20 and has 
requested a meeting with EAP A/S Kelly.  END NOTE.) 
 
3. (S) On Iran, Canada plans to express concern in its 
statement to the IAEA Board of Governors meeting next week, 
and to follow that up with a demarche on IAEA DG El-Baradei. 
Vidricaire cautioned that El-Baradei has limited personal 
influence on how the IAEA proceeds, as he is beholden to the 
wishes of member states. 
 
4. (S) Now that Iran is being closely watched, Vidricaire was 
concerned that it might choose to follow the letter of the 
law in development of a full-blown civil nuclear program, and 
then be able to convert it to a weapons program on short 
notice at a later date.  Like North Korea, Iran might choose 
a time of crisis, when the U.S. and the international 
community are distracted, to leave the NPT.  Unlike North 
Korea, Iran would then have a large-scale nuclear program, 
and would present a much greater threat.  Vidricaire said the 
IAEA would find it difficult to curb the Iranian program if 
it proceeded in this manner.  He felt that Iran also saw 
India and Pakistan as role models - defying the NPT, bearing 
up under international censure for a number of years, and 
emerging at the other end with nuclear weapons. 
CELLUCCI 

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