US embassy cable - 05CAIRO8873

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 008873 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, MOPS, KDEM, KPAL, IS, IZ, EG 
SUBJECT: SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE 2005 U.S.- EGYPT MCC 
 
Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  The U.S. - Egyptian military partnership represents 
the foundation of our broader strategic relationship. 
Although both nations benefit from the relationship, we 
occasionally differ in the strategies we adopt to achieve our 
shared goals.  Egypt is committed to strengthening our ties, 
and the 2005 Military Cooperation Committee meeting offers an 
opportunity to confirm the mutual benefits of the 
relationship and press for further engagement in key areas. 
Because of the 2005 effort in Congress to redirect or 
withhold an earmark from Egypt's military assistance, Egypt 
will be seeking reassurance as to the importance of the 
relationship.  Egypt understands that there will be no 
political release "deliverables" this year, but may ask the 
U.S. to reconsider.  The U.S. team should urge Egypt to (1) 
bolster MoD's own public affairs program so that it can 
better ariculate how Egypt supports U.S. global priorities, 
(2) explore opportunities for greater engagement in the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) and in promoting regional 
stability, and (3) define its vision of military 
transformation and modernization. 
 
---------------------------- 
The internal political scene 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  2005 has witnessed a remarkable series of political 
developments that are remaking Egypt's political landscape. 
Political reform has been under discussion for several years, 
but it was only on February 26, after extracting from the 
opposition the concession that any discussion of 
constitutional reform should be postponed until 2006, that 
President Mubarak unilaterally announced that he supported an 
amendment to the Constitution that would permit the direct 
election of the president in competitive multi-party 
elections.  (Note:  Egypt's president since 1952 has been 
chosen by a yes/no referendum after nomination by the 
parliament.  End note.) 
 
3.  (C)  Mubarak's announcement came against a backdrop of 
USG-GOE tension over the arrest and detention of Ayman Nour, 
leader of the newly-formed liberal Ghad Party on January 30. 
Nour was released in March after being charged with forging 
signatures on the documents establishing his party in late 
2004.  Nour's trial opened in June and quickly was postponed 
until the end of the year, but not before the GOE's lead 
witness recanted his testimony and alleged that the GOE had 
coerced his statements against Nour.  Nour's effort to reform 
and revitalize the opposition occurred in tandem with an 
effort by the so-called young guard in the NDP, led by 
presidential son Gamal, to revamp and re-legitimize the 
ruling party, through "New Thinking" that focuses on greater 
accountability, economic reform, and democracy. 
 
4.  (C)  On May 25, a nationwide referendum ratified the 
GOE's proposed amendment to Article 76, which set stringent 
candidacy rules for registered parties and effectively ruled 
out independent candidates.  The amendment passed 
overwhelmingly, but the GOE is widely believed to have 
exaggerated the turnout.  (The GOE claimed that 53 percent of 
eligible voters placed votes, with the overwhelming majority 
in favor.  By contrast, the actual presidential election in 
September only drew 30 percent of voters according to GOE 
figures--and independent monitors asserted that the number 
was closer to 23 percent.)  In addition, the referendum was 
marred by attacks by NDP-affiliated thugs on both 
demonstrators protesting the referendum and on female 
journalists covering the event.  Shortly after Mubarak 
formally announced his candidacy in July, GOE security forces 
again violently dispersed a peaceful protest demonstration. 
The USG issued critical public statements after both the May 
25 and July 30 incidents. 
 
5.  (C)  President Mubarak and the NDP ran a high-profile 
campaign for the September 7 presidential election.  Most of 
his opponents were representatives of fringe parties, but 
both Ayman Nour of the Ghad Party and Noman Gomaa of the Wafd 
Party made significant public challenges.  The September 7 
voting proceeded in an atmosphere of calm and order.  The 
official results gave Mubarak 88 percent of an approximately 
20 percent turnout.  Nour took second, with 7 percent, while 
Gomaa polled third at 3.5 percent.  Nour's campaign 
complained that he had actually polled higher and that 
significant rigging had taken place to boost the president's 
margin of victory. 
 
