US embassy cable - 02TEGUCIGALPA2934

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

Identifier: 02TEGUCIGALPA2934
Wikileaks: View 02TEGUCIGALPA2934 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tegucigalpa
Created: 2002-10-23 20:17:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: ASEC HO PTER
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 002934 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR DS/DSS/ITA 
DS/OP/WHA FROM EAC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2012 
TAGS: ASEC, HO, PTER 
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) 
 
REF: A. 02 SECSTATE 151188 
     B. 02 TEGUCIGALPA 00989 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Roger Pierce, Reason 1.5 (C) 
and (D). 
 
1.  (U)  The following responses are keyed to the Security 
Environment Profile Questionnaire contained in REFTEL. 
 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
 
2.  (SBU)  Demonstrations:  Responses keyed to REFTEL 
question paragraphs. 
 
(1-A.)  Yes.  Indigenous groups such as the civic council of 
popular indigenous organizations (COPIN) and Council of 
Peasant Organizations of Honduras (COCOCH) have carried out 
anti-American demonstrations against U.S. foreign policy 
initiatives and military presence.  Additionally there is a 
Mosque in San Pedro Sula (approximately 3 1/2 hours North of 
Tegucigalpa).  There is a large concentration of persons of 
Arab decent (although most Honduran Arabs are Christian and 
pro-American) in San Pedro Sula and La Ceiba (a town along 
the North Coast).  It was reported that after the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon there were 
small celebrations in each city (NFI). 
 
(1-B.)  No. 
 
(1-C.)  N/A. 
 
(1-D.)  Usually less than 100 people.  In April of 1998 an 
estimated 220 protesters from COCOCH demonstrated in front of 
the Embassy compound. 
 
(1-E.)  Yes.  Demonstrations are triggered by U.S. foreign 
policy initiatives, past perceived human rights violations, 
military action, and the U.S. presence in Honduras (i.e., 
U.S. Military presence at Soto Cano Air Base).  Note: Most 
Anti-US activity is inspired by a handful of demonstrators, 
sometimes within larger demos passing by the Embassy in route 
to other venues that take the opportunity to be photographed 
by newspapers/media.  Demonstrators sometimes conduct 
protests on domestic issues in front of the Embassy to 
maximize local news coverage. 
 
(1-F.)  Peaceful. 
 
(1-G.)  N/A. 
 
(1-H.)  NO. 
 
(1-I.)  Yes. 
 
(1-J.)  Yes.  Occasionally they will pass by the Embassy 
compound. 
 
(1-K.)  The size varies from a few hundred to a few thousand 
people. 
 
(1-L.)  Peaceful. 
 
(1-M.)  N/A. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Macro Conflict Conditions:  Responses to paragraph 
2. 
 
(2-A.)  NO. 
 
(2-B.)  N/A. 
 
(2-C.)  N/A. 
 
(2-D.)  N/A. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Host Country Capabilities:  Responses to Paragraph 
3. 
 
(3-A.)  No. 
 
(3-B.)  Yes.  (See 3-J) 
 
(3-C.)  Yes. 
 
(3-D.)  No.  However, GOH intelligence units have an 
institutional awareness of and a modest capability of 
penetrating indigenous radical groups. 
 
(3-E.)  Yes. 
 
(3-F.)  No. 
 
(3-G.)  Yes. 
 
(3-H.)  Average. 
(3-I.)  Average/Ineffective. 
 
(3-J.)  Ineffective.  A new unit within the Ministry of 
Security has been established,(and received training from USG 
via US border patrol BORTAC TDY Trainers funded by ICITAP),to 
handle border patrol duties but has yet to come fully on-line. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Indigenous Terrorism-Anti American Terrorist 
Groups:  Responses to paragraph 4. 
 
(4-A.)  No. 
 
(4-B.)  N/A. 
 
(4-C.)  N/A. 
 
(4-D.)  N/A. 
 
(4-E.)  N/A. 
 
(4-F.)  N/A. 
 
(4-G.)  N/A. 
 
(4-H.)  N/A. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups:  Responses to 
paragraph 5. 
 
(5-A.)  No. 
 
(5-B.)  N/A. 
 
(5-C.)  N/A. 
 
(5-D.)  N/A. 
 
(5-E.)  N/A. 
 
7.  (S/NF)  Transnational Terrorism-Transnational Terrorist 
Indicators:  Responses to paragraph 6. 
 
(6-A.)  No.  However, there are rumors that there are Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), IRA, and Chiapas(Zapatistas) 
sympathizers in Honduras who could be involved in advising 
indigenous groups.  Some Hondurans are studying in Cuba and 
also conceivably could be receiving training in subversion 
and terrorism, although it is more likely they are being 
indoctrinated as agents of influence.   As this Cuban program 
for Hondurans is in its infancy, there have been no 
indications that such training is taking place. 
 
(6-B.)  N/A. 
 
(6-C.)  N/A. 
 
(6-D.)  N/A and NO; however, there was one sensitive report 
that 1-2 individuals, formerly from a European group may have 
been hiding in Honduras and possibly working with unwitting 
individuals.  They reportedly have departed the country, NFI. 
 
(6-E.)  N/A. 
 
(6-F.)  The only known hostile intelligence presence of note 
is Cuban.  While the Cuban mission appears to have extensive 
contacts with leftists and indigenous groups, there is no 
indication they are planning or supporting terrorism. 
 
(6-G.)  There is no shortage of weapons in Honduras.  It 
would also not be difficult for hostile terrorist elements to 
import weapons and/or explosives from neighboring countries. 
PALMER 

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