US embassy cable - 90KHARTOUM3477

SUDAN AND THE ARABS: POSSIBLY STEP-SISTERS; CERTAINLY NOT BROTHERS

Identifier: 90KHARTOUM3477
Wikileaks: View 90KHARTOUM3477 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Khartoum
Created: 1990-04-01 07:32:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PINR ECON MASS KPRP SU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
R 010732Z APR 90
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3052
INFO ARABLEAGUE COLLECTIVE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 KHARTOUM 03477 
 
DEPT PASS TO OAU COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, MASS, KPRP, SU 
SUBJECT: SUDAN AND THE ARABS:  POSSIBLY STEP-SISTERS; 
         CERTAINLY NOT BROTHERS 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  SUMMARY:  SUDAN'S ARAB RELATIONSHIPS HAVE UNDERGONE A 
METAMORPHOSIS SINCE THE MILITARY COUP OF JUNE 1989.  MOST 
ARAB STATES REACTED WARMLY TO THE OUSTER OF SADIQ AL- 
MAHDI.  SINCE THEN, THIS WARMTH HAS DISSIPATED AS AN 
UNENLIGHTENED GOS HAS DRIFTED TOWARD LIBYA FOR SUSTENANCE. 
THE GOS HAS TRIED TO GLOSS OVER ITS PECULIAR INTEGRATION 
PLAN WITH LIBYA BY DEPICTING IT AS A STEP TOWARD ARAB 
UNITY.  WHILE SOUTHERN SUDANESE BLAME ARAB INFLUENCE FOR 
THEIR TROUBLES, SUDAN'S ARAB IMPULSES REFLECT EXPEDIENCY 
MORE THAN CONVICTION.  OTHER THAN HISTORICAL, MULTIFACETED 
LINKAGES WITH EGYPT, SUDAN'S ARAB TIES ARE LARGELY DRIVEN 
BY PROSPECTS OF JOBS AND AID, ESPECIALLY DONATION OF KEY 
COMMODITIES (WHEAT AND OIL) AND MILITARY MATERIAL.  THE 
RELATIONSHIPS TEND TO BE ONE-SIDED--SUDAN IS A WILLING 
RECIPIENT WITH LITTLE, EXCEPT RHETORIC AND ITS 
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CASE OF LIBYA, TO OFFER.  AMONG ARABS, 
EGYPT IS MOST MINDFUL OF SUDAN WITH CONCERNS FOR WATER 
RESOURCES AND STABILITY.  SUDANESE ARE DRAWN TO EGYPT--AS 
MANY AS A MILLION MAY LIVE THERE--AND RELY ON ITS 
BENEFICIENCE BUT ARE QUICK TO BRIDLE AT PERCEIVED 
MEDDLING.  PRIME TARGETS FOR GOS SOLICITATIONS ARE LIBYA 
(RECEPTIVE), IRAQ (ONCE RECEPTIVE) AND SAUDI ARABIA 
(DISENCHANTED).  MEANWHILE LARGE SUDANESE COMMUNITIES IN 
SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND THE UAE REMAIN KEY SOURCES FOR 
PRIVATE INCOME AND BADLY NEEDED BUT DECLINING 
INVESTMENT.  END SUMMARY. 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
3.  SUDAN, WITH ITS ETHNIC AMALGAM STRETCHING SOUTH OF 
THE SAHARA, DOES NOT FIT COMFORTABLY INTO THE ARAB 
WORLD.  TO BE SURE, ARAB CULTURE--LANGUAGE, MEDIA, THE 
ARTS, HISTORY, MANNERS--PERMEATES NORTHERN SUDANESE 
THINKING AND BEHAVIOR, AND ITS INFLUENCE IS EVIDENT EVEN 
AMONG SOUTHERNERS PRONE TO RESIST IT.  MOREOVER, SUDAN'S 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS ARE DOMINATED BY 
MEMBERS OF RIVERINE, EASTERN AND WESTERN TRIBES 
CONVENTIONALLY CLASSIFIED AS ARAB.  AS POLITICS GO, 
HOWEVER, THIS ARABIST LINK, INTRODUCED BY THE EGYPTIANS, 
IS IN MANY WAYS AN ARTIFICIAL CONCEPTION.  SUDANESE, 
EMBROILED IN THEIR OWN NATIONAL AND PERSONAL PROBLEMS, 
ARE NOT EMOTIONALLY DRIVEN BY "ARAB ISSUES" LIKE THE 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT AND THE IRANIAN THREAT, 
EXCEPT AS THEY BEAR A MORE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP, E.G. 
ISRAEL'S ETHIOPIAN TIES AND ITS ALLEGED LINKS WITH THE 
SPLA.  RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL FACTORS--THE HISTORIC STAIN 
OF THE ARAB SLAVE TRADE, INSTANCES OF DISCRIMINATION, AND 
PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAMIC NONCONFORMITY--ALSO DISTANCE 
SUDANESE SOMEWHAT FROM THE ARAB MAINSTREAM. 
 
4.  NOTWITHSTANDING AMBIVALENT EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT TO 
THE OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, PARTICIPATES IN THE 
INNUMERABLE ARAB GATHERINGS AND HIGHLIGHTS ITS ARAB 
CREDENTIALS WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO THE EXTENT OF 
UNDERTAKING AIRY UNITY PROJECTS.  THE REASON IS PLAINLY 
SELF-INTEREST.  SUDAN EMBRACES ARABISM BECAUSE IT 
LITERALLY PAYS TO DO SO.  SUFFERING FROM AN INTERMINABLE 
WAR AND ECONOMIC DEVASTATION, SUDAN NEEDS THE JOB AND AID 
OPPORTUNITIES THAT ARAB COUNTRIES CAN AND SOMETIMES DO 
PROVIDE. 
 
5.  WHILE NORTHERN SUDANESE TEND TO ACCEPT THEIR ARAB 
STATUS AS USEFUL, SOUTHERNERS PERCEIVE ARABS AS THE 
PROBLEM.  TO SOUTHERNERS, "ARAB" HAS BECOME A PEJORATIVE 
TERM REPRESENTING UNJUST AND OPPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR. 
PASSING OVER SUDAN'S ETHNIC DIVERSITY, TRADITIONAL 
RIVALRIES AND IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS, THEY ARE FOND OF 
BLAMING THE ARABS FOR MISRULE AND INEQUITY.  A FREQUENT 
SOUTHERN REFRAIN IS THAT ARABS CONSTITUTE ONLY A 
MINORITY, THOUGH A PLURALITY, IN SUDAN, WHICH IS PROBABLY 
TRUE.  BASED ON THIS ASSUMPTION, SOUTHERNERS ARGUE THAT 
THEIR UNITING WITH NONARAB NORTHERNERS--SUCH AS THE NUBA, 
THE FUR, AND THE NUBIANS--COULD RESOLVE SUDAN'S DIVISIVE 
PROBLEMS.  THE IMPROBABILITY OF THIS THESIS ONLY 
UNDERSCORES ITS FALLACY.  RELIGIOUS, IDEOLOGICAL AND 
TRADITIONAL TRIBAL DIVISIONS OUTWEIGH THE ISSUE OF ARAB 
TIES.  THE FUR OF DARFUR, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE MORE AT EASE 
WITH ARAB MUSLIMS, EXCEPTING PERHAPS THEIR RIZEIGAT 
ADVERSARIES, THAN WITH SOUTHERN CHRISTIANS. 
 
