US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2705

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ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

Identifier: 05THEHAGUE2705
Wikileaks: View 05THEHAGUE2705 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2005-10-06 17:12:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PTER PGOV SOCI ASEC KISL NL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002705 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, SOCI, ASEC, KISL, NL 
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 173666 
     B. THE HAGUE 2599 
     C. THE HAGUE 2651 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CHAT BLAKEMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND ( 
D). 
 
1. (S) This cable responds to ref a request for information 
on Islamic Extremism in the Netherlands. 
 
2. (S) SUMMARY: Within the relatively large Dutch Muslim 
Community, Islamic Extremism represents a worrisome and 
growing trend.  Dutch security and intelligence services 
estimate that about 5 percent of the total Dutch Muslim 
population, or roughly 50,000 individuals, follow 
"non-moderate" forms of Islam and may be sympathetic to 
fundamentalist or radical views.  Within this group, the GONL 
believes there are 150-200 hard-core radicals who might be 
prepared to use violence; approximately 20 individuals have 
been arrested or will stand trial for terrorist offenses. 
The Netherlands has both home-grown radical Islamists -- most 
notably the Hofstad group, which has been associated with the 
murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh -- and transnational 
terrorist groups that maintain a presence in Holland or 
transit through the country, as well as a few volunteers who 
have gone to Iraq to fight against coalition forces.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
EXTREMISM RISING 
---------------- 
 
3. (C) According to public sources, the Dutch General 
Security and Intelligence Service (AIVD) believes that the 
vast majority of Dutch Muslims -- 95 percent -- follow 
"moderate" forms of Islam that do not call for radical social 
or political change.  Within the remaining 5 percent -- or 
approximately 50,000 individuals -- the number of "radicals" 
potentially prepared to use violence to pursue religious and 
political objectives is estimated to be about 150-200.  This 
hard-core of activists is presumed to be supported by small 
but tight social groups within the larger Muslim population. 
 
4. (C) During 2004, Dutch security services reported that 
Muslims, particularly those of Moroccan origin, between 15 
and 25 years-old had become increasingly receptive to radical 
interpretations of Islam.  Religiously-conservative dress and 
viewpoints, and public expressions of frustration and rage 
regarding external events such as the war in Iraq and 
developments in the Middle East have become increasingly 
common on university campuses.  Internet websites catering to 
Muslim youth have also witnessed dramatic increases in 
pro-al-Qaida and anti-U.S./anti-Israel sentiments, especially 
since the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an 
Islamic extremist in November 2004 (see below).  Community 
police similarly report a noticeable rise in pro-al-Qaida 
graffiti in predominantly Muslim neighborhoods of large 
cities like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. 
 
RADICAL MESSAGE/FOREIGN INFLUENCE 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (S) The GONL has publicly stated that Saudi government 
money and missionary groups have played a role in bringing a 
radical message to Holland.  It is widely reported that the 
Dutch security services are monitoring six Salafi mosques and 
foundations for their extremist bent and possible role in 
radicalization and recruitment.  They include al-Fourqaan 
mosque in Eindhoven, al-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam, 
as-Sunnah mosque in The Hague, al-Mouahidine in Helmond, 
Foundation for Islamic Youth in Breda, and the Islamic 
Foundation for Instruction and Transfer of Knowledge in 
Tilburg.  The GONL claims these mosques are supported by 
missionary activity and, until relatively recently, funding 
from Saudi Arabia.  Imams who admonish the moral decadence of 
Dutch society and proclaim all attempts at integration 
undesirable have preached at these mosques for years.  Some 
of these imams also preach the need for Muslims to defend 
themselves in the face of anti-Muslim sentiments.  Al-Tawheed 
 was linked to the Saudi al Haramain organization, designated 
under Executive Order 13224 in 2004.  Three of the Salafi 
mosques including al-Fourqaan, al-Mouahidine, and Foundation 
for Islamic Youth have been linked to the Saudi mission Al 
Waqf al Islami. 
 
6. (SBU) Nearly all Dutch Imams are born and receive their 
training overseas, primarily in Turkey, Morocco and the Gulf 
States.  The GONL recently declared two imams in Eindhoven 
and one in Rotterdam personae non grata for allegedly 
attempting to recruit for extremist groups.  One has already 
left the country; the other two are appealing their 
expulsions in court.  The controversial Minister for 
Integration, Rita Verdonk, has recently called for barring 
foreign imams from preaching in the Netherlands, but her 
proposal has met strong resistance on religious and free 
speech grounds.  Other proposals to increase opportunities 
for training Imams in the Netherlands have broader public 
support, but are proving difficult to implement in practice. 
 
RECRUITMENT 
----------- 
7. (SBU) Recruitment of individuals to extremist ideas in the 
Netherlands is growing, especially among alienated Muslim 
youth.  According to the GONL, recruitment here follows three 
well-established patterns.  Most commonly, a foreign veteran 
of jihad, well-versed in Islam, recruits young men and, to a 
lesser extent, young women from the fringes of mosques, 
schools or Islamic cultural centers.  Groups seeking a 
spiritual leader or connections to the international 
extremist network represent a second more autonomous and 
self-selecting recruitment, which tends to take place on 
Internet websites or in chat rooms.  The third form of 
recruitment occurs in prison, where individuals jailed for 
extremist or terrorist activity recruit followers from a 
plethora of discontented prison inmates. 
 
8. (SBU) The GONL produced a report in December 2004, "From 
Dawa to Jihad" that reported an increase in recruitment for 
both jihad and dawa in the Netherlands. Dawa, as the Dutch 
define it, is the intensive propagation of radical Islamic 
ideology through missionary work.  The Dutch have been 
monitoring Dawa-oriented radical Salafist organizations and 
networks from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States 
who are all working to "re-Islamize" Muslim minorities in the 
west. 
 
TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9. (S) There is solid evidence that both home grown and 
transnational terrorist groups have planned to carry out 
attacks in Holland in the past year.  At the moment, 20 
individuals are being held in Dutch prisons on 
terrorism-related charges, including planning to carry out 
attacks.  So far, Dutch security forces have disrupted attack 
plans in the preliminary stages, but there is a body of 
reporting indicating that additional plans may be in the 
works.  On September 9, the Dutch government raised its 
terrorist threat level claiming it had "sufficient cause for 
taking additional security measures at railway and metro 
stations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam." 
 
10. (S) In addition to planning attacks against targets in 
the Netherlands, transnational groups have also used the 
Netherlands as a source of logistic support for international 
terrorist networks.  The Dutch security services are aware 
that jihad veterans (including those who have fought in 
Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, and Iraq), terrorist 
facilitators, and recruits have all transited the Netherlands 
in the past few years, and are watching such movements 
closely. 
 
GROUPS OPERATING IN THE NETHERLANDS 
----------------------------------- 
 
11. (S) Transnational Islamic Extremist organizations on 
Dutch soil include the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group 
(GICM), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), 
and Hizb ut Tahrir (HUT).  Several al-Qaida-linked 
individuals are also known to have transited and/or made 
contact with individuals in the Netherlands.  The most 
prominent extremist group, however, is the home-grown 
"Hofstad Group" -- at the moment, 14 of the approximately 20 
individuals in detention or awaiting trial for 
terrorist-related charges in the Netherlands are associated 
with this group. 
 
HOFSTAD GROUP 
------------- 
 
12. (S) The so-called "Hofstad Group" -- named after the 
neighborhood in The Hague where several members lived -- is 
an indigenous Islamist terrorist cell of approximately 20 
young Dutch Muslims of mainly North African descent.  The 
group adheres to the radical "Takfir wal Hijra" version of 
Salafi Islam, also shared by Al Qaida second-in-command Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, under which the killing of perceived enemies of 
Islam is considered justified.  The Hofstad group first 
attracted the attention of Dutch authorities in 2002 when one 
member (Samir Azzouz) attempted to travel to Chechnya for 
jihad.  Several members, including Azzouz, were arrested in 
the summer of 2004 in conjunction with apparent plans to 
launch terrorist attacks against Schipol Airport, a nuclear 
reactor, and other targets, but were later released for lack 
of evidence. 
 
13. (S) In November 2004, the group attracted international 
attention when a member, Mohammed Bouyeri, murdered Dutch 
filmmaker Theo van Gogh on an Amsterdam sidewalk in broad 
daylight.  After shooting van Gogh and slashing his throat, 
Bouyeri pinned a note to his victim's chest espousing radical 
Islamist views and threatening several other prominent Dutch 
figures.  When police attempted to search a house in The 
Hague occupied by members of the Hofstad Group shortly after 
the murder, the suspects threw several hand grenades, shot at 
police, and seriously injured one officer before being 
overwhelmed.  The revelation in the Dutch press that Dutch 
authorities had had Bouyeri and other Hofstad Group members 
under surveillance for several months but were apparently 
unaware of the group's plans or capabilities led to 
wide-spread calls for a reevaluation of the terrorist threat 
in the Netherlands and the GONL's plans for dealing with it. 
 
14. (C) In July 2005, Mohammed Bouyeri was sentenced to life 
in prison for murdering Van Gogh.  Bouyeri, along with 13 
others, will stand trial in December, 2005 for membership in 
a terrorist organization that plotted to kill Dutch 
politicians.  (Note:  Participation in a terrorist 
organization only became illegal with the passage of a new 
raft of counterterrorism laws in August 2004.)  Some of the 
13 standing trial for membership, will also face additional 
charges.  Nouredine el Fatimi, arrested in June, also faces 
charges for illegal arms possession.  He eluded capture for 
nearly eight months and, according to press accounts, was 
recruiting young men off the streets in The Hague to join a 
terrorist group.  Hofstad members Jason Walters and Ismail 
Akhnikh will also be charged with illegal arms possession and 
attempted murder as the result of their grenade and shooting 
attack against police during their arrest.  On September 22, 
two of the marginal members arrested in November 2004 were 
released from custody, but are still expected to stand trial. 
 
 
DUTCH FIGHTERS TO IRAQ 
---------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) As in the rest of Europe, the GONL is concerned 
about the possible return of a handful of its citizens or 
other EU nationals who have traveled to Iraq to carry out 
jihad against U.S. and coalition forces.  The most 
high-profile case of a Dutch citizen active in Iraq is Wesam 
al Delaema, a former hairdresser in Amsterdam, whose 
extradition is sought by the U.S.  He has been charged with 
conspiring to murder Americans in Iraq by placing explosives 
in a road in Iraq. Delaema and others called themselves the 
"Mujahideen from Fallujah" and videotaped their intentions to 
kill Americans in Iraq using explosives.  The extradition 
request is currently working its way through the Dutch legal 
system. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16. (S) Although only a very small minority of Dutch Muslims 
can be considered dangerous radicals, virulent strains of 
Islamic extremism are becoming disturbingly popular.  The 
extremist message is particularly attractive -- almost trendy 
-- among Moroccan youth in segregated, relatively poor 
neighborhoods in Dutch cities.  Awareness of radical Islam in 
the Netherlands is not a post-9/11 or post-Madrid phenomenon, 
as the AIVD has reported on radical Islam for years.  The 
evolution of the Hofstad group focused the GONL on fact that 
radicalization among home-grown Muslims was occurring, but it 
is only since the murder of van Gogh, that the Dutch 
government has started to take serious steps to stem the tide 
of radicalization. 
BLAKEMAN 

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