6.  (C)  By mid-October, the stage was set for the 
parliamentary elections, which were scheduled for three 
stages, beginning on November 7 and finishing on December 6. 
The surprise developments in the first round were the defeat 
of Ayman Nour in his home area (apparently after a major NDP 
push to support his opponent, a retired State Security 
colonel) and the fact that the banned but tolerated Muslim 
Brotherhood, running as independents, won 34 seats out of the 
164 in play.  In the second round, amid violence apparently 
instigated by NDP supporters, the MB continued its surprising 
run of electoral success.  As of November 23, the MB had 
secured 47 seats, and appears to be en route to unprecedented 
electoral success. 
 
7.  (C)  The actual impact of these various political 
developments will only become apparent with the seating of 
the new parliament on December 13 and the naming of a new 
cabinet.  The surprising successes of the MB (and collapse of 
the established opposition parties), and the apparent failure 
of the NDP's "New Guard" to present candidates articulating a 
clear vision of political reform, raises crucial questions 
about the directions of Egypt's political scene in 2006. 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
Military funding--a source of concern 
------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  MoD tells us that the annual USG contribution of 
$1.3 billion in security assistance pays for 80 percent of 
Egypt's military procurement budget.  MoD's effort to 
modernize its equipment from an old-style Soviet stock to a 
U.S. based inventory is more than one-half complete.  (Note: 
MoD estimates that their stock of equipment is now 52 percent 
U.S. and 48 percent Soviet. End note.)  Progress with 
modernization, however, is increasingly slow because the bulk 
of the $1.3 billion in annual assistance goes to maintenance 
and upgrades of existing sytems.  The Egyptians will argue 
that the assistance budget does not allow them to purchase 
the systems their modernization plan calls for and that 
efforts in Congress to redirect military assistance are 
therefore damaging to their strategic goals.  They will 
explain that military modernization is a national security 
issue on which the GOE will not compromise and likely note 
that should the GOE lose any of its military assistance, it 
will take money currently allocated to other sectors, such as 
health and education, to ensure that modernization can 
continue.  In addition, they will stress that the loss of 
military assistance will force them to look for cheaper 
(non-U.S.) sources of equipment.  Such a shift would hamper 
our goal of bolstering interoperability, lessen our ability 
to shape Egypt's military modernization, and could 
potentially reduce our access to the MoD. 
 
9.  (C)  The MoD will also explain that the 2005 Senate Bill 
that did not include an earmark on Egypt's FMF was 
unjustified, particularly given Egypt's partnership with the 
U.S. in the GWOT (in Afghanistan and Iraq) as well as its 
efforts to promote stability in Gaza and Sudan.  Although 
Congress restored the earmark during a late October 
conference, MoD contacts said they considered the experience 
troubling because military assistance is not "just about the 
money."   Rather, they said it symbolizes the strength of 
Egypt's relationship with the U.S. and the commitment that 
the U.S. made to both Egypt and Israel when they signed the 
Treaty of Peace.  Removing the earmark, one MoD contact 
noted, would represent a "downgrade" in the relationship and 
a sign that the U.S. values Egypt less than Israel or Jordan. 
 The fact that senior GOE officials, including Foreign 
Minister Aboul Gheit, Field Marshal Tantawi, Egyptian General 
Intelligence Service Director Soliman, and President Mubarak, 
have all underlined the importance of military assistance in 
recent months illustrates GOE's view of the significance of 
the military relationship to the overall bilateral 
relationship.   Egypt is well aware that its FMF troubles are 
not over.  In a November 17 meeting with the Ambassador, 
Field Marshal Tantawi acknowledged that he anticipates that 
the military funding debates will reemerge in 2006. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
U.S. gains from the relationship: political and operational 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
10.  (C) Global War on Terror:  The GOE cooperates in the 
GWOT in numerous ways.  This includes expeditious management 
of Suez canal transit and overflight requests.  Although 
Egyptian law requires a presidential waiver for the passage 
of nuclear powered vessels through the canal, since the 
beginning of 2003, at least 49 nuclear powered warships 
transited the canal.  The MoD is keenly attuned to our 
security needs in the Canal and waives the $50,000 per vessel 
security surcharge that other vessels pay.  In Afghanistan, 
Egypt still staffs a U.S. funded field hospital and has 
started to train local Afghan medical personnel.  The GOE 
also sent two C-130s of arms and ammunition to Afghanistan in 
2005, is considering providing weapons and driving training 
to Afghan police, and has agreed to send two engineers to 
support Provincial Reconstruction Team work.  The GOE has 
also agreed to send an officer to serve as liaison to 
Headquarters, Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa to further 
improve coordination with the U.S. 
 