6.  THE ARAB WORLD, FOR THE MOST PART, LOOKS ON SUDAN AS 
CHRONICALLY WAYWARD WITH SELF-INDUCED PROBLEMS.  SUDANESE 
ARE VIEWED AS PERSONABLE, RESPECTFUL OF AUTHORITY, AND 
DEPENDABLE WORKERS ABROAD BUT, AT HOME, HOPELESSLY 
INCAPABLE OF MANAGING THEMSELVES.  EXASPERATION AND 
PATERNALISM ARE STANDARD ARAB RESPONSES.  BROODING ABOUT 
BURDENSOME AND UNSAFE (THE UAE AMBASSADOR WAS NEARLY 
ASSASSINATED IN 1988) LIVING CONDITIONS, ARAB DIPLOMATS 
IN KHARTOUM UNIFORMLY CRAVE EARLY REASSIGNMENTS.  THEIR 
AVOIDANCE OF THE WESTERN DIPLOMATIC CIRCUIT (EXCEPTING 
EGYPT ABD MOROCCO) IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF THEIR 
INDUSTRY, THOUGH SOME ARE NOTICEABLY UNINFORMED AND 
UNPRODUCTIVE   THE EGYPTIANS ARE THE MOST NUMBEROUS, 
ACTIVE, VISIBLE AND BEST INFORMED OF ARAB DIPLOMATS. 
DIPLOMATS FROM WEALTHIER ARAB STATES ALSO SOCIALIZE 
REGULARLY WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.  HOWEVER, THEY ARE 
USUALLY ASKED FOR MORE ASSISTANCE THAN ADVICE. 
 
7.  TWO AXIOMS WELL DEFINE THE STATE OF SUDAN'S ARAB 
RELATIONS TODAY.  FIRST, A SENSE OF DEJA VU PREVAILS. 
IRRESOLUTE DECISIONMAKING AND ZIGZAGING POLICIES 
CHARACTERIZING SADIQ AL-MAHDI'S GOVERNMENTS HAS ALSO 
PLAGUED THEIR MILITARY SUCCESSOR PUSHING SUDAN TOWARD 
INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION AND IRRELEVANCE.  SADIQ'S OUSTER 
IN JUNE 1989 WAS WELCOMED HEARTILY BY MOST ARABS.  THE 
FORMER PRIME MINISTER'S INCOMPETENT RULE, TACTLESS 
CONDUCT AND FLIRTATIONS WITH THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT 
(NIF) AND IRAN MANAGED TO ANTAGONIZE PRACTICALLY ALL 
ARABS SAVE LIBYA.  THESE EARLY CHEERS SOURED HOWEVER AS 
THE RCC RAPIDLY REVEALED THEIR OWN BRAND OF ECONOMIC 
MISMANAGEMENT, INABILITY TO COMPROMISE FOR PEACE AND A 
POLITICAL AGENDA WHICH IS ATTRACTIVE TO ISLAMIC 
FUNDAMENTALISTS.  THE REGIME WHICH BEGAN BY COLD 
SHOULDERING THE LIBYANS AND MAKING OVERTURES TO MODERATE 
ARABS GRADUALLY REVERTED, BECAUSE OF NECESSITY, TO WHERE 
SUDAN'S WARMEST PUBLIC RELATIONSHIP IS AGAIN THAT WITH 
LIBYA. 
 
8.  SECOND, SUDAN'S ARAB RELATIONSHIPS, LARGELY 
UNILATERAL IN TERMS OF TANGIBLE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY 
BENEFITS, CLEARLY ARE MORE IMPORTANT TO SUDAN THAN TO ITS 
PARTNERS.  A HIERARCHY EXISTS AMONG THESE RELATIONSHIPS. 
ON THE PERIPHERY, WITH MINIMAL TIES TO SUDAN, ARE THE 
MAHGREB STATES (MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA), PEOPLES OF 
THE LEVANT (LEBANESE, SYRIANS, PALESTINIANS, JORDANIANS) 
AND OTHER NONDONOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES (SOMALIA, DJIBOUTI, 
MAURITANIA).  OF GREATER IMPORTANCE ARE THE SMALL ARABIAN 
PENINSULAR STATES WHERE MANY SUDANESE WORK.  MORE VITAL 
ARE SAUDI ARABIA, LIBYA AND IRAQ WHICH ARE PRIME TARGETS 
FOR AID AND EMPLOYMENT.  FINALLY, EGYPT IS IN A CATEGORY 
OF ITS OWN.  A BRIEF SURVEY OF SOME OF THESE 
RELATIONSHIPS FOLLOWS. 
 
EGYPT 
 
9.  SUDAN HAS LONG MAINTAINED A SUBSTANTIAL (THOUGH 
OCCASIONALLY PRICKLY) RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT THAT IS 
FIRMLY FOUNDED ON HISTORY AND THE NILE.  COMBINED WITHIN 
OTTOMAN EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM (AND 
EVEN EARLIER DATING BACK TO CUSHITE PHARAOHS), SUDANESE 
AND EGYPTIANS REFER TO THEMSELVES AS BROTHERS.  BY ITS 
VERY FAMILIARITY AND OBVIOUS ASYMMETRY, THE BILATERAL 
RELATIONSHIP UNDERGOES PERIODIC STRAINS.  MUTUAL 
INTERESTS AND PERSONAL CONTACTS SO TIGHTLY INTERTWINE 
THIS LINK, HOWEVER, THAT A RUPTURE IS ALL BUT IMPOSSIBLE 
TO IMAGINE. 
 
10.  THE EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE RELATIONSHIP IS FAR DEEPER AND 
MORE MULTI-FACETED THAN MANY REALIZE.  EGYPT'S PRIMARY 
CONCERN IS STABILITY ON ITS SOUTHERN BORDER AND ENSURING 
ITS WATER SUPPLY.  MEASUREMENT OF NILE WATERS IS AN 
IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS.  SUDAN, 
EGYPT AND ETHIOPIA FREQUENTLY DEBATE WATER ALLOCATIONS IN 
BILATERAL SESSIONS AND IN FORMAL MEETINGS OF A NILE WATER 
COMMISSION.  (SUDAN REPORTEDLY USES ONLY ONE QUARTER OF 
ITS ALLOCATION WHILE EGYPT USES TWICE ITS ALLOCATED 
AMOUNT.)  ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST SUCCESSES IN SUDAN THAT 
COULD STIMULATE EGYPT'S RELIGIOUS RIGHT WORRY THE 
EGYPTIANS ABOVE OTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.  THERE IS 
NOT, HOWEVER, A STRONG LINK BETWEEN THE NIF AND EGYPT'S 
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ASSORTED ISLAMIC GAMAA GROUPINGS. 
EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE TIES IN GENERAL ARE SUSTAINED THROUGH A 
VARIETY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONNECTIONS.  AMONG THEM:  A 
STEADY STREAM OF SUDANESE SHOPPERS, VACATIONERS AND 
JOB-SEEKERS TRAVELLING TO EGYPT (UP TO A MILLION ARE 
BELIEVED TO LIVE THERE); AN OPTIONAL EGYPTIAN SCHOOL 
SYSTEM, ELEMENTARY THROUGH UNIVERSITY, IN SUDAN FUNDED BY 
THE GOE; THE PERVASIVE INFLUENCE OF EGYPTIAN MEDIA AND 
POPULAR CULTURE IN SUDAN; AN ESTIMATED 20,000 SUDANESE 
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN EGYPT (INCLUDING 1000 SOUTHERNERS 
ON EGYPTIAN SCHOLARSHIPS); STRONG COMMERCIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS; EGYPTIAN DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY IN AGRICULTURE; EGYPTIAN TRAINING 
FOR POLICE, MILITARY OFFICERS AND TRADE UNIONISTS; AND A 
HERITAGE OF EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE MARRIAGES (SADAT'S MOTHER 
WAS SUDANESE; AHMAD AL-MIRGHANI AND MUBARAK AL-MAHDI'S 
MOTHERS ARE EGYPTIAN). 
 
