|Wikileaks:||View 05BAGHDAD2437 at Wikileaks.org|
|Tags:||MOPS PREL PGOV PINS IZ Parliament|
|Redacted:||This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.|
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002437 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PGOV, PINS, IZ, Parliament SUBJECT: CHARGE SATTERFIELD MEETING WITH IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Charge Satterfield joined the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Interior in a May 30 dinner with the Minister of Interior Baqr Jabr where they discussed: Middle East and Iraqi political developments, the current security operations in Baghdad, as well as police training programs and human rights reform. The meeting proved a useful interface to broadly review current Ministry of Interior initiatives and learn how the Minister intends to advance security in Baghdad and throughout country. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) Charge joined Mr. Casteel and the Minister of Interior Baqr Jaber for a May 30 dinner at the Adnon Palace. The Charge and Minister discussed the political reforms throughout the Middle East, agreed the January Iraqi election was the spark of change, and expressed the importance of ensuring the next round of Iraqi elections are supported and carried out in December 2005. The Charge and Minister also agreed the Syrian government is a major obstacle to the advancement of democracy in the region. At present, the Syrians are only changing their words, but not their actions. The Charge emphasized that while the highest officials of the Syrian Government sorely crave international attention, the international community must focus its attention at the lower levels and only shift that attention once we begin to see positive action. 3. (C) Jabr described his recent meeting with Masood Barzani, President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Irbil on May 20 as productive. Jabr conveyed he will continue to assist the Kurdish forces where he can with equipment and political support and stressed the central government must show its support to the Kurdish region. He then added he is a strong supporter of the Iraqi Transitional Government's (ITG) President Jalal Talibani from the Patriotic Union of Kurds (PUK) as they have worked together for the past twenty years. However, he is not such an advocate of Mr. Barzani who disappointed him in 1996 when he allied with Saddam Hussien. This disappointment led Jabr to speak out publicly against Barzani to the displeasure of SCIRI officials. 4. (C) Both Charge and Jabr agreed the operations currently underway in Baghdad are proving successful. The results are a product of better than expected coordination between MoI, Ministry of Defense and Coalition forces. While admitting there still remains a lot of work ahead, Jabr is pleased with the progress and the ground swell of support from the Baghdad citizenry. Jabr ended by mentioning that the number of IEDs and VBIEDs are down over the past week and there have been zero VBIED's over the past two days. 5. (C) Charge expressed the importance of building on this coordination with the MoD at the upcoming European Union conference in Brussels. It will be an ideal opportunity to voice a unified Ministry of Interior MoI and MoD vision for Iraq. Jabr agreed and stated he is attending the conference because of its importance to the future Iraq both from a security and diplomatic perspective. 6. (C) Jabr stated his priorities for the MoI are building the intelligence structure, improving police training, increasing the efficiency of the Ministry as an institution, and bringing about fundamental human rights reform. (NOTE: The Minister's passion for human rights reform is more pronounced than any other of the four Minister's IRMO-MOI advisers have worked with. This may rest with the fact that Jabr and his immediate family emigrated from Iraq in 1982 after the regime of Saddam Hussein executed 12 family members. The regime then executed his brother in 1996 to further pressure Jabr to stop his political and media activities. END NOTE) 7. (U) Minimize considered for REOs Basrah, Hillah, Kirkuk, and Mosul. Jeffrey
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