US embassy cable - 06OSLO63

IAEA/IRAN: FM PERSONALLY DRIVING NORWAY'S POLICY

Identifier: 06OSLO63
Wikileaks: View 06OSLO63 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Oslo
Created: 2006-01-18 15:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PARM KNNP PREL IR NO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000063 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2016 
TAGS: PARM, KNNP, PREL, IR, NO 
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: FM PERSONALLY DRIVING NORWAY'S POLICY 
 
REF: OSLO 56 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: P/E Counselor Mike Hammer, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Stoere is 
directly and personally driving Norway's policy on whether 
the IAEA should report Iran to the UN Security Council. 
Stoere wants clarity on how the Security Council will deal 
with the issue before agreeing to send it there.  Stoere is 
reaching out to his British, French, and German colleagues to 
sound them out.  (Note.  Post understands that Stoere's call 
to Straw has already taken place, but has no read-out of the 
content.  End Note.)  Stoere has told the press that Norway 
has not yet decided whether it will support reporting Iran to 
the UNSC.  No approach to Norway below Stoere himself is 
likely to have much of an impact on Norway's position.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) A visibly uncomfortable MFA DAS for Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament Jan Arve Knutsen admitted to us on January 18 
that Stoere's direction on IAEA/Iran is at odds with the 
Ministry's previous indication that Norway was likely follow 
the EU-3 lead.  "The Minister himself needs to be convinced 
that reporting Iran to Security Council is the right thing to 
do," Knutsen said, blushing when he added, "We've changed our 
talking points to be in line with the Minister's lead." 
 
3.  (C) Knutsen told us that after his meeting with el 
Baradei on January 17, Stoere is prepared to see the issue 
carry on until the next regularly scheduled IAEA meeting in 
March.  Stoere also heard from el Baradei that Iran should be 
allowed a "pilot facility," and Stoere appears sympathetic to 
the idea that Iran should be given something.  Knutsen 
admitted that he had no idea what a "pilot facility" was, but 
that el Baradei had told Stoere that a "pilot facility" had 
no proliferation risk. 
 
4.  (C) When pushed on how we should expect Norway to vote, 
whether it would stand with its major allies in the EU and 
US, Knutsen noted that Stoere has said that his mind is not 
yet made up, but that for the present Stoere thinks more time 
needs to be given to (undefined) "diplomatic efforts." 
Stoere's Chief of Staff independently confirmed to us that 
his minister needs convincing and reiterated that Stoere's 
major concern is how the Security Council would handle the 
issue if it were sent there. 
 
5.  (C) On January 17, Ambassador raised Iran in a previously 
scheduled meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Kjetil 
Skogrand.  Skogrand told the Ambassador that, even though 
Norway is unsure that reporting the matter to the UNSC should 
be the next step, Norway "will not stand in the way" if a 
majority of the IAEA board support reporting Iran to the 
Security Council. 
 
6.  (C) Comment.  Stoere's tack on IAEA/Iran is clearly less 
forward-leaning than that of Foreign Ministry as a whole, and 
Stoere personally has taken Norway deeper into the undecided 
column.  Stoere is running this policy single-handed. 
Despite Deputy FM Skogrand's assurance that Norway would not 
stand in the way, it is conceivable that Stoere will continue 
to call for more time to be given to a diplomatic solution at 
the February Extraordinary IAEA Board meeting.  If we want to 
make sure that Norway is with us, we need to go directly to 
Stoere and allay his concerns about how the UNSC would handle 
this issue. 
 
Visit Oslo's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m 
 
WHITNEY 
 
 
NNNN 

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