11.  DESPITE THEIR CLOSE RELATIONS, EGYPTIANS ADMIT TO 
BEING CONSTANTLY CONFOUNDED BY THEIR UNPREDICTABLE 
SOUTHERN BROTHERS.  SHOCKED IN THE 1950'S WHEN SUDAN ON 
SHORT NOTICE AND IN A REVERSAL OF POLICY OPTED FOR 
INDEPENDENCE RATHER THAN UNION, THE EGYPTIANS HAVE SINCE 
TRIED, OFTEN UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO GUIDE SUDANESE POLICIES 
WITHOUT SEEMING OVERBEARING.  MANY EGYPTIANS PRIVATELY 
ADMIT TO VIEWING SUDANESE AS INTELLECTUALLY INFERIOR. 
BUT THEY RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO DEAL CAREFULLY WITH 
SUDANESE WHO ARE HYPERSENSITIVE TO PERCEIVED EGYPTIAN 
INSULTS TO THEIR DIGNITY. 
 
12.  BY CONTRAST, MOST SUDANESE ARE CYNICAL AND DUBIOUS 
ABOUT EGYPTIAN MOTIVES.  MANY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE 
EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT DISCARDED PLANS TO UNITE WITH AND 
CONTROL SUDAN.  (ONLY A FEW SUDANESE DINOSAURS BELONGING 
TO THE OLD NATIONAL UNIONIST PARTY STILL SUPPORT THIS 
ONCE POPULAR DREAM.)  THE BUILDING OF THE ASWAN DAM, 
WHICH FORCED THE RELOCATION OF NORTHERN SUDANESE 
RESIDENTS OF WADI HALFA, AND THE UNCOMPLETED JONGOLAI 
CANAL, BELIEVED BY SOUTHERNERS TO BE AN EGYPTIAN PLOT TO 
DIVERT NILE WATERS FOR ITS BENEFIT, STILL AROUSES 
RESENTMENT.  THEY COMPLAIN ABOUT THE UBIQUITOUS EGYPTIAN 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.  IN EXPLAINING THEIR ATTITUDES, 
SUDANESE WILL OFTEN DRAW DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SUDANESE 
AND EGYPTIAN PERSONALITY AND CHARACTER TRAITS.  EGYPTIANS 
COMMONLY ARE SAID TO BE CAREFREE, HUMOROUS, DECEPTIVE AND 
MACHIEVILLIAN, AND COMFORTABLE WITH AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
WHILE THE SUDANESE DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS SERIOUS, 
INTROVERTED, HONEST, DIRECT AND POLITICALLY LIBERTARIAN. 
 
13.  SUDANESE WILL USUALLY SAY THAT EGYPTIANS EVOKE 
BITTERSWEET FEELINGS.  MOST SUDANESE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT 
THEY FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH EGYPTIANS AND THAT EGYPT IS 
THEIR MOST INTIMATE AND IMPORTANT NEIGHBOR.  ON 
PRACTICALLY ANY POLITICAL ISSUE--E.G. AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
SHARIA, LIBYAN INTEGRATION, HANGING OF CURRENCY 
VIOLATORS--THE FIRST SUDANESE REACTION IS TO WONDER ABOUT 
EGYPT'S REACTION.  DEEP DOWN, SUDANESE, EVEN MOST UMMA 
PARTY ADHERENTS, ADMIT TO THE EXPECTATION, IF NOT 
APPRECIATION, OF EGYPTIAN GUIDANCE AND PROTECTION.  AT 
THE SAME TIME, REFLECTING THE CLASSIC LOVE/HATE EMOTIONS 
OF A SUBORDINATE TOWARD HIS MORE POWERFUL GUARDIAN, 
SUDANESE ENJOY NOTHING BETTER THAN TO BAIT EGYPTIANS AND 
WATCH THEM PUBLICLY HUMILIATED.  A DISPUTED FOUL IN A 
FOOTBALL MATCH IN KHARTOUM BETWEEN SUDAN AND EGYPT ALMOST 
STARTED A RIOT IN EARLY 1989.  MOST SUDANESE 
ENTHUSIASTICALLY CHEERED FOR ALGERIA (AS THEY WILL FOR 
ANY OPPONENT OF EGYPT) IN ALGERIA'S RECENT WORLD CUP 
MATCHES WITH EGYPT. 
 
14.  THE RESULT OF THE JUNE 30 COUP WAS A SURPRISE TO THE 
EGYPTIANS THOUGH, AT THE TIME, THE GOE CERTAINLY WELCOMED 
AND ENCOURAGED CHANGE MORE THAN ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT, AS 
A RESULT OF ITS ROCKY RELATIONSHIP WITH SADIQ AL-MAHDI 
AND HIS EGYPTOPHOBIC UMMA COLLEAGUES.  GENERAL OMAR 
HIGHLIGHTED THE SHIFT IN POLICY BY INVITING EGYPTIAN 
AMBASSADOR SHERBINI FOR DISCUSSIONS SOON AFTER THE COUP 
AND MAKING CAIRO HIS FIRST FOREIGN CALL (IN CONTRAST TO 
SADIQ WHO DELIBERATELY SNUBBED EGYPT AND TRAVELLED WIDELY 
BEFORE VISITING EGYPT.)  WITH UNAPOLOGETIC DECLARATIONS 
OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOE, THE RCC SOLICITED ADVICE OF 
PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND AMBASSADOR SHERBINI.  THE 
BLANDISHMENTS AND THE POLITICAL TURNAROUND IN THE GOS 
POSTURE TOWARD EGYPT HAD THEIR DESIRED EFFECT, WITH THE 
GOE SENDING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND ENCOURAGING 
DONATIONS FROM ITS WEALTHIER MODERATE ARAB FRIENDS. 
MUBARAK AND THE EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 
(TRADITIONAL LEADING PLAYERS INVOLVING SUDAN) CLEARLY 
WANTED TO BELIEVE IN GENERAL OMAR.  MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF 
FUNDAMENTALIST LEANINGS, UNPOPULARITY, AND INCOMPETENCY 
WERE DISCOUNTED, EVENTUALLY LEADING IN LATE 1989 TO AN 
EGYPTIAN SPLIT IN PERCEPTIONS OF SUDAN BETWEEN SENIOR 
INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS AND A LESS SANGUINE FOREIGN 
MINISTRY.  THIS SPLIT QUICKLY BECAME A HOT TOPIC OF 
SUDANESE POLITICAL CONVERSATION.  WHILE BIFURCATED GOE 
VIEWS OF SUDAN APPARENTLY REMAIN, SUDANESE ARGUE THAT GOE 
DISCONTENT WITH EVENTS IN SUDAN HAVE WIDENED AND DEEPENED 
AS THE GOS HAS WARMED TO LIBYA AND FAILED TO MAKE PEACE 
WITH THE SPLA.  MOST BELIEVE THAT THE GOE HAS RETREATED 
SIGNIFICANTLY FROM ITS EARLY SUPPORT OF THE RCC AND THAT 
FROSTIER BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND EVEN COUP PLOTTING, 
REMINISCENT OF A YEAR AGO ARE IN THE OFFING. 
 