11.  (C) Iraq:  With U.S. urging, Egyptian political 
engagement with Iraq has increased significantly in the past 
six months, and we can credit our strong military 
relationship for at least some of Egypt's willingness to 
cooperate on this issue.  In addition to sending Ambassador 
Ihab al Sherif to Baghdad (Note: he was killed before he 
could present his credentials.  End note.), Egypt hosted 
Iraq's National Security Advisor Rubaie for high-level 
meetings, and supported the Arab League's November 19-21 
National Accord Conference on Iraq by having Mubarak speak at 
the opening plenary and engaging Iraq's government officials 
during the visit.  Egypt's ongoing support for the political 
process in Iraq will play a key role in helping Iraq reengage 
with the Arab world, and we should urge them to maintain the 
momentum.  The GOE has also provided technical assistance to 
the Iraqis, including training for diplomats, police and 
security forces and has offered to do more. 
 
12.  (C) Israel-Palestine:  Egypt's efforts to create an 
atmosphere for progress in the Israeli-Palestinian 
relationship prove its commitment to helping the U.S. achieve 
regional stability.  GOE security forces are continuing to 
provide training to fledgling Palestinian security forces. 
The Egyptian-Israeli Border Guard Agreement allowing Egypt to 
place 750 guards along its border with Gaza facilitated 
Israel's withdrawal from Gaza.  Ongoing GOE support for the 
Palestinian Authority and close coordination with Israel 
played an equally critical role in the November 15 Agreement 
on Movement and Access that will prevent Gaza from becoming a 
prison and thereby diffuse tensions among Palestinians. 
 
13.  (C)  Syria: Senior GOE officials, including President 
Mubarak, have repeatedly pressed President Bashar al Asad to 
cooperate with Mehlis in the investigation of Hariri's 
killing and with the U.S. to prevent insurgents from entering 
Iraq via Syria.  Senior GOE officials, including Foreign 
Minister Aboul Gheit have assured us as recently as the week 
of November 13 that a breakthrough is in sight and that Asad 
is considering a proposal that would allow for questioning 
Syrian suspects outside of Lebanon. 
 
14.  (C)  Sudan:  In addition to sending large amounts of 
humanitarian aid to Sudan, the GOE has also deployed three 
mobile medical teams and 800 peacekeeping troops there. 
Egypt's support for the peace negotiations likewise reflects 
support for the U.S. goal of promoting regional stability. 
 
----------------------------- 
Areas for Greater Cooperation 
----------------------------- 
 
15.  (C)  Iraq and GWOT:  The USG would like Egypt to provide 
even more tangible support in the GWOT and to the new Iraqi 
government, and Egypt appears willing.  Greater Egyptian 
financial support of the Bagram field hospital would also be 
useful.  We should consider asking MoD to send its own C-130s 
to Bagram when it redeploys the staff in December (and in the 
future) rather than relying on U.S. support.  Funding for the 
field hospital will expire in March 2007, and it is worth 
pressing the MoD to maximize the hospital's outreach to the 
local community over the next 15 months.  On Iraq, we should 
underscore the need for ongoing political support for the new 
government and the political process through additional 
high-level visits, training, and cultural exchanges. 
 
16.  (C)  Interoperability:  The absence of interoperability 
between the Egyptian and U.S. militaries poses a challenge to 
greater military engagement.  There is no possibility that 
Egypt will sign either a Communications Interoperability 
Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) or an Acquisition 
and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in the near term.  Under 
instruction from CENTCOM, we have temporarily stopped raising 
the CISMOA with MoD because the lack of progress on the issue 
was negatively impacting the relationship.  In reality, 
should Egypt opt to sign a CISMOA, the USG would be faced 
with additional, more complex challenges, such as the lack of 
sufficient military assistance funds to purchase secure 
communications equipment and political release 
considerations.   We have tabled a proposal on the ACSA, but 
have yet to receive a response from MoD.  As a sign of MoD's 
recalcitrance on signing the ACSA, they recently declined 
CENTCOM's request for bilateral discussions on the matter. 
 
17.  (C)  Transformation:  USG interest in encouraging the 
MoD to define its military transformation goals will remain 
high and should guide our military assistance program and 
priorities.  We have asked MoD to outline its transformation 
strategy (and start to define how the MoD intends to shape 
its doctrine, personnel, equipment, and priorities to meet 
new strategic objectives) during the MCC, but given the 
traditional reticience and the promotion of a new Chief of 
Staff may lead the MoD to be hesitant or unable to offer much 
detail on plans to recruit, train, equip and organize their 
forces to meet emerging regional challenges and objectives. 
The most significant change in staffing involves Chief of 
Staff Samy Enan, who replaced LTG Waheba.  In contrast to LTG 
Waheba, a fluent English speaker who spent extensive periods 
of time in the U.S. and attended briefings on the U.S.'s own 
transformation strategy, LTG Samy speaks little English and 
has not studied in the U.S.  (Note:  His only known training 
outside of Egypt was in France and Russia. End note.) 
Because of LTG Samy's limited exposure to the U.S. system, he 
may be a traditionalist.  MCC discussions of transformation 
may provide insights into how LTG Samy views this pivotal 
issue. 
 
18.  (C)  Modernization:  After considerable U.S. urging, 
Egypt has drafted a modernization plan.  Getting Egypt to 
ensure that its requests for acquisitions are consistent with 
its plan will be key, and we should stress this in MCC 
discussions.  We should also encourage the MoD to think more 
critically about whether they still need to retain their 
stock of aging and difficult to maintain Soviet equipment. 
 
19.  (C) Public Relations:  A more refined public relations 
strategy would allow the MoD to answer questions from 
Washington regarding the utility of USG military assistance 
and the degree of Egyptian support for U.S. strategic goals. 
The MoD has been reluctant to allow the international press 
to cover events in which Egypt is seen as supporting U.S. 
objectives.  But we should remind MoD of the extent to which 
media in America influences public opinion and urge them to 
use this to their advantage by publicizing cases where the 
MoD partners with the U.S. to achieve shared goals. 
 
---------------- 
Weapons' release 
---------------- 
 
20.  (C)  The MoD will continue to press, at a minimum, for 
release of the TOW 2B anti-tank missiles and the Longbow 
upgrades for Apache helicopters.  But they understand that 
this is not realistic and know that there will be no release 
"deliverable" at this year's MCC.  Egypt needs to understand 
that it must gear systems requests to actual strategic goals, 
as defined in their modernization plans and consistent with 
the long term transformation strategy.  Absent this 
justification and given the USG commitment to preserving 
Israel's qualitative military edge, it will be difficult to 
obtain inter-agency and Congressional support for requests 
for new systems. 
 
------------------------- 
The Value of MCC Dialogue 
------------------------- 
 
21.  (C)  The MCC is a central component in our bilateral 
dialogue and gives us a valuable opportunity to explore 
mutual views on the state and direction of the relationship. 
Although the MoD originally asked to keep the Executive and 
Plenary sessions smaller than in the past, the mere fact that 
the issues discussed touch multiple USG agencies and multiple 
offices within each agency mandate greater inclusivity.  MoD 
has asked for a brief "pull-aside" with ASD Rodman.  This, 
along with the meeting with the Minister of Defense, would 
likely be the most appropriate time for a candid exchange. 
In addition to urging ongoing GOE engagement in the GWOT, and 
greater focus on MoD's public affairs, transformation and 
modernization strategies, we suggest that ASD Rodman thank 
Egypt for its role in promoting regional security and for 
being a critical partner to the U.S.  The sole deliverable 
for this year's MCC is a commitment to support the Egyptian 
field hospital in Bagram until March 2007. 
 
 
RICCIARDONE