15.  ALTHOUGH SUDANESE SHOP FOR CONSUMER GOODS IN CAIRO 
AND MOST LOCAL MERCHANTS (INCLUDING MANY COPTS) MAINTAIN 
TIES TO EGYPTIAN COMPANIES, EGYPT IS NOT SUDAN'S TOP 
TRADING PARTNER.  OFFICIAL TRADE HAS BEEN GOVERNED BY 
SPECIAL TRADE PROTOCOLS THAT PROVIDES BARTER AND SPECIAL 
ACCOUNTING MECHANISMS TO DEAL WITH THE NONCONVERTIBLE 
CURRENCIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.  THESE PROTOCOLS, 
LARGELY ILLUSORY (TRADE GOES ON REGARDLESS) WITH FANCIFUL 
PROJECTED AMOUNTS--USDOLS 360 MILLION IN THE 1989 
PROTOCOL--AND AN OVERVALUED SUDANESE POUND IN RELATION TO 
THE EGYPTIAN POUND, HAVE BROKEN DOWN REGULARLY WITH 
MUTUAL CHARGES OF AN UNFAIR SURPLUS AND FAILURE TO LIVE 
UP TO THE ACCORD.  IN 1989, THE GOVERNMENT OF SADIQ 
AL-MAHDI ABROGATED THE PROTOCOL AND RESORTED BRIEFLY TO 
TIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE AND BORDER TRAFFIC (NUBIANS 
IN NORTHERN SUDAN TRADITIONALLY HAVE FLOATED BETWEEN 
BORDERS).  WITH FRIENDLIER BILATERAL TIES AFTER THE COUP, 
ANOTHER LUCRATIVE PROTOCOL WAS NEGOTIATED.  KEY PROBLEMS 
WITH THE PROTOCOLS HAVE BEEN SMUGGLING, ESPECIALLY OF 
SUDANESE CAMELS BYPASSING EGYPTIAN CUSTOMS OFFICIALS, AND 
A COMPLICATED MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME THAT DIFFERS 
ACCORDING TO VARIOUS COMMODITIES.  ACCORDING TO THE 
LATEST STATISTICS, SUDAN EXPORTED 26,607,000 SUDANESE 
POUNDS (USDOLS 2,216,000 BASED ON CURRENT COMMERCIAL 
EXCHANGE RATE) WORTH OF GOODS TO EGYPT IN THE FIRST HALF 
OF 1989--PRIMARILY SESAME, WATERMELON SEEDS AND CAMELS. 
CAMELS CONSTITUTE THE BULK OF EXPORTS.  (THE 1989 
PROTOCOL ASSIGNED A VALUE OF USDOLS 120 MILLION FOR CAMEL 
EXPORTS; LITTLE OF THE CAMEL TRADE FLOWS THROUGH OFFICIAL 
CHANNELS.)  DURING THE SAME PERIOD, IMPORTS FROM EGYPT 
TOTALED 113,081,000 SUDANESE POUNDS (USDOLS 9,423,000), 
CONCENTRATED IN TEXTILES AND OTHER MANUFACTURED GOODS. 
THE TEMPORARY RUPTURE IN THE PROTOCOL FAILED TO PUT A 
DENT INTO TRADE PATTERNS.  TOTAL OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN TRADE 
(IMPORTS AND EXPORTS) FOR ALL OF 1988 AMOUNTED TO 161 
MILLION POUNDS. 
 
16.  PLEADING POVERTY AND A NEED TO APPEAR EVENHANDED IN 
SUDAN'S CIVIL WAR, EGYPT HAS PROVIDED LITTLE MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE, MUCH TO THE SUDANESE ARMY'S CHAGRIN.  A 
MILITARY AGREEMENT EXISTS BETWEEN SUDAN AND EGYPT.  A 
DEFENSE TREATY SIGNED BY NIMEIRI WAS TRANSFORMED INTO A 
WEAK "BROTHERHOOD CHARTER" UNDER SADIQ AL-MAHDI.  EVEN 
THIS WAS REPEALED IN 1989 AT THE INSISTENCE OF THE SPLA. 
AFTER THE COUP HOWEVER, THE GOS ANNOUNCED THAT THE 
MILITARY DEFENSE TREATY HAD NEVER BEEN ABROGATED AND THUS 
REMAINED IN EFFECT.  THE GOE, INDIFFERENT TO WHETHER A 
TREATY EXISTS OR NOT, HAS SHOWN RELATIVELY LITTLE 
INTEREST IN THE WHOLE AFFAIR.  EGYPT'S BIGGEST INFLUENCE 
WITH THE SUDANESE MILITARY HAS BEEN THROUGH ITS TRAINING 
PROGRAMS, RANGING FROM BASIC LEVELS TO NASSER HIGHER WAR 
COLLEGE.  SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND 
COUNCIL (RCC) RECEIVED TRAINING IN EGYPT, WHICH REMAINS 
SUDAN'S CENTER OF FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING.  MOST 
SUDANESE OFFICERS ARE SYMPATHETIC TO EGYPTIANS, THOUGH 
THEY CHAFE AT THE LACK OF MATERIAL HELP.  SMALL AMOUNTS 
OF MILITARY AID RECENTLY PROVIDED HAVE BEEN NONLETHAL 
SUCH AS UNIFORMS AND PARACHUTES.  SUDANESE ARE QUICK TO 
REMIND THE EGYPTIANS THAT SUDANESE BRIGADES FOUGHT SIDE 
BY SIDE WITH THE EGYPTIANS DURING ALL THE ARAB-ISRAELI 
WARS. 
 
LIBYA 
 
17.  AN INTEGRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN SUDAN AND LIBYA 
ABRUPTLY ANNOUNCED IN EARLY MARCH 1990 PROPOSING TO 
COMBINE THE TWO COUNTRIES' POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, 
AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS WITHIN FOUR YEARS CULMINATED A STEADY 
WARMING TREND IN THE RCC'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TRIPOLI.  A 
RECURRING PHENOMENON TO LURE COLONEL QADHAFI'S FAVOR, THE 
UNITY PACKAGE LARGELY REGURGITATED OLD IDEAS INCORPORATED 
MOST RECENTLY IN AN ABORTED UNITY PLAN MOOTED IN 1988. 
DESPITE ORNATE RHETORIC, MULTIPLE OFFICIAL VISITS, AND A 
CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO PROMOTING UNITY, FEW SUDANESE 
SERIOUSLY BELIEVE IT WILL SUCCEED.  THUS, CONFIDENT THAT 
UNITY WILL UNGLUE BEFORE IT MATERIALIZES, PUBLIC 
OPPOSITION TO INTEGRATION IS LIMITED, THOUGH SENIOR ARMY 
OFFICERS REPORTEDLY HAVE VOICED DISSATISFACTION. 
RIDICULE IS THE MORE COMMON REACTION.  AWARE OF THE 
DERISION, THE GOS HAS TRIED TO PORTRAY THE ACCORD AS A 
STEP TOWARD PAN-ARAB UNITY, A MORE PALATABLE IF EQUALLY 
UNLIKELY NOTION.  THE UNITY SCHEME, SO LONG AS IT IS 
UNREALIZED ALSO HAS ITS SUPPORTERS.  MANY SUDANESE 
ACCEPT LIBYAN AID AS AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY AND WELL WORTH 
HOLLOW RHETORIC AND QUIXOTIC UNITY SCHEMES.  SUDANESE 
MOSTLY LOOK UPON LIBYANS AS DUNDERHEADS AND QADHAFI AS 
ECCENTRIC BUT NOT A REAL THREAT TO SUDAN.  "MILK THEM 
WHILE YOU CAN" IS A POPULAR SENTIMENT. 
 
18.  TO BE SURE, SUDANESE SECURITY AUTHORITIES, MINDFUL 
OF LIBYAN MISCHIEF, HAVE GENERALLY TRIED TO KEEP CLOSE 
TABS ON LIBYAN ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS IN AND NEAR 
KHARTOUM.  THE RECENT ABOLITION OF VISAS FOR LIBYANS (AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY ALL ARABS) COMPLICATES THEIR JOB, THOUGH 
SECURITY OFFICERS AT THE AIRPORT REPORTEDLY ARE PAYING 
SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LIBYAN VISITORS WHEN THEY PASS 
THROUGH NORMAL IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS PROCEDURES. 
CYNICS RECKON THERE IS LITTLE LEFT TO SABOTAGE IN SUDAN. 
LACKLUSTER LIBYAN-BACKED REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES IN 
SUDAN, RECOGNIZED AS A "POLITICAL PARTY" BEFORE THE COUP, 
DISBANDED WITH THE ABOLITION OF PARTIES, AND, ACCORDING 
TO SEVERAL SUDANESE, HAVE REMAINED INACTIVE.  LIBYANS 
APPEAR TO BE FOCUSING INSTEAD ON LINKING THEIR POPULAR 
ORGANIZATIONS WITH SUDAN'S LOCALLY-BASED, AND 
INCREASINGLY ACTIVE PEOPLES' COMMITTEES AND POPULAR 
DEFENSE FORCES.  AS FOR LIBYAN TRANSGRESSIONS IN DARFUR, 
WHILE SOME SUDANESE PROFESS TO BE TROUBLED BY THE AFFRONT 
TO SUDAN'S SOVEREIGNTY, THE MAJORITY SEEM CONTENT TO TURN 
A BLIND EYE TO EVENTS IN A REMOTE AREA. 
 
19.  LIBYA'S MAIN ECONOMIC ATTRACTION IS CHEAP OIL BUT 
SUDAN HAS LITTLE OF VALUE TO OFFER IN RETURN.  DEPRIVED 
OF REGULAR SUPPLIES FROM KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA, DUE TO 
NONPAYMENT AND RCC POLITICS, SUDAN RECENTLY HAS HAD TO 
RELY ALMOST COMPLETELY ON LIBYAN OIL.  THE CURRENT DEAL 
FOR LIBYAN OIL REQUIRES SUDAN TO PAY ONLY FOR INTEREST ON 
THE PURCHASE WITH THE PRINCIPAL TO BE PAID IN KIND WITH 
FUTURE SUDANESE OIL PRODUCTION.  DESPITE WELL-PUBLICIZED 
AGREEMENTS WITH LIBYA, SHIPMENTS OF LIBYAN OIL HAVE BEEN 
ERRATIC.  LIBYA'S PROMISED 50,000 METRIC TONS OF OIL PER 
MONTH TO SADIQ'S GOVERNMENT AND THE RCC HAS NOT ALWAYS 
ARRIVED.  FOLLOWING THE MARCH 1990 INTEGRATION ACCORD, 
LIBYA PLEDGED TO DOUBLE ITS SUDANESE OIL SHIPMENTS TO 
100,000 METRIC TONS FOR BOTH APRIL AND MAY. 
 
20.  SUDAN'S BALANCE OF TRADE WITH LIBYA HAS BEEN 
ENTIRELY NEGATIVE ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES.  FOR 
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1989, LIBYA RECEIVED NO SUDANESE 
EXPORTS WHILE SUDAN IMPORTED 269,712,000 POUNDS (USDOLS 
22,500,000) OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FROM LIBYA.  LIBYA HAS 
FOCUSED INSTEAD ON OBTAINING POLITICAL DIVIDENDS FROM 
TRADE.  THIS WAS DRAMATICALLY REFLECTED IN THE 1989 
KHARTOUM TRADE FAIR WHEN LIBYA'S BOOTH WAS CONFINED TO 
ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF ALLEGED 
CASUALTIES FROM U.S. BOMBING OF TRIPOLI.  (THE U.S. 
PULLED OUT WHEN THE GOS FAILED TO ACT ON AMERICAN 
PROTESTS.)  IN DECEMBER 1989, SUDAN AND LIBYA APPROVED A 
USDOLS 50 MILLION COMMERCIAL PROTOCOL PLEDGING THE EXPORT 
OF SUDANESE GOATS, OIL SEEDS, PERFUME AND TEXTILES IN 
RETURN FOR OIL, FERTILIZERS AND CEMENT.  AS WITH THE 
EGYPTIAN PROTOCOL, THE ACCORD IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR ITS 
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS RATHER THAN AS A GUIDE TO ACTUAL 
TRADE.  A BILATERAL PROTOCOL IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 
WAS SIGNED IN FEBRUARY 1990 AIMED AT LIBYAN BANKROLLING 
CEREAL AND MEAT PRODUCTION FACILITIES.  LIBYAN 
AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE ALSO HAS MORE POLITICAL THAN 
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE; A LIBYAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
SCHEME IN DARFUR IS WIDELY VIEWED AS A FRONT FOR ARMS 
SMUGGLING AND OTHER NONAGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES. 
 
21.  SUDAN AND LIBYA RECENTLY RESURRECTED THE IDEA OF A 
JOINT INVESTMENT BANK CAPITALIZED AT USDOLS 50 MILLION 
AND HAVE DISCUSSED IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATION AND 
TRANSPORT SERVICES BETWEEN THEIR COUNTRIES.  AS IN THE 
CASE OF OIL SHIPMENTS HOWEVER, LIBYAN PROMISES OF 
ECONOMIC HELP FOR ECONOMIC PROJECTS HAVE HAD A HABIT OF 
NOT MATERIALIZING.  LIBYA PROVIDES A MODEST NUMBER OF 
JOBS FOR SUDANESE--ABOUT 2000 SUDANESE RESIDE IN LIBYA 
BESIDES SEASONAL MIGRATION OF SUDANESE TRIBES FROM DARFUR 
INTO KUFRA.  A SUDANESE ESTIMATED THAT 2000-3000 DARFUR 
TRIBESMEN WORK WITHOUT PERMITS IN KUFRA. 
 
22.  LIBYA, ONCE A BACKER OF THE SPLA, IS NOW SUDAN'S 
MOST DEPENDABLE MILITARY SUPPLIER.  THE SUBSTANTIAL 
SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP EXISTS EITHER BASED ON SECRET PACTS 
AS ALLEGED BY THE SPLA OR, MORE LIKELY, BASED ON INFORMAL 
ARRANGEMENTS CONCLUDED BY SADIQ AL-MAHDI'S MINIONS AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY RENEWED BY THE RCC.  A FORMAL MILITARY 
PROTOCOL SIGNED BY THE GOS SHORTLY AFTER PRESIDENT 
NIMEIRI'S OUSTER WAS NOT OPEN-ENDED AND REFERRED ONLY TO 
A SPECIFIC LIST OF ITEMS.  BY WHATEVER RATIONALE, THE 
LIBYANS HAVE LOANED OR DONATED IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS 
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF MILITARY PROVISIONS RANGING FROM 
AMMUNITION TO MIG-23 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.  DOLLAR FIGURES 
ARE DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE, BUT THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THIS 
AID HAS BEEN A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN PROPPING UP THE SUDANESE 
ARMY IN ITS CONFLICT WITH THE SPLA.  SINCE THE COUP, 
LIBYA HAS DISPATCHED TWICE WEEKLY TO SUDAN AN IL-76 
TRANSPORT PLANE LADEN WITH SUPPLIES, BELIEVED EXCLUSIVELY 
FOR MILITARY USE.  IN ADDITION, LIBYA HAS PROVIDED 
TRAINING, ADVISORS AND PILOTS, THOUGH LIBYA'S DIRECT 
INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MILITARY IN SUDAN HAS BEEN DENIED BY 
THE GOS.  LIBYAN MILITARY, HOWEVER, ARE PERIODICALLY SEEN 
AT KHARTOUM HOTELS AND MILITARY FACILITIES.  LIBYA'S 
INVOLVEMENT IN BOMBING RAIDS WAS PROVEN WHEN THE SPLA 
PRODUCED A LIBYAN PILOT AFTER DOWNING A MIG AIRCRAFT IN 
1989.  THE GOS STILL DENIED IT.  LIBYAN PILOTS SEEM TO 
OPERATE AUTONOMOUSLY, WITH THE TACIT BACKING OF THE 
SUDANESE MILITARY BRASS. 
 
SAUDI ARABIA 
 
23.  WHILE SHUNNING THE SPOTLIGHT, SAUDI ARABIA, MORE 
THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, PLAYS A CRITICAL ECONOMIC ROLE IN 
BOLSTERING SUDAN THROUGH LARGE-SCALE REMITTANCE-PRODUCING 
EMPLOYMENT, DIRECT GOVERNMENT AID, TRADE AND PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT.  WITH AN ESTIMATED 350,000 SUDANESE 
DOCUMENTED EXPATRIATE WORKERS (PLUS ANOTHER 150,000 OR SO 
WHO NEVER RETURNED FROM HAJ), SAUDI ARABIA PROVIDES THE 
LARGEST SHARE OF REMITTANCES.  BECAUSE THE BULK OF 
REMITTANCES HAVE COME TO SUDAN THROUGH UNOFFICIAL 
CHANNELS, THEY HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO CALCULATE. 
ACCORDING TO ONE STUDY IN 1985, TOTAL REMITTANCES 
AMOUNTED TO USDOLS 2.9 BILLION, ONE-THIRD OF SUDAN'S 
GNP.  OFFICIAL EXPATRIATE REMITTANCES IN 1988 TOTALED 
USDOLS 445 MILLION WHICH CONSTITUTED 78 PERCENT OF 
SUDAN'S HARD CURRENCY BUDGET.  SINCE THE COUP HOWEVER, 
NOT ONLY HAS OFFICIAL REMITTANCES DECLINED TO AN ANNUAL 
0ARGET OF USDOLS 300 MILLION (AND PROBABLY MUCH LESS), 
BUT UNOFFICIAL REMITTANCES, PROVIDING MUCH NEEDED PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT, ALSO HAVE DRIED UP IN THE FACE OF THE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION ZEAL OF THE RCC.  EXPATRIATES HAVE 
PREFERRED TO KEEP THEIR SAVINGS IN FOREIGN ACCOUNTS WHICH 
THEIR FAMILIES USE WHEN THEY ARE ABLE TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE 
OF SUDAN. 
 
24.  WITH ITS RELATIVELY HIGH SALARIES, SAUDI ARABIA IS 
THE FAVORED DESTINATION FOR AMBITIOUS AND ENTERPRISING 
SUDANESE.  THRONGS OF VISA APPLICANTS CAN ALWAYS BE SEEN 
OUTSIDE THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM DURING WORKING 
HOURS.  SUDANESE WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA RANGE FROM 
PROFESSIONALS (TWO-THIRDS OF SUDANESE DOCTORS ARE 
OVERSEAS) TO MANUAL LABORERS.  THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAS 
PROVIDED IRREGULAR DOSES OF AID, MOST RECENTLY RELEASING 
207 MILLION RIYALS (USDOLS 55.2 MILLION) TO REBUILD THE 
ROAD FROM KHARTOUM TO PORT SUDAN.  THE SAUDIS HAVE 
GENERALLY AVOIDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE.  THEY RECENTLY 
TURNED DOWN, FOR EXAMPLE, GOS REQUESTS FOR SMALL NAVAL 
CRAFT FOR ANTISMUGGLING PATROLS ON THE RED SEA.  THEY 
REPORTEDLY FINANCED, HOWEVER, THE SUDANESE PURCHASE FROM 
CHINA IN 1989 OF 40 TANKS AND 40 ARMORED PERSONNEL 
CARRIERS (APC'S), ALONG WITH FIELD AND ANTIAIRCRAFT 
ARTILLERY AND SMALL ARMS.  THE SAUDI MONETARY FUND AND 
SAUDI FUND FOR DEVELOPMENT HAVE FUNDED NUMEROUS ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS INCLUDING ABOUT FIFTY THAT ARE 
ONGOING.  REHABILITATION OF THE GEZIRA AGRICULTURAL 
SCHEME AND A NEW AIRPORT IN PORT SUDAN ARE EXAMPLES OF 
MAJOR PROJECTS UNDERWAY.  ACCORDING TO 1988 FIGURES, 
SAUDI AGENCIES HAD OVER USDOLS 1.2 BILLION IN OUTSTANDING 
LOANS TO SUDAN, BY FAR THE LARGEST LOAN COMMITMENT OF ANY 
NATION.  REPORTEDLY, SAUDI WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE AID HAS 
LANGUISHED RECENTLY BECAUSE OF SAUDI DISMAY WITH RCC 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT. 
 
25.  OFFICIAL TRADE FIGURES CONFIRM THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS 
SUDAN'S LARGEST TRADE PARTNER.  FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS 
OF 1989, SUDANESE EXPORTS--LARGELY LIVESTOCK (CAMELS AND 
GOATS), SESAME SEEDS AND SORGHUM--TOTALED 276,624,000 
POUNDS (USDOLS 22,674,000) AND IMPORTS--PETROLEUM 
PRODUCTS AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT--CAME TO 
316,627,000 POUNDS (USDOLS 25,953,000).  SAUDIS HAVE ALSO 
BEEN IMPORTANT PRIVATE INVESTORS IN SUDAN, INCLUDING 
PRINCE MOHAMMAD AL FAISAL (FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK), SHEIKH 
MAHFOUZ SALEM BIN MAHFOUZ (SAUDI-SUDANESE BANK), SHEIKH 
ABDEL LATIF GHORAB (DALLAH AL-BARAKA GROUP), SHEIKH OMER 
BIN LADEN (BIN LADEN COMPANIES) AND IBRAHIM AL-AFFANDI. 
ALTHOUGH SAUDI INVESTORS HAVE BEEN ASSIDUOUSLY COURTED BY 
THE RCC PRIVATELY AND AT THE RECENT INVESTMENT 
CONFERENCE, BUSINESSMEN REPORT THAT SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB 
INVESTORS HAVE EXHIBITED A MARKED RELUCTANCE TO RISK 
THEIR FUNDS IN SUDAN.  SAUDI PRIVATE INVESTMENT SEEMS TO 
BE SHRINKING RATHER THAN EXPANDING. 
 
26.  SUDAN'S LINKS TO SAUDI ARABIA ARE BOTH STRENGTHENED 
AND WEAKENED BY ISLAMIC CONNECTIONS.  ALL BUT THE MOST 
SECULAR OF SUDANESE MUSLIMS PARTICIPATE AT LEAST ONCE IN 
THE HAJ, THE PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA.  SAUDI ARABIA ALSO 
CONTRIBUTES SUBSTANTIALLY TO ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN 
SUDAN INCLUDING AN ISLAMIC INSTITUTE IN KHARTOUM. 
PARADOXICALLY, SUDAN'S RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES ARE AMONG THE 
ELEMENTS THAT MOST DISCONCERT THE SAUDIS.  RELIGIOUS 
LEADERS OF THE PURIST WAHABI SECT IN SAUDI ARABIA FROWN 
ON MYSTICAL MUSLIM PRACTICES COMMON IN SUDAN INCLUDING 
VENERATION OF SAINTLY FOREFATHERS, CONSULTATIONS WITH 
LIVING FAKIS (HOLY MEN) AND MAGICAL (FORTUNE TELLING, 
HEALING) FORMS OF FOLK RELIGION.  POLITICALLY, THE SAUDIS 
DISDAIN ISLAMIC COMPETITION ARISING FROM SUFI SECTS AND 
THE INDIGENOUS NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT.  BECAUSE ISLAMIC 
FUNDAMENTALISM HAS OFTEN INCLUDED AN ANTI-SAUDI STRAIN, 
THEY REPORTEDLY ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH MILITANT 
PROCLIVITIES, INCLUDING IRANIAN SYMPATHIES, APPARENT IN 
SOME SUDANESE OFFICIALS.  THIS ALSO REFLECTS LACK OF 
SAUDI ENTHUSIASM FOR SUPPORTING ANY ARAB COUNTRY WHICH 
ATTEMPTS TO FOLLOW A STRICTER FORM OF ISLAM THAN THAT OF 
THE KEEPER OF THE HOLY CITIES.  SAUDIS ARE ALSO SAID TO 
BE DISTRESSED AT THE FUROR IN SUDAN OVER THE HUDUD, WHICH 
DRAWS UNWANTED ATTENTION TO SAUDI APPLICATION OF SHARIA 
LAW.  SAUDIS, DISTINGUISHING THEIR HOMOGENOUS MUSLIM 
NATION FROM A MIXED RELIGIOUS SOCIETY LIKE SUDAN, WOULD 
PREFER THAT SUDAN COMPROMISE ON SHARIA TO PRODUCE PEACE, 
RELIGIOUS HARMONY AND STABILITY.  SUDAN'S ASSOCIATIONS 
WITH RADICAL LIBYA ONLY AGGRAVATE SAUDI DISCOMFORT WITH 
SUDAN, A DISCOMFORT THAT HAS ALREADY DIMINISHED SAUDI 
ASSISTANCE FOR SUDAN. 
 
IRAQ 
 
27.  THE EARLY LOVEFEST BETWEEN THE RCC AND SADDAM 
HUSSEIN, MUCH OF IT COUCHED IN SECRECY, SEEMS SOMETHING 
OF AN ANAMOLY, WHICH MAY EXPLAIN WHY IT HAS NOW COOLED 
SOMEWHAT.  SADDAM, AFTER ALL, RULES A SECULAR STATE WARY 
OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS (AN IRAQI DISSIDENT BELONGING 
TO AL-DAWA WAS MURDERED IN 1988 BY THE IRAQIS IN THE 
LOBBY OF KHARTOUM'S HILTON HOTEL), WHILE THE RCC, BACKED 
BY THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT, HAS PURGED AND ARRESTED 
HUNDREDS OF SUDANESE SECULARISTS.  VISITS BY RCC MEMBERS 
OMAR AL-BASHIR AND MOHAMMAD AL-KHALIFA, HOWEVER, WERE 
WARMLY RECEIVED BY SADDAM AND GOS APPEALS FOR MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE SPLA TOOK KURMUK, WERE 
GENEROUSLY REWARDED WITH TWO SOVIET AN-12 AIRCRAFT, AND 
SHIPMENTS OF AMMUNITION AND SMALL ARMS.  A NUMBER OF 
THEORIES HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD BY SUDANESE TO EXPLAIN 
SADDAM'S FRIENDLINESS.  CERTAINLY SADDAM, LIKE MUBARAK, 
DESPISED SADIQ AL-MAHDI, WHO FLIRTED WITH THE IRANIANS, 
AND THUS HAD REASON TO WELCOME HIS REPLACEMENT.  SADDAM 
ALSO MAY HAVE FELT AN AFFINITY TO A GOVERNMENT OF 
SOLDIERS, CERTAINLY MORE SO THAN TO THE FREEWHEELING 
DEMOCRACY THAT PRECEDED IT.  FURTHERMORE, SADDAM, WITH 
VISIONS OF GRANDEUR AS A PAN-ARAB LEADER AND REELING FROM 
CRITICISM FOR HIS POLICIES IN LEBANON, MAY HAVE BEEN 
SUSCEPTIBLE TO GOS BLANDISHMENTS.  FINALLY, SADDAM, 
PERHAPS GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP OF SUDANESE "VOLUNTEERS" 
(TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MANUAL LABORERS IN IRAQ ENLISTED OR 
WERE COERCED IN THE WAR EFFORT) IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND, 
BECAUSE OF HIS OWN EXPERIENCE, SYMPATHISED WITH A 
SUDANESE WAR LARGELY AGAINST NONARABS.  ALL OF THE ABOVE 
WERE PROBABLY FACTORS. 
 
28.  SADDAM'S AMICABLE RELATIONS WITH THE RCC PUT IRAQ'S 
KEY INSTITUTION IN SUDAN, THE IRAQI BAATHIST PARTY, IN A 
PREDICAMENT.  COMPOSED LARGELY OF SUDANESE STUDENTS WHO 
ONCE STUDIED IN BAGHDAD, THE BAATHIST PARTY, WHICH IS 
SMALL BUT INFLUENTIAL AMONG SUDANESE PROFESSIONALS, 
STAUNCHLY SUPPORTS SECULARIST RULE AND OPPOSES THE NIF. 
BAATHISTS ENJOYED SOMEWHAT OF A GRACE PERIOD FROM 
SECURITY OFFICIALS AFTER THE COUP WITH ARRESTS OF ONLY A 
FEW PARTY LEADERS.  INCLINED TO JOIN THE COMMUNISTS AND 
OTHER SECULARISTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE RCC, PARTY MEMBERS 
WERE TORN BETWEEN LOYALTY TO IRAQ AND SECULARIST 
IDEOLOGY.  IT THUS VACILLATED BEFORE JOINING OTHER 
PARTIES AND UNIONS AND SIGNING AN OPPOSITION CHARTER 
AGAINST THE RCC.  THE UNCERTAINTY WAS EVIDENT AGAIN AT 
THE TIME OF THE DOCTORS STRIKE IN DECEMBER 1989, AS MANY 
BAATHISTS, ESPECIALLY IN LEGAL CIRCLES, WERE SAID TO BE 
RELUCTANT TO GET INVOLVED.  BAATHISTS, ALONG WITH OTHER 
LEFTISTS, WERE ARRESTED IN LARGE NUMBERS AFTER THE 
STRIKE.  AROUND THE SAME TIME, IRAQ SEEMS TO HAVE JOINED 
OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES IN THEIR DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE 
GOS, AND STOPPED SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE.  BAATHIST 
CHAIRMAN TAISEER MUTASSIR RECENTLY TOLD A FELLOW ATTORNEY 
THAT IRAQ PLANNED TO CUT ALL ITS AID TO SUDAN. 
 
THE PENINSULAR STATES 
 
29.  FOLLOWING EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, THE LARGEST NUMBER 
OF EXPATRIATE SUDANESE WORK AND RESIDE IN THE UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES.  ACCORDING TO ONE SUDANESE ESTIMATE, THERE ARE 
BETWEEN 50,000 AND 100,000 SUDANESE IN THE UAE.  MOST ARE 
MIDDLE CLASS BUSINESSMEN, CIVIL SERVANTS, TEACHERS AND 
PROFESSIONALS.  TWO CURRENT CABINET MINISTERS WERE 
WORKING IN ABU DHABI WHEN THEY WERE PICKED FOR THE 
CABINET.  KAMAL HAMZA, EX-MAYOR OF DUBAI AND NOW 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RULER'S DIWAN, HEADS A DISTINGUISHED 
SUDANESE COMMUNITY IN DUBAI.  THIS EXPATRIATE PRESENCE 
HAS FOCUSED SOME UAE ATTENTION ON SUDAN.  THE ABU DHABI 
FUND HAD COMMITTED USDOLS 239,580,000 TO SUDANESE 
PROJECTS THROUGH 1988.  SHEIKH ZAYID CONTRIBUTED USDOLS 
35 MILLION TO SUDAN AFTER GENERAL OMAR PAID A VISIT, AND 
THE UAE NAVY REPORTEDLY TRAINS SUDANESE OFFICERS.  THERE 
ARE ALSO SAID TO BE A NUMBER OF SUDANESE IN THE POLICE 
FORCES OF THE VARIOUS EMIRATES.  A RECENT VISITOR TO THE 
UAE, WHO MET A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, REPORTED 
COINSIDERABLE DISMAY OVER SUDAN.  SHEIKH SULTAN OF 
SHARJAH (WHO HAS DONATED CONSIDERABLE MONEY TO THE 
UNIVERSITY OF KHARTOUM INCLUDING SHARJAH HALL) BLUNTLY 
TOLD THE VISITOR THAT HE AND OTHER OFFICIALS INTENDED TO 
AVOID ASSISTANCE TO THE GOS UNTIL IT "SHAPED UP." 
 
30.  KUWAIT ALSO HAS ATTRACTED SUDANESE PROFESSIONALS, 
THOUGH IN LESS NUMBERS THAN THE UAE--ABOUT 20,000 TO 
30,000.  KUWAIT'S MAJOR INPUT IN SUDAN HAS BEEN THROUGH 
THE KUWAIT FUND WHICH HAS PROVIDED LARGE AMOUNTS OF AID 
FOR DEVELOPMENT, MOSTLY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL (E.G. KENANA 
SUGAR FACTORY, A MAJOR POULTRY FARM), PROJECTS.  USDOLS 
809,353,000 WAS COMMITTED THROUGH 1988, SECOND ONLY TO 
THE SAUDIS.  KUWAIT HAS UNTIL RECENTLY SUPPLIED OIL. 
SUDANESE OFFICIALS REPORT THAT KUWAITI INTEREST IN SUDAN 
IS ALSO DECLINING.  ECHOING THEIR ARAB COLLEAGUES, 
KUWAITIS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE GOS IS ISOLATING 
ITSELF INTERNATIONALLY AND MAKING LITTLE PROGRESS IN 
ECONOMIC REFORM. 
 
31.  ABOUT FOUR TO SIX THOUSAND SUDANESE, MOSTLY 
TEACHERS, WORK IN OMAN AND NORTH YEMEN.  THESE COUNTRIES 
HAVE PROVIDED LITTLE DIRECT ASSISTANCE, THOUGH OMAN MADE 
A SMALL CONTRIBUTION AFTER A VISIT BY OMAR AL-BASHIR. 
THE SUDANESE HAVE HAD A LENGTHY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
YEMENIS--MANY ATTENDED SCHOOL IN KHARTOUM, OTHERS WORKED 
AS PEDDLERS.  INTERESTINGLY, SUDANESE TEND TO PICK 
YEMENIS, WHO ARE PERCEIVED AS HONEST AND UNPRETENTIOUS, 
AS ARABS WITH WHOM THEY ARE MOST COMFORTABLE.  QATAR, 
ANOTHER DISPLEASED ARAB STATE, REFUSED GENERAL OMAR'S 
PLEA FOR AID AND REPORTEDLY WANTS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF 
SUDANESE EMPLOYED IN QATAR.  ROUNDING OUT THE PENINSULAR 
STATES, SUDAN HAS LITTLE COMMERCIAL AND NO DIPLOMATIC 
PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN OR ADEN. 
 
PERIPHERY STATES 
 
32.  SUDAN'S MODEST RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE REMAINING ARAB 
STATES, PERCEIVED AS DISTANT AND UNLIKELY DONORS, RARELY 
CONCERN THE GOS.  EXCEPT FOR A COTERIE OF AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT ALUMINI NOW IN THEIR 40'S, FEW 
SUDANESE HAVE VENTURED TO THE LEVANT.  LEBANON IS CITED 
IN CONVERSATION ONLY AS A WARNING OF WHAT DECENTRALIZED 
LOYALTIES AND INTOLERANCE MIGHT PRODUCE IN SUDAN.  THE 
ARAB BAR ASSOCIATION'S ANNUAL MEETING IN 1989 IN DAMASCUS 
WAS THE FIRST VISIT TO SYRIA BY MEMBERS OF THE SUDANESE 
DELEGATION.  SYRIA GIVES NO AID TO SUDAN, THOUGH RELIEF 
ASSISTANCE GIVEN IN 1988 IS DRAWING ATTENTION AS IT IS 
THE BASIS FOR A MISAPPROPIATION AND CORRUPTION CASE 
AGAINST FORMER STATE COUNCIL MEMBER IDRIS AL-BANNA. 
JORDAN HAS DONATED SOME MEDICINE AND SENDS A ROTATING 
MEDICAL TEAM TO WORK IN DARFUR.  THE "PALESTINE 
AMBASSADOR" ACTIVELY BUT NOT TOO SUCCESSFULLY SEEKS TO 
SPARK SUDANESE INTEREST IN THE INTIFADA.  HE HAS BEEN 
GIVEN PERMISSION TO CONSTRUCT A PALESTINE UNIVERSITY IN 
KHARTOUM.  YASSIR ARAFAT'S OCCASIONAL VISITS ATTRACT 
LITTLE ATTENTION. 
 
33.  SUDAN ALSO HAS FEW TRADE OR OTHER LINKS WITH THE 
MAHGREB STATES.  MOROCCAN LINKS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE 
CONFINED TO 60 STUDENTS STUDYING IN MOROCCO AND A PRIVATE 
BANK'S FINANCING OF AN AGRICULTURE PROJECT.  NONE OF THE 
DIPLOMATS FROM THE MAGHREB SEEM TO PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO 
LOCAL AFFAIRS.  THE SOMALI EMBASSYS ONLY APPARENT 
FUNCTION IN SUDAN IS TO ISSUE REFUGEE DOCUMENTS TO 
ETHIOPIAN REBELS.  MANY SUDANESE ARE NOT EVEN AWARE OF 
DJIBOUTI OR MAURITANIA, NEITHER OF WHICH HAVE AN EMBASSY 
IN KHARTOUM. 
 
34.  COMMENT.  SUDAN DELIGHTS IN TRUMPETING ITS ROLE AS A 
BRIDGE BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES.  THIS 
COMMENDABLE THOUGH UNATTAINED IDEAL OVERLOOKS A 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM--SUDAN'S BRIDGES TO BOTH ARABS AND 
AFRICANS ARE IN DISREPAIR.  IRONICALLY WHILE ARAB 
RELATIONS WITH THE RCC HAVE GRADUALLY WORSENED UNTIL THEY 
HAVE RETURNED TO, OR EVEN BECOME WORSE THAN, THEIR 
PRE-COUP STATUS, GENERAL OMAR HAS MANAGED, DESPITE 
CONTINUING CONFLICT WITH THE SPLA AND ALLEGATIONS OF NIF 
INFLUENCE, TO REPAIR RELATIONS WITH SOME OF HIS AFRICAN 
NEIGHBORS INCLUDING KENYA, ZAIRE, AND THE C.A.R., DAMAGED 
BY SADIQ. 
 
35.  COMMENT CONTINUED.  WHILE THE SPECTER OF PAN-ARABISM 
WHICH LOOMS IN ANY DISCUSSION OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS IS 
REVILED BY SOUTHERN SUDANESE, BROAD ARAB COLLABORATION 
TODAY, INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, IS NOT INIMICAL TO SOUTHERN 
INTERESTS OR TO THOSE OF THE U.S.  WITH THE REGRETTABLE 
EXCEPTION OF LIBYA, ARAB NATIONS WITH CONNECTIONS TO 
SUDAN WANT PEACE, STABILITY AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN 
SUDAN.  THEY RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY OF, AND THEIR 
LEADERS HAVE ENCOURAGED, COMPROMISE ON SHARIA, ADJUSTMENT 
OF POLICIES TO BROADEN GOS POLITICAL APPEAL, AND 
COOPERATION WITH THE IMF FOR REAL ECONOMIC REFORM. 
MENDING ITS ARAB BRIDGES MAY WELL PROVE A KEY TO 
IMPROVING SUDAN'S FORTUNES. 
 
ONEILL